per se rule in Iowa

2021In State v. Straw, we refused to adopt a per se rule or a structural error standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims premised on the district court failing to tell the defendant the maximum sentence he or she was facing by pleading guilty. 709 N.W.2d at 137 .

2021We did so because “if we adopted a per se rule, some defendants would grin like a Cheshire cat as we gave them a second bite at the apple—even though they committed the crime and actually knew the maximum length of punishment for the crime.” Id.

2018We conclude PCR counsel did not neglect to perform an essential duty in not pursuing common law retroactivity and Stevens did not suffer prejudice. 5 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 , 114–17 (Iowa 2013) (considering retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)); Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354 , 358–59 (Iowa 2012) (considering retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)); Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 544–45 (indicating the per se framework applies only to federal court decisions); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697 , 700–01 (2010) (considering retroactivity of Graha

2016See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa 2013); Perez, 816 N.W.2d at 358–59; Goosman, 3As discussed in detail below, the United States Supreme Court has summarized its per se approach since its decision in Schriro: [A]n old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.

2016The Iowa Supreme Court has considered the prejudice prong in cases where a defendant has entered a guilty plea and determined, “Our standard for the prejudice element in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims remains consistent—in order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 138 ; see also State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (“In State v. Straw, . . . this court refused to accept

2016Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 138 ; see also State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (“In State v. Straw, . . . this court refused to accept a per se rule of prejudice where there is a deficiency in the court colloquy and acceptance of a guilty plea.”).

2016“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).

2016“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).

2015See id. at 43–44; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682 , 703–04 (Iowa 2006).

2015See id. at 43-44 ; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 703-04 (Iowa 2006).

2015See id. at 43–44; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682 , 703–04 (Iowa 2006).

2015See id. at 43-44 ; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713 N.W.2d 682, 703-04 (Iowa 2006).

2017Under a per se violation, an agreement is “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish ... illegality.” Id. at 568 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 , 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 , 164 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (2006)).

2017Under a per se violation, an agreement is “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish ... illegality.” Id. at 568 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 , 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 , 164 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (2006)).

2017Under a per se violation, an agreement is “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish ... illegality.” Id. at 568 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 , 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 , 164 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (2006)).

2017Under a per se violation, an agreement is “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish . . . illegality.” Id. at 568 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 , 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 , 164 L.

1999Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 -97 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. at 1719 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 347-48 ).

1999Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 -97 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. at 1719 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 347-48 ).

2022Critics of Schneckloth focus primarily on the lack of clarity and predictability in the Schneckloth test and question whether a per se requirement that officers must warn individuals of their right to refuse would actually “be an unreasonable burden on law enforcement.” Id. at 781–82 (majority opinion).

2022Yet, we declared, “An evaluation of such a per se requirement that police advise an individual of his or her right to decline to consent to a search . . . is reserved for another day.” Id. at 782 .

2018We conclude PCR counsel did not neglect to perform an essential duty in not pursuing common law retroactivity and Stevens did not suffer prejudice. 5 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 , 114–17 (Iowa 2013) (considering retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)); Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354 , 358–59 (Iowa 2012) (considering retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)); Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 544–45 (indicating the per se framework applies only to federal court decisions); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697 , 700–01 (2010) (considering retroactivity of Graha

2016See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa 2013); Perez, 816 N.W.2d at 358-59 ; Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 540, 544-45 ; Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa 1991).

2015In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Court declined to apply a per se analysis to a member’s claim that it had been wrongfully éxpelled from a nonprofit wholesale purchasing cooperative, noting that “such cooperative arrangements would seem to be ‘designed to “increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.” ’ ” Id. at 295 , 105 S.Ct. at 2620 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 212 (quoting BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 , 99 S.Ct. at 1562 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 16 ); see also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 744, 747-49 (nth Cir.1998) (declining

2015Ed. 2d at 16 ); see also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 744 , 747–49 (11th Cir. 1998) (declining to apply a per se analysis to an arrangement whereby competing hospitals agreed to seek bids as a group for temporary nursing services); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting antitrust claims and contrasting a legitimate, independent medical cost insurer with a “ ‘sham’ organization seeking only to combine otherwise independent buyers in order to suppress their otherwise competitive instinct to bid up pric

2015See id. at 1167 .

