93 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2022Id. at 155-56, 164 . 352 State v. Portulano McNeely’s resolution of the split of authority elimi- nated any legitimacy of a per se analysis under the Fourth Amendment in the blood draw context. 2021In doing so, the Court acknowledged that “some cir- cumstances will make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted war- rantless blood test,” but it determined that each case should be decided on its own facts, and that a per se rule would reflect “ ‘considerable overgeneralization.’ ” Id. at 153 (quot- ing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 US 385, 393 , 117 S Ct 1416 , 137 L Ed 2d 615 (1997)). | 4 | 4 |
Shillinger v. Haworthgreen2 sentences2025The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be prejudicial and that, therefore, 2025Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hutchisongreen2 sentences2024See State v. Hutchison, 142 Or App 56, 59 , 920 P2d 1105 , rev den, 324 Or 395 (1996) (declining to adopt such an absolute rule); Garrett, 292 Or App at 867 n 8 (rejecting a per se rule “that whenever a trial court knows about the jury’s voting posture, the court is * * * required to remind jurors not to abandon conscientiously held opinions and that a hung jury is acceptable”). 2024See State v. Hutchison, 142 Or App 56, 59 , 920 P2d 1105 , rev den, 324 Or 395 (1996) (declining to adopt such an absolute rule); Garrett, 292 Or App at 867 n 8 (rejecting a per se rule “that whenever a trial court knows about the jury’s voting posture, the court is * * * required to remind jurors not to abandon conscientiously held opinions and that a hung jury is acceptable”). | 2 | 2 |
Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc.green2 sentences2023See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. and Derivative Litig., 275 FRD 154, 158-59 (SDNY 2011) (concluding that email messages sent to and from the hus- band’s work email address were not protected by the marital communications privilege where employees were regularly reminded that the email account was for business purposes only and email messages contained there were subject to disclosure); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F Supp 2d 1083, 1108 (WD Wash 2011) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did not attach to employee’s email messages and communications created and sent or receiv 2023See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. and Derivative Litig., 275 FRD 154, 158-59 (SDNY 2011) (concluding that email messages sent to and from the hus- band’s work email address were not protected by the marital communications privilege where employees were regularly reminded that the email account was for business purposes only and email messages contained there were subject to disclosure); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F Supp 2d 1083, 1108 (WD Wash 2011) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did not attach to employee’s email messages and communications created and sent or receiv | 2 | 2 |
State v. McCarthygreen2 sentences2022Such a rule would be overbroad, could dis- courage the development and utilization of improvements to the warrant process, and was not necessary.” McCarthy, 369 Or at 170-71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 354 State v. Portulano The Oregon Supreme Court then expressed juris- prudential concerns that motivated the majority in McNeely, “Following McNeely, this court has also expressed concern about creating broad exceptions to the warrant requirement based on generalizations about the length of time it takes to get a warrant.” McCarthy, 369 Or at 171 . 2022Such a rule would be overbroad, could dis- courage the development and utilization of improvements to the warrant process, and was not necessary.” McCarthy, 369 Or at 170-71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 354 State v. Portulano The Oregon Supreme Court then expressed juris- prudential concerns that motivated the majority in McNeely, “Following McNeely, this court has also expressed concern about creating broad exceptions to the warrant requirement based on generalizations about the length of time it takes to get a warrant.” McCarthy, 369 Or at 171 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2 |
Maryland v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2015Our conclusion that Article I, section 9, does not permit a routine weapons inquiry whenever an officer makes a traffic stop answers the state’s argument for a per se rule.10 However, the parties’ arguments do raise another question: When an officer stops an individual to conduct a 9 In his dissent in Wilson, Justice Stevens observed that “the number of stops in which an officer is actually at risk is dwarfed by the far greater number of routine stops.” 519 US at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 2015Our conclusion that Article I, section 9, does not per- mit a routine weapons inquiry whenever an officer makes a traffic stop answers the state’s argument for a per se rule.10 However, the parties’ arguments do raise another question: When an officer stops an individual to conduct a traffic investigation and does have cognizable safety concerns, does Article I, section 9, preclude the officer from asking the detained individual about weapons? 