per se rule in Arizona

2017And though, as the superior court acknowledged, Dwyer presented evidence “from which it can be fairly inferred that his trial counsel was using drugs and/or alcohol during the general time of [Dwyer]’s trial,” drug and alcohol abuse during trial, “standing alone, does not establish a per se violation of a criminal defendant’s right to receive effective assistance of counsel.” State v. D’Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 (1988).

1994But this fact, "standing alone, does not establish a per se violation of a criminal defendant's right to receive effective assistance of counsel." State v. D'Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73 , 750 P.2d 14, 16 (1988).

2016The Supreme Court rejected this per se rule, however, because a “reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some sort of container.” Id. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 (emphasis added).

2016The Supreme Court rejected this per se rule, however, because a “reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some sort of container.” Id. at 251 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 (emphasis added).

2009Delaval, in turn, adopted the per se rule based on the reasoning and holding of Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9 , 45 Cal.Rptr. 17 , 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965).

2009Delaval, in turn, adopted the per se rule based on the reasoning and holding of Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9 , 45 Cal.Rptr. 17 , 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965).

2009See Delaval, 476 U.S. at 871 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 .

2009See Delaval, 476 U.S. at 871 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 .

2006Segura, 468 U.S. at 799 , 104 S.Ct. at 3385 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182, 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 57-58 , 906 P.2d 579, 590-91 (1995); see also State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 284, 287 , 689 P.2d 543, 546 (App.1983), aff'd as modified, 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) (“Where the evidence sought to be suppressed is the product of an independent source entirely free and distinct from the proscribed police activity, it should be admissible, and not subject to a per se rule of exclusion based solely on the unlawful

2006Segura, 468 U.S. at 799 , 104 S.Ct. at 3385 ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182, 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 57-58 , 906 P.2d 579, 590-91 (1995); see also State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 284, 287 , 689 P.2d 543, 546 (App.1983), aff'd as modified, 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) (“Where the evidence sought to be suppressed is the product of an independent source entirely free and distinct from the proscribed police activity, it should be admissible, and not subject to a per se rule of exclusion based solely on the unlawful

2015The Court held that “some circumstances will make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood test[, but t]hat ... is a reason to decide each ease on its facts, as we did in Schmerber, not to accept the ‘considerable overgeneralization’ that a per se rule would reflect.” 133 S.Ct. at 1561 (citation omitted).

2015McNeely was limited to the question of whether the potential dissipation of alcohol in a defendant’s blood over time constitutes a per se exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1556 .

2008Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), however, “removed the per se bar. to the admission of victims’ statements regarding the effect of a crime upon their lives.” Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186 , 191 ¶ 16, 68 P.3d 412, 417 (2003).

2008Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), however, “removed the per se bar. to the admission of victims’ statements regarding the effect of a crime upon their lives.” Lynn v. Reinstein, 205 Ariz. 186 , 191 ¶ 16, 68 P.3d 412, 417 (2003).

2026The supreme court declined, however, “to adopt a per se rule barring all in-life photos,” deferring to the 5 STATE v. MAYO Decision of the Court superior court’s determination whether “photographs will incite the jurors’ passions.” Id. at 511, ¶ 50 (citation omitted). ¶16 In this case, the sentencing judge, not jurors, heard and viewed the presentation of the victim impact evidence.

2024The resolution of that position awaits another day because Stuebe failed to show prejudice under Strickland. ¶14 “A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory of the case reasonably supported by the evidence.” State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz. 585, 588 (1983).

2023Ct. App. 2010) (determining there was evidence from which a jury could find that a priest’s sexual abuse of a student was within the scope of his employment, in part due to the priest’s authority over the student); Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (“[A] trier of fact could reasonably find that the sexual relations between [the priest] and the plaintiff directly grew out of, and were the immediate and proximate results of, the church sanctioned counseling sessions.”), overruled in part by Cefaratti v. Aranow, 141 A.3d 752 (Conn. 2016). ¶39 Doe also relies heavily on S

2019Arpaio v. Figueroa, 229 Ariz. 444, 447, ¶ 11 (App. 2012).

2017Far from specifically authorizing a per se rule, Huffman properly interpreted Schmer-ber to require an individualized, totality of the circumstances determination. ¶ 32 In State v. Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 150 , 152 ¶ 9, 978 P.2d 127, 129 (App. 1998), police officers directed a blood draw from a DUI suspect relying on “the department’s policy that exigent circumstances always exist in vehicular aggravated assault and manslaughter cases.” Although the case involved a different statute, the court of appeals analyzed Schmerber’s exigent circumstances rule as we do here: In Schmerber , exigent circums

2017Far from specifically authorizing a per se rule, Huffman properly interpreted Schmer-ber to require an individualized, totality of the circumstances determination. ¶ 32 In State v. Flannigan, 194 Ariz. 150 , 152 ¶ 9, 978 P.2d 127, 129 (App. 1998), police officers directed a blood draw from a DUI suspect relying on “the department’s policy that exigent circumstances always exist in vehicular aggravated assault and manslaughter cases.” Although the case involved a different statute, the court of appeals analyzed Schmerber’s exigent circumstances rule as we do here: In Schmerber , exigent circums

2017Far from specifically authorizing a per se rule, Huffman properly interpreted Schmerber to require an individualized, totality of the circumstances determination. 2 The dissent also cites Campbell v. Superior Ct., 106 Ariz. 542, 554 , 479 P.2d 685, 696 (1971), for the proposition that this Court found “no merit” to a constitutional challenge to the implied consent law.

2017Far from specifically authorizing a per se rule, Huffman properly interpreted Schmerber to require an individualized, totality of the circumstances determination. 2 The dissent also cites Campbell v. Superior Ct., 106 Ariz. 542, 554 , 479 P.2d 685, 696 (1971), for the proposition that this Court found “no merit” to a constitutional challenge to the implied consent law.

2017Unlike a direct appeal, in which the type and number of issues an appellant can raise “are not limited by a per se rule,” the issues that may be raised in a Rule 32 petition ai*e limited by Rule 32.1, and a petitioner must “assert grounds that bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order to obtain relief.” State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 145-46 , 692 P.2d 991, 994-95 (1984). ¶ 9 Although Leyva framed one of his claims below as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, Rule 32,1 does not provide for review of such a ruling.

2017Unlike a direct appeal, in which the type and number of issues an appellant can raise “are not limited by a per se rule,” the issues that may be raised in a Rule 32 petition ai*e limited by Rule 32.1, and a petitioner must “assert grounds that bring him within the provisions of the Rule in order to obtain relief.” State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 145-46 , 692 P.2d 991, 994-95 (1984). ¶ 9 Although Leyva framed one of his claims below as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, Rule 32,1 does not provide for review of such a ruling.

2017Contrary to Dwyer’s contentions, the record does not support a conclusion that counsel was impaired during trial to the point of causing presumptive prejudice by being simply a “neutral observer of the trial.” See State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 399 (1985).