2015See id. at 1167 .

2015This, together with the fact that such concurrent representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney’s ability to effectively represent a client.” Severson, 215 P.3d at 426 (quoting State v. Cook, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007)).

2015This, together with the fact that such concurrent representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney’s ability to effectively represent a client.” Severson, 215 P.3d at 426 (quoting State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 , 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (2007)).

2015This, together with the fact that such concurrent representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney’s ability to effectively represent a client.” Severson, 215 P.3d at 426 (quoting State v. Cook, 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007)).

2015This, together with the fact that such concurrent representation by public defenders generally will create no incentive (economic or otherwise) for diminished advocacy in such cases, convinces us that a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney’s ability to effectively represent a client.” Severson, 215 P.3d at 426 (quoting State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 , 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (2007)).

2015In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Court declined to apply a per se analysis to a member’s claim that it had been wrongfully éxpelled from a nonprofit wholesale purchasing cooperative, noting that “such cooperative arrangements would seem to be ‘designed to “increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.” ’ ” Id. at 295 , 105 S.Ct. at 2620 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 212 (quoting BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 , 99 S.Ct. at 1562 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 16 ); see also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 744, 747-49 (nth Cir.1998) (declining

2015Ed. 2d at 16 ); see also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 740, 744 , 747–49 (11th Cir. 1998) (declining to apply a per se analysis to an arrangement whereby competing hospitals agreed to seek bids as a group for temporary nursing services); Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 925 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting antitrust claims and contrasting a legitimate, independent medical cost insurer with a “ ‘sham’ organization seeking only to combine otherwise independent buyers in order to suppress their otherwise competitive instinct to bid up pric

2015As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, “[i]n many instances the application of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of counsel.” Id. at 953 (quoting People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1979)). 30 These decisions are persuasive and should be followed.

2015As noted by the Illinois Supreme Court, “[i]n many instances the application of such a per se rule would require the appointment of counsel with virtually no experience in' the trial of criminal matters, thus raising, with justification, the question of competency of counsel.” Id. at 953 (quoting People v. Robinson, 79 Ill.2d 147 , 37 Ill.Dec. 267 , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1979)).

2018Bar Ass’n 2016); see also Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 504 (Iowa 2017) 23 (holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct “cannot be used to establish a per se claim for legal malpractice”); Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Iowa 1996) (holding the rules of professional conduct do “not undertake to define standards of civil liability”).

2018Bar Ass'n 2016); see also Stender v. Blessum , 897 N.W.2d 491 , 504 (Iowa 2017) (holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct "cannot be used to establish a per se claim for legal malpractice"); Ruden v. Jenk , 543 N.W.2d 605 , 611 (Iowa 1996) (holding the rules of professional conduct do "not undertake to define standards of civil liability").

2019He states if reliability is considered, additional factors should be used in addition to those set out in Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 .

2005Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 , 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977).

2018We conclude PCR counsel did not neglect to perform an essential duty in not pursuing common law retroactivity and Stevens did not suffer prejudice. 5 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 , 114–17 (Iowa 2013) (considering retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)); Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354 , 358–59 (Iowa 2012) (considering retroactivity of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)); Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 544–45 (indicating the per se framework applies only to federal court decisions); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697 , 700–01 (2010) (considering retroactivity of Graha

2016See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Iowa 2013); Perez, 816 N.W.2d at 358-59 ; Goosman, 764 N.W.2d at 540, 544-45 ; Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa 1991).

2016Identical withdrawals would have been needed if Johnson had complied with rule 32:1.8(j). 1 As previously noted, we rejected in Monroe “the proposition that a sexual relationship between client and attorney is a per se violation of rule 32:8.4(d).” 784 N.W.2d at 788 .

2016We did add that “a client-attorney relationship compromised by a concurrent intimate relationship could prompt acts or omissions by the attorney or client that would impede the proper functioning of the court system for purposes of the client’s case.” Id. at 789 .