90 In his dissent in Wilson, Justice Stevens observed that “the number of stops in which an officer is actually at risk is dwarfed by the far greater nu | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Grossgreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. David Lee Greengreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Bryan Lee Simpsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State of Texas v. Mazuca, Alvarogreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wackergreen2 sentences2015The Supreme Court has “never suggested that use of any device or enhancement — no matter where that device or enhancement was used — would qualify” as a “constitutionally significant ‘search.’” State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 371 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (emphasis in original); Wacker, 317 Or at 426 n 12 (Campbell did not establish “a per se rule against the warrantless use by police of any technologically enhanced observation regardless of the circumstances”). 1999State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 374 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (holding that dog sniffs are not searches when conducted in a public place); State v. Wacker, 317 Or 419 , 426 n 12, 856 P2d 1029 (1993) (stating that warrantless use of a technological enhancement is not a per se violation of Article I, section 9); State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 172-73 , 759 P2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a radio transmitter to follow defendant’s car was a search); State v. Louis, 296 Or 57, 61 , 672 P2d 708 (1983) (holding that photographs taken from a legal vantage point across the street, of the defendant exposing h | 1 | 3 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 597 . 2013Moreover, as noted, Brown explicitly rejected application of a per se rule to attenuation analysis, stating that “ [t]he workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test.” 422 US at 603 . | 1 | 3 |
Wasco County v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local No. 2752green2 sentences2013Cite as 353 Or 170 (2013) 177 As DOC acknowledges, a public employer commits a per se violation of ORS 243.672(1)(e) if it makes a unilateral change regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining while the employer has a duty to bargain.6 See Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or App 859 , 613 P2d 1067 (1980) (upholding ERB’s authority to adopt “violation per se” analysis of unilateral changes). 2013Cite as 353 Or 170 (2013) 177 As DOC acknowledges, a public employer commits a per se violation of ORS 243.672(1)(e) if it makes a unilateral change regarding a mandatory subject of bargaining while the employer has a duty to bargain.6 See Wasco County v. AFSCME, 46 Or App 859 , 613 P2d 1067 (1980) (upholding ERB’s authority to adopt “violation per se” analysis of unilateral changes). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2022State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, 54-59 , 156 P3d 771, 781 (2007) (concluding that the severity of the car accident objectively demonstrated exigent circumstances and rejecting the assertion that the “officers’ belief that warrantless blood extractions were routine dooms the State’s quest for exigency” because the officer’s subjective assessment is largely irrelevant); State v. Johnson, 744 NW2d 340, 344 (Iowa 2008) (concluding that the same time-based considerations present in Schmerber were present in the case before it given the circumstances of the accident). 364 State v. Portulano at 2551 ( 2021In addition, the Court observed that a per se rule would “improperly ignore the current and future technological developments in warrant procedures, and might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions ‘to pursue progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law enforcement.’ ” Id. at 156 (quot- ing Rodriguez, 156 P3d at 779 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2020See Brown, 301 Or at 274 (announcing a per se exception to the warrant requirement “provided (1) that the automobile is mobile at the time it is stopped by police or other govern- mental authority, and (2) that probable cause exists for the search of the vehicle”). 1995Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences2016In Bailey , the Supreme Court disavowed the per se rule from Dempster that the discovery and execution of a valid arrest warrant necessarily breaks the connection between a police illegality and discovery of evidence for Fourth Amendment purposes. 356 Or at 488-89, 504 . 2014Cite as 356 Or 486 (2014) 505 We now apply those factors to the evidentiary record in this case. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Hallgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examinersgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Nielsengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Payne v. Tennesseegreen | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. William Dennis Danielson v. United States v. William Dennis Danielsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Multnomah County v. Mehrweingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Couey v. Atkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hedgpethgreen | 1 | 1 |
| UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gabriel Valdez ANDAVERDE, Defendant-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Antonio Rodriguez-Preciado, AKA Tony Rodriguez-Preciadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bianchigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mitchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Benninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| Stufflebeam v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tualatin Valley Bargaining Council v. Tigard School District 23Jgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Backstrandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dempster
green
2 sentences2015See Mitchell, 273 Or App at 215-17 (applying Brown factors, as discussed in Bailey); Benning, 273 Or App at 194, 199-203 (observing that, in support of its argument that evidence need not be suppressed, “the state relied upon the per se rule of attenuation set forth in Dempster , 248 Or at 404”; applying the factors set forth in Unger to determine whether the state met its burden to establish attenuation). 2015At the suppression hearing, when arguing that the evidence need not be suppressed, the state relied upon the per se rule of attenuation set forth in Dempster, 248 Or at 404 . | 4 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Unger
green
2 sentences2014Moreover, it is not even clear that a per se rule would have the benefit of predictability, as the threshold issue of whether police acted unlawfully can, in some circumstances, involve close factual questions and is, Cite as 356 Or 59 (2014) 85 of course, subject to the general “reasonableness” test of Article I, section 9. 2014Moreover, it is not even clear that a per se rule would have the benefit of predictability, as the threshold issue of whether police acted unlawfully can, in some circumstances, involve close factual questions and is, Cite as 356 Or 59 (2014) 85 of course, subject to the general “reasonableness” test of Article I, section 9. | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Garrett
green
2 sentences2024See State v. Hutchison, 142 Or App 56, 59 , 920 P2d 1105 , rev den, 324 Or 395 (1996) (declining to adopt such an absolute rule); Garrett, 292 Or App at 867 n 8 (rejecting a per se rule “that whenever a trial court knows about the jury’s voting posture, the court is * * * required to remind jurors not to abandon conscientiously held opinions and that a hung jury is acceptable”). 2024See State v. Hutchison, 142 Or App 56, 59 , 920 P2d 1105 , rev den, 324 Or 395 (1996) (declining to adopt such an absolute rule); Garrett, 292 Or App at 867 n 8 (rejecting a per se rule “that whenever a trial court knows about the jury’s voting posture, the court is * * * required to remind jurors not to abandon conscientiously held opinions and that a hung jury is acceptable”). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2023Id. at 259-61 .4 We also observe that the cases that LPMC cites in support of its argument that this court should adopted a per se rule do not, themselves, announce a per se rule; they rather rely on the existence of company policies that would make an employee’s belief that the email messages were confidential unreasonable. 2023Id. at 259-61 .4 We also observe that the cases that LPMC cites in support of its argument that this court should adopted a per se rule do not, themselves, announce a per se rule; they rather rely on the existence of company policies that would make an employee’s belief that the email messages were confidential unreasonable. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Hedgpeth
green
2 sentences2023Hedgpeth, 365 Or at 734-35 , 735 n 6 (“[E]vidence that a defendant showed symptoms of impair- ment at the time he or she was stopped” is “relevant even to prove a per se violation of ORS 813.010 because it can be used by the factfinder as the ‘something more’ that is nec- essary to connect the breath result to the statutory require- ment of a BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving.” (Brackets and internal quotation marks omitted.)); State v. Dollman, 303 Or App 168, 169-70 , 463 P3d 607 , rev den, 366 Or 827 (2020) (concluding that “symptoms of impairment” shortly after driving coup 2020Specifically, the state notes that the court explained that “such evidence is relevant even to prove a per se violation of ORS 813.010 because it can be used by the factfinder as the ‘[s]omething more’ that ‘is necessary to connect the [test] result to the statutory requirement of a 170 State v. Dollman BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving.’ ” Id. at 735 n 6 (quoting State v. Eumana-Moranchel, 352 Or 1, 9-10 , 277 P3d 549 (2012) (first brackets in original)). | 2 | 2020–2023 |
State v. Andersen
green
2 sentences2021It argued that “the trial court added a third requirement [for the auto- mobile exception to apply] not found in case law: that the state show that it could not have obtained a warrant before someone tried to move the truck.” In response, defendant argued that, as a result of this court’s decision in State v. Andersen, 361 Or 187 , 390 P3d 992 (2017) (Andersen II), the automobile exception is no longer a per se exception and the state had failed to meet its burden of proving that an actual exigency existed at the time of the search. 2021It argued that “the trial court added a third requirement [for the auto- mobile exception to apply] not found in case law: that the state show that it could not have obtained a warrant before someone tried to move the truck.” In response, defendant argued that, as a result of this court’s decision in State v. Andersen, 361 Or 187 , 390 P3d 992 (2017) (Andersen II), the automobile exception is no longer a per se exception and the state had failed to meet its burden of proving that an actual exigency existed at the time of the search. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
State v. EUMANA-MORANCHEL
green
2 sentences2020Specifically, the state notes that the court explained that “such evidence is relevant even to prove a per se violation of ORS 813.010 because it can be used by the factfinder as the ‘[s]omething more’ that ‘is necessary to connect the [test] result to the statutory requirement of a 170 State v. Dollman BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving.’ ” Id. at 735 n 6 (quoting State v. Eumana-Moranchel, 352 Or 1, 9-10 , 277 P3d 549 (2012) (first brackets in original)). 2020Specifically, the state notes that the court explained that “such evidence is relevant even to prove a per se violation of ORS 813.010 because it can be used by the factfinder as the ‘[s]omething more’ that ‘is necessary to connect the [test] result to the statutory requirement of a 170 State v. Dollman BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving.’ ” Id. at 735 n 6 (quoting State v. Eumana-Moranchel, 352 Or 1, 9-10 , 277 P3d 549 (2012) (first brackets in original)). | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Guggenmos
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. MacHuca
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Bridewell
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Cocke
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Snow
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Milligan
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jimenez
green
2 sentences2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for 2017State v. Snow, 337 Or 219, 223-25 , 94 P3d 872 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating rule and finding that facts demon- strated exigent circumstances); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126-30 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (same); State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235-36 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988) (facts did not demonstrate exigent circumstances); State v. Jimenez, 357 Or 417, 426 , 353 P3d 1227 (2015) (refusing to adopt per se rule recogniz- ing exigent circumstances in all instances); State v. Cocke, 334 Or 1, 9 , 45 P3d 109 (2002) (declining to recognize per se exception to warrant requirement for | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2015The Supreme Court has “never suggested that use of any device or enhancement — no matter where that device or enhancement was used — would qualify” as a “constitutionally significant ‘search.’” State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 371 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (emphasis in original); Wacker, 317 Or at 426 n 12 (Campbell did not establish “a per se rule against the warrantless use by police of any technologically enhanced observation regardless of the circumstances”). 2015The Supreme Court has “never suggested that use of any device or enhancement — no matter where that device or enhancement was used — would qualify” as a “constitutionally significant ‘search.’” State v. Smith, 327 Or 366, 371 , 963 P2d 642 (1998) (emphasis in original); Wacker, 317 Or at 426 n 12 (Campbell did not establish “a per se rule against the warrantless use by police of any technologically enhanced observation regardless of the circumstances”). | 2 | 1999–2015 |
| State v. Bailey green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Krummacher v. Gierloff green | 2 | 1988–2008 |
| State v. Cloud green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Dollman green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Hilburn green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Aguirre-Rodriguez green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Bliss green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Richards v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Colman-Pinning neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Skillicorn green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Payne green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Lawson/James green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Yancy v. Shatzer green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Christian green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Savastano green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Marsh green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Field green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Martinez-Alvarez neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Amaya green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Town of Newton v. Rumery green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Reeves v. Chem Industrial Company green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Dudley green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.