per se rule in Minnesota

2007However, even absent such express consent, a state may exercise its authority if the operation of federal law does not preempt it from doing so.” (Citations omitted.) See also Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731 (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court has not established a per se rule prohibiting the exercise of state jurisdiction ... in the absence of an express congressional grant of jurisdiction”).

2000See id. at 731-32 .

2015Not only have we failed to reject reliance on the advice of counsel as a justification for interference with a contract, but in Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn.1998), we impliedly recognized that a defendant’s interference with a contract may be justified by reliance on the advice of counsel.

2015Not only have we failed to reject reliance on the advice of counsel as a justification for interference with a contract, but in Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 1998), we impliedly recognized that a defendant’s interference with a contract may be justified by reliance on the advice of counsel.

2015A per se rule regarding the evidence necessary to establish justification would be inconsistent with the case-by-case, fact-based nature of the justification inquiry, see Kjesbo v. Ricks, 517 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn.1994).

2015At trial, Bernu testified regarding the substance of Sokolowski’s advice and the court had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of 4 A per se rule regarding the evidence necessary to establish justification would be inconsistent with the case-by-case, fact-based nature of the justification inquiry, see Kjesbo v. Ricks, 517 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1994). 12 Bernu’s testimony.

2005Six years before Fare, in State v. Hogan, we had also rejected a per se rule requiring parental presence during a juvenile’s interrogation, and instead adopted a totality of the circumstances test. 297 Minn. 430, 440 , 212 N.W.2d 664, 671 (1973).

2005Six years before Fare, in State v. Hogan, we had also rejected a per se rule requiring parental presence during a juvenile’s interrogation, and instead adopted a totality of the circumstances test. 297 Minn. 430, 440 , 212 N.W.2d 664, 671 (1973).

1995See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361 , 111 S.Ct. at 1867 (“While the prosecutor’s criterion might well result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation”).

1995See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361 , 111 S.Ct. at 1867 (“While the prosecutor’s criterion might well result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation”).

1994“In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption — as a per se rule — that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.” McCollum , — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596, n. 8 , 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1021, n. 8 , 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)).

1994“In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption — as a per se rule — that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.” McCollum , — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596, n. 8 , 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1021, n. 8 , 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)).

2014Bistodeau moved the district court to rescind the revocation, arguing that under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the search of his breath was not within a per se exception to the warrant requirement and that the commissioner did not prove either exigent circumstances or valid consent to the search.

2014Christiansen challenged the revocation in the district court, arguing that under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the search of his blood was not within a per se exception to the warrant requirement, that the commissioner did not prove either exigent circumstances or that he validly consented to the search, and that his right to counsel was violated.

2010State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 592-93 (Minn.2005) (adopting a totality of the circumstances test).

2010State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 592-93 (Minn.2005) (adopting a totality of the circumstances test).

2009Smith concerned a defendant’s constitutional right to an attorney, and under these circumstances we declined to adopt a per se rule invalidating the trial, preferring a more “flexible approach.” Id.

2008The supreme court also concluded that a “more flexible approach than a per se rule” is warranted to balance the competing considerations of the “integrity of the criminal justice system” and the “reluctance to set aside a criminal conviction where guilt has been fairly established.” Id. at 514 .

2009Under this analysis, “ ‘state jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.’” Id. at 216 , 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333, 334 , 103 S.Ct. 2378 , 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983)).

2009Under this analysis, “ ‘state jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.’” Id. at 216 , 107 S.Ct. 1083 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333, 334 , 103 S.Ct. 2378 , 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983)).

2025Id. at 367 (internal citations omitted).

2025See also State v. Bale, 267 N.W.2d 730 , 732-33 7 In accordance with supreme court precedent, we are not adopting a per se rule that applies to all fleeing charges following an illegal stop.

2023They argue that children in a pluralistic society cannot “discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic,” Bd. of Educ. of Sauk Ctr., 17 Minn. at 416, if they are isolated from entire communities of their peers.

2023They argue that children in a pluralistic society cannot “discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic,” Bd. of Educ. of Sauk Ctr., 17 Minn. at 416 , if they are isolated from entire communities of their peers.

2023See Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 881 (noting that as a “general proposition” “speech relating to domestic violence involves a matter of public concern”); Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 25–26 (Minn. 1996) (noting that child sexual abuse is matter of public concern). 3 But Freborg was not discussing crime in general, the prevalence of crime in our 3 Importantly, neither Maethner nor Richie adopts a per se rule.

2023See Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 881 (noting that as a “general proposition” “speech relating to domestic violence involves a matter of public concern”); Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 25–26 (Minn. 1996) (noting that child sexual abuse is matter of public concern). 3 But Freborg was not discussing crime in general, the prevalence of crime in our 3 Importantly, neither Maethner nor Richie adopts a per se rule.

2018See Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1 , 11 (Minn. 2013) (discussing how "[s]olemn declarations in open court," such as affirming the voluntariness of a plea during the plea colloquy, "carry a strong presumption of verity" (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63 , 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621 , 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ) ); Chapman v. State , 282 Minn. 13 , 162 N.W.2d 698 , 700 (1968) (referencing the "general policy favoring ... finality," including the "solemn commitment" of a guilty plea); see also State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875 , 878 (Minn. 1986) ("A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has tradition

2018See Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1 , 11 (Minn. 2013) (discussing how "[s]olemn declarations in open court," such as affirming the voluntariness of a plea during the plea colloquy, "carry a strong presumption of verity" (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63 , 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621 , 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ) ); Chapman v. State , 282 Minn. 13 , 162 N.W.2d 698 , 700 (1968) (referencing the "general policy favoring ... finality," including the "solemn commitment" of a guilty plea); see also State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875 , 878 (Minn. 1986) ("A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has tradition

2018See Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1 , 11 (Minn. 2013) (discussing how "[s]olemn declarations in open court," such as affirming the voluntariness of a plea during the plea colloquy, "carry a strong presumption of verity" (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63 , 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621 , 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ) ); Chapman v. State , 282 Minn. 13 , 162 N.W.2d 698 , 700 (1968) (referencing the "general policy favoring ... finality," including the "solemn commitment" of a guilty plea); see also State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875 , 878 (Minn. 1986) ("A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has tradition

2018See Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1 , 11 (Minn. 2013) (discussing how "[s]olemn declarations in open court," such as affirming the voluntariness of a plea during the plea colloquy, "carry a strong presumption of verity" (quoting Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63 , 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621 , 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) ) ); Chapman v. State , 282 Minn. 13 , 162 N.W.2d 698 , 700 (1968) (referencing the "general policy favoring ... finality," including the "solemn commitment" of a guilty plea); see also State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875 , 878 (Minn. 1986) ("A guilty plea by a counseled defendant has tradition

2017More specifically, the majority asserts that intent is a legally required prerequisite to premeditation because we have said “premeditation” requires “some amount of time to pass between the formation of the intent and the carrying out of the act.” State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 1992).

2017Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that after a plea of guilty, “nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment”); State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Minn. 1984) (stating that the decision to admit guilt is so critical that it must remain with the defendant).