71 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2025Id. ¶86 We would adopt a similar per se rule of reversal for the type of allocution error that occurred here. 2008In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a per se rule which prohibits an attorney with concurrent prosecutorial obligations from also representing indigent defendants. | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Vazquezgreen2 sentences2022Rather, if a drug dog enters a vehicle before probable cause is established, its ensuing search of the vehicle can be permissible under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) the dog’s leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009)). ¶20 These two considerations go hand in hand. 2022Rather, if a drug dog enters a vehicle before probable cause is established, its ensuing search of the vehicle can be permissible under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) the dog’s leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009)). ¶20 These two considerations go hand in hand. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2020Examples of improper police conduct that constitute entrapment, “depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case,” include inducement by means of “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money,” Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 , as well as “personalized highpressure tactics, and appeals to extreme vulnerability,” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 20181042-CA 7 2020 UT App 61 State v. Hatchett ¶13 Hatchett argues that “even though [his] response[s] to the polic 2005Instead, Utah has adopted an objective standard through which all entrapment claims will be examined, with the focus on whether the police conduct created “a substantial risk that a normal law-abiding person would be induced to commit a crime.” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct.App.1993); see also State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the objective view asks whether “the conduct of the government comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration of justice”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kinkennongreen2 sentences2014The Nebraska Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se rule of disqualification, ruling that *38 the need for disqualification in a particular case may be rebutted if the county attorney demonstrates that "the disqualified attorney is effectively screened from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant." Id. at 444. 2009However, the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have rejected the inflexibility of a per se rule and have held instead that “the entire staff ordinarily need not be disqualified from prosecuting the defendant if the staff member who had previously worked for the defendant is isolated from any participation in the prosecution of the defendant.” New Mexico v. Pennington, 115 N.M. 372 , 851 P.2d 494, 498 (Ct.App.1993); see also Nebraska v. Kinkennon, 275 Neb. 570 , 747 N.W.2d 437, 444 (2008)(“[W]hen the disqualified attorney is effectively screened from any participation in | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2007The supreme court "hals] not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification." State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 14 , 48 P.3d 953 . 2007The supreme court "hals] not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification." State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 14 , 48 P.3d 953 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2020Examples of improper police conduct that constitute entrapment, “depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case,” include inducement by means of “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money,” Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 , as well as “personalized highpressure tactics, and appeals to extreme vulnerability,” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 20181042-CA 7 2020 UT App 61 State v. Hatchett ¶13 Hatchett argues that “even though [his] response[s] to the polic 2005Instead, Utah has adopted an objective standard through which all entrapment claims will be examined, with the focus on whether the police conduct created “a substantial risk that a normal law-abiding person would be induced to commit a crime.” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct.App.1993); see also State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the objective view asks whether “the conduct of the government comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration of justice”). | 1 | 2 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2013See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule that any confession following a threat or promise is involuntary and analyzing the voluntariness of a confes *1033 sion based on the totality of the cireum-stances). 2013See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule that any confession following a threat or promise is involuntary and analyzing the voluntariness of a confes *1033 sion based on the totality of the cireum-stances). | 1 | 2 |
Johansen v. Johansengreen2 sentences2026See Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, ¶¶ 2, 15, 19 , 504 P.3d 152 . 2026See Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, ¶¶ 2, 15, 19 , 504 P.3d 152 . | 1 | 1 |
Segota v. Young Chryslergreen2 sentences2026We therefore concluded that “the district court exceeded its discretion in determining that [the husband’s] failure to provide initial disclosures naming [the wife] as his only case-in- chief witness was harmless.” Id. ¶53 Relatedly, in Segota v. Young 180 Co., 2020 UT App 105 , 470 P.3d 479 , we implicitly rejected a per se rule that it is always harmless for an initially non-disclosing party—in that case the plaintiff—to belatedly provide initial disclosures that are “identical to [the opposing party’s] own disclosures.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up). 2026We therefore concluded that “the district court exceeded its discretion in determining that [the husband’s] failure to provide initial disclosures naming [the wife] as his only case-in- chief witness was harmless.” Id. ¶53 Relatedly, in Segota v. Young 180 Co., 2020 UT App 105 , 470 P.3d 479 , we implicitly rejected a per se rule that it is always harmless for an initially non-disclosing party—in that case the plaintiff—to belatedly provide initial disclosures that are “identical to [the opposing party’s] own disclosures.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
