per se rule in Ohio

2009Children Services Bd. (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 85 , 86 . {¶ 64} In United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648 , the U.S. Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the right to counsel exists "* * * when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id. at 659, fn. 25 .

2009Children Services Bd. (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 85 , 86 . {¶ 64} In United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648 , the U.S. Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the right to counsel exists "* * * when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id. at 659, fn. 25 .

2026Sept. 19, 1996) (75-day sua sponte trial continuance “was for good cause and was both necessary and reasonable, given that the trial court entered upon the record that it was engaged in another criminal trial”). “‘[I]t is difficult, if not unwise, to establish a per se rule of what constitutes “reasonableness”’ when determining the length of a continuance for speedy trial purposes.” [State v. Monroe, 2007-Ohio-1492, ¶ 34 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d 90, 91 (1988).] Here, we do not find that two and a half months was an unreasonably long continuance for Sweeney’s jury tr

2024“When a trial court exercises its discretion to continue the period for trial beyond the statutory limit, … the period of continuance must be reasonable.” State v. Ramey, 2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 28 ; State v. Saffell, 35 Ohio St.3d 90, 91 (1988) (R.C. 2945.72(H) “permits a continuance beyond the ninety-day limit so long as the continuance is reasonable” and “necessary under the circumstances of the case”). 3 Case No. 2024-L-005 It has been recognized that “it is difficult, if not unwise, to establish a per se rule of what constitutes ‘reasonableness’ beyond the ninety-day stricture of R.C. 2945.71.”

2014The court, therefore, concluded that Lawrence failed to meet the first and sixth prongs of the test outlined in Petro. {¶ 21} As a preliminary point, we note our prior decision in City of Dayton v. Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d 87 , 539 N.E.2d 646 (2d Dist.1987), which states that: While Petro stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial, we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature of impeachi

2014The court, therefore, concluded that Lawrence failed to meet the first and sixth prongs of the test outlined in Petro. {¶ 21} As a preliminary point, we note our prior decision in City of Dayton v. Martin, 43 Ohio App.3d 87 , 539 N.E.2d 646 (2d Dist.1987), which states that: While Petro stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial, we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature of impeachi

2009Hence, ‘(t)he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ Id. at 686 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ], {¶ 66} “In United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , the Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the right to counsel exists ‘ * * * when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.’ Id. at 659 [ 104

2009Hence, ‘(t)he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ Id. at 686 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ], {¶ 66} “In United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 , the Supreme Court held that a per se violation of the right to counsel exists ‘ * * * when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.’ Id. at 659 [ 104

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1132 (D.C.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1132 (D.C.Cir.2000) (declining “to extend the per se ineffectiveness rule beyond those cases in which a defendant is represented by a person never properly admitted to any bar” and holding that “the fact of suspension does not, by itself, render counsel ineffective under the Sixth Amendment”); United States v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir.2007) (declining “to extend a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule to cases where the defendant was represented by a trained and qualified attorney, albeit one with licensing problems”); see

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2024See, e.g., Beto v. Barfield, 391 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (D.

2022See, e.g., Beto v. Barfield, 391 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.1968); Reese, 926 F.2d at 669-670 ; United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (D.Mass.1992); People v. Medler, 177 Cal. App.3d 927 , 223 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1986); Dolan v. State, 469 So.2d 142 (Fla.App.1985); Cornwell v. Dodd, 270 Ga. 411, 412 , 509 S.E.2d 919 (1999); People v. Brigham, 151 11In Kenny and Cantu, the courts stated that this inquiry is “totally separate” from the traditional Strickland analysis because, “if trial counsel is found to be incompetent as a matter of law,” there would be no need to inquire into attorney errors or p

2024See, e.g., Beto v. Barfield, 391 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (D.

2022See, e.g., Beto v. Barfield, 391 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.1968); Reese, 926 F.2d at 669-670 ; United States v. Dumas, 796 F. Supp. 42, 45-46 (D.Mass.1992); People v. Medler, 177 Cal. App.3d 927 , 223 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1986); Dolan v. State, 469 So.2d 142 (Fla.App.1985); Cornwell v. Dodd, 270 Ga. 411, 412 , 509 S.E.2d 919 (1999); People v. Brigham, 151 11In Kenny and Cantu, the courts stated that this inquiry is “totally separate” from the traditional Strickland analysis because, “if trial counsel is found to be incompetent as a matter of law,” there would be no need to inquire into attorney errors or p

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Solina, 709 F.2d 160, 166-169 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); Huckelbury v. State, 337 So.2d 400, 402-403 (Fla. App. 1976); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 291, 293 (1979). {¶35} Some courts have held “a per se rule of ineffectiveness” is warranted only where counsel has never been admitted to practice in any jurisdiction.

2022In State v. Bonnell, 61 Ohio St.3d 179 , 573 N.E.2d 1082 (1991), the supreme court rejected the imposition of a per se rule for Sixth Amendment violations occurring at arraignment and held that the accused “must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the absence of counsel at the arraignment.” Id. at 182 ; see, also, State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St. 3d 231, 250 , 586 N.E.2d 1042 (1992).

2022In State v. Bonnell, 61 Ohio St.3d 179 , 573 N.E.2d 1082 (1991), the supreme court rejected the imposition of a per se rule for Sixth Amendment violations occurring at arraignment and held that the accused “must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the absence of counsel at the arraignment.” Id. at 182 ; see, also, State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St. 3d 231, 250 , 586 N.E.2d 1042 (1992).

2017Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 , 62 S.Ct. 457, 475 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

2017Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 , 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 , 62 S.Ct. 457, 475 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

2023Franklin No. 22AP-170, 2022-Ohio-3407, ¶ 32 , quoting State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505 , 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus. ‘While [State v. Petro, supra] stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial, we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature of impeaching or contradicting evidence.

2023Franklin No. 22AP-170, 2022-Ohio-3407, ¶ 32 , quoting State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505 , 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus. ‘While [State v. Petro, supra] stands for the proposition that newly discovered evidence that merely impeaches or contradicts other evidence is not enough for a new trial, we do not read Petro as establishing a per se rule excluding newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial simply because that evidence is in the nature of impeaching or contradicting evidence.

2006In more recent years, the same rationale has been applied to pat-down searches in detentions of this kind, on the view that "[t]he right to search is virtually automatic when individuals are suspected of committing a crime, like drug trafficking, for which they are likely to be armed." State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405 , 413 , cert. den., 510 U.S. 1166 , 114 S.Ct. 1195 , 127 L.Ed.2d 544 . {¶ 11} The Fourth Circuit has adopted a per se rule allowing pat-down searches, stating that "[t]he indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable suspicion of danger to t

2003See, also, United States v. Sakyi (4th Cir. 1998), 160 F.3d 164 , at 169 recognizing a per se rule approving protective frisks when the detainee is suspected of drug activity.

2023The effect of the General Assembly's amendment was to divide R.C. 4511.19 into two classification of offenses: the offense of operating a vehicle while under the influence, and the “per se” offense.” State v. Hassler, 115 Ohio St.3d 322 , 2007-Ohio-4947 , 875 N.E.2d 46, ¶10 [footnote omitted]. {¶28} Per se offenses make the blood-alcohol content an element of the offense.

2008Based on these principles, we held that `the results of a properly administered bodily substances test presented with expert testimony may be admitted in evidence despite the fact that the bodily substance was withdrawn more than two hours from the time of the alleged violation.' Id. at 105 , 532 N.E.2d 130 ." Hassler , supra at 324-325 , 2007-Ohio-4947 at ¶ 11 , 875 N.E.2d 46 , 48-49 . {¶ 21} In the case at bar the trial court apparently granted the State's motion in limine upon the belief that the BAC results were inadmissible because appellant was not charged with a per se violation of R.C.

2022We found that such a per se rule would be incorrect and inconsistent with our later pronouncement in Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 444 , 2006-Ohio-6108 , 857 N.E.2d 95 , which established that (1) a person may negotiate a debt on behalf of another without practicing law and (2) whether a person engages in the practice of law while negotiating a debt depends on whether that person’s actions include the rendering of legal services (e.g., giving legal advice, drafting legal documents, raising legal defenses).

2022We found that such a per se rule would be incorrect and inconsistent with our later pronouncement in Cleveland Bar Assn. v. CompManagement, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 444 , 2006-Ohio-6108 , 857 N.E.2d 95 , which established that (1) a person may negotiate a debt on behalf of another without practicing law and (2) whether a person engages in the practice of law while negotiating a debt depends on whether that person’s actions include the rendering of legal services (e.g., giving legal advice, drafting legal documents, raising legal defenses).