Packingham v. North Carolinagreen1 sentence2025For many users, Facebook is their “principal source[] for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.” See Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 104, 107 (2017). ¶62 Given this, a per se rule that statements made on social media are incapable of defamatory meaning would be inappropriate. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen1 sentence2025Id. at 376 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ¶57 That narrower ground represents Young’s controlling reasoning on allocution. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Giantgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 204 (Fla. 2007) (“As we held in Green and reaffirmed in Beber, ‘a prior inconsistent statement standing alone is insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (citations omitted)); State v. Giant, 37 P.3d 49, 58 (Mont. 2001) (“Rather, in order to create a clear, bright-line rule for trial courts and practitioners, we reaffirm our holdings in White Water and in Gommenginger that require prior inconsistent statements admitted as substantive evidence of guilt be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction.”), overruled in | 1 | 1 |
| Brower v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haltomgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ¶ 11 , 121 P.3d 42 (“Utah has never recognized a per se rule of entrapment.”) (quotation simplified). 2020See State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ¶ 11 , 121 P.3d 42 (“Utah has never recognized a per se rule of entrapment.”) (quotation simplified). | 1 | 1 |
Baugh v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 204 (Fla. 2007) (“As we held in Green and reaffirmed in Beber, ‘a prior inconsistent statement standing alone is insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (citations omitted)); State v. Giant, 37 P.3d 49, 58 (Mont. 2001) (“Rather, in order to create a clear, bright-line rule for trial courts and practitioners, we reaffirm our holdings in White Water and in Gommenginger that require prior inconsistent statements admitted as substantive evidence of guilt be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction.”), overruled in | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Brighamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Candedogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mitchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Grossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkampred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Telfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Padgettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Texas v. Mazuca, Alvarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Montoyagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coroles v. Sabeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hummonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Grossgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Lucasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Efrain MacEira v. Luis Enrique Pagan, Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grendel's Den, Inc. v. John P. Larkin, Cambridge License Commission, Grendel's Den, Inc. v. John P. Larkingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of RBgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Penningtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nicholsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. McElhineygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Wesley R. McKinneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gainergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Washington State Legislature v. State
green
2 sentences2013Second, they include in their complaint a detailed legislative history of the components of the Bill, and argue that the fact that some of these components were rejected by the legislature as individual bills, while others passed committee or a floor vote in one house but were then held and combined with the rest of the Bill's components, demonstrates that the Bill constitutes impermissible "bundling" and "log-rolling" in violation of the spirit of the single-subject rule. 25 I 45 Appellants urge us to adopt what they represent as the rule of Washington State Legislature v. State, 189 Wash.2d 2013Second, they include in their complaint a detailed legislative history of the components of the Bill, and argue that the fact that some of these components were rejected by the legislature as individual bills, while others passed committee or a floor vote in one house but were then held and combined with the rest of the Bill’s components, demonstrates that the Bill constitutes impermissible “bundling” and “log-rolling” in violation of the spirit of the single-subject rule.25 ¶45 Appellants urge us to adopt what they represent as the rule of Washington State Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d 353 ( | 3 | 2013–2013 |
Gregory v. Shurtleff
green
2 sentences2013We need not establish so liberal a test in order to conclude that the Bill in question today does not violate the single-subject rule. 24 In addition to individual programs enacted or amended, including the Textbook Approval and Teacher Salary Supplement Programs, the Bill also both provided funding for programs (continued...) 24 Cite as: 2013 UT 18 Opinion of the Court such a combination is a per se violation of the rule. 2013We need not establish so liberal a test in order to conclude that the Bill in question today does not violate the single-subject rule. 24 In addition to individual programs enacted or amended, including the Textbook Approval and Teacher Salary Supplement Programs, the Bill also both provided funding for programs (continued...) 24 Cite as: 2013 UT 18 Opinion of the Court such a combination is a per se violation of the rule. | 3 | 2013–2013 |
Shillinger v. Haworth
green
2 sentences2026There, the Tenth Circuit held that “a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes . . . a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment” under which prejudice “must be presumed.” Id. at 1142 . 2025There, the Tenth Circuit held that “a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes . . . a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment” under which prejudice “must be presumed.” Id. at 1142 . | 2 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Goins
green
2 sentences2023The Goins court specifically addressed the reality that a per se rule of admissibility for preliminary hearing testimony of unavailable witnesses “places magistrates in the uncomfortable position of choosing between conducting preliminary hearings in fidelity with article I, section 12 and permitting the type of examinations” that were standard before the constitutional amendment limited the scope of preliminary hearings. 2017 UT 61, ¶ 34 . 2020This practice was based on State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), in which the Utah Supreme Court “announced a per se rule under which preliminary hearing testimony is admissible so long as the requirements of unavailability and an opportunity to cross-examine are satisfied.” State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 30 , 423 P.3d 1236 . | 2 | 2020–2023 |
State v. Ruiz
green
2 sentences2022Rather, if a drug dog enters a vehicle before probable cause is established, its ensuing search of the vehicle can be permissible under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) the dog’s leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009)). ¶20 These two considerations go hand in hand. 2022Rather, if a drug dog enters a vehicle before probable cause is established, its ensuing search of the vehicle can be permissible under the Fourth Amendment if “(1) the dog’s leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog.” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009)). ¶20 These two considerations go hand in hand. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2020This practice was based on State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), in which the Utah Supreme Court “announced a per se rule under which preliminary hearing testimony is admissible so long as the requirements of unavailability and an opportunity to cross-examine are satisfied.” State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 30 , 423 P.3d 1236 . 2017The State correctly asserts that Brooks announced a per se rule under which preliminary hearing testimony is admissible so long as the requirements of unavailability and an opportunity to cross-examine are satisfied. ¶ 31 However, subsequent changes to article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution undermine one of Brooks 's key premises-that "[d]efense counsel's motive and interest are the same in either setting." See id. | 2 | 2017–2020 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015"The Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] does not require counsel to ... fully investigate every potential lead." Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 183 , 344 P.3d 581 (emphasis in original). "[Clounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 183 , 344 P.3d 581 . "[S)trategie choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitatio 2015"The Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] does not require counsel to ... fully investigate every potential lead." Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 183 , 344 P.3d 581 (emphasis in original). "[Clounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 183 , 344 P.3d 581 . "[S)trategie choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitatio | 2 | 1990–2015 |
cluster 10840912
green
2 sentences2026We therefore concluded that “the district court exceeded its discretion in determining that [the husband’s] failure to provide initial disclosures naming [the wife] as his only case-in- chief witness was harmless.” Id. ¶53 Relatedly, in Segota v. Young 180 Co., 2020 UT App 105 , 470 P.3d 479 , we implicitly rejected a per se rule that it is always harmless for an initially non-disclosing party—in that case the plaintiff—to belatedly provide initial disclosures that are “identical to [the opposing party’s] own disclosures.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up). 2026The case of Sabour v. Koller, 2024 UT App 26 , 546 P.3d 28 , provides a useful starting point for our analysis in this regard. ¶56 In Sabour, the plaintiffs disclosed that they might call themselves as witnesses in their case-in-chief, but they failed to 20230024-CA 31 2026 UT App 54 Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith provide adequate summaries of their expected testimony as required by rule 26(a). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sabour v. Koller
green
2 sentences2026The case of Sabour v. Koller, 2024 UT App 26 , 546 P.3d 28 , provides a useful starting point for our analysis in this regard. ¶56 In Sabour, the plaintiffs disclosed that they might call themselves as witnesses in their case-in-chief, but they failed to 20230024-CA 31 2026 UT App 54 Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith provide adequate summaries of their expected testimony as required by rule 26(a). 2026The case of Sabour v. Koller, 2024 UT App 26 , 546 P.3d 28 , provides a useful starting point for our analysis in this regard. ¶56 In Sabour, the plaintiffs disclosed that they might call themselves as witnesses in their case-in-chief, but they failed to 20230024-CA 31 2026 UT App 54 Cook Martin Poulson PC v. Smith provide adequate summaries of their expected testimony as required by rule 26(a). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Vargas
green
1 sentence2025For these reasons, we disagree with Vargas’s view that his conviction was not strongly supported by the record. ¶44 Additionally, even as to cases where the prosecution’s case is not strongly supported, we do not read Salazar or Gregg as announcing a per se rule requiring defense counsel to seek admission of any evidence with the potential to undermine an 20230226-CA 18 2025 UT App 142 State v. Vargas alleged victim’s credibility despite the fact that the evidence might also undermine the defendant’s case. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Bustamante-Conchas
green
1 sentence2025Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1139 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cache County v. Beus
green
1 sentence2021As explicitly stated in Gilbert, “[i]f attorney fees are recoverable by contract” a party may recover those fees “attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights.” Id. ¶ 52 (quoting Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503 , ¶ 16, 128 P.3d 63 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp.
green
2 sentences2021Barker Company PC CPA Profit Sharing Plan v. Turner ¶40 Turner’s first argument is that $2,496.50 in attorney fees awarded to the Plan should be eliminated from the overall award because these fees relate to an issue on which it “did not prevail”—specifically, a statement of discovery issues Turner filed that was granted in part and denied in part.7 In support of his argument, he simply asserts that Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361 , 246 P.3d 131 , establishes a per se rule that “[w]here a prevailing party in litigation was unsuccessful on motions within the litigati 2021Barker Company PC CPA Profit Sharing Plan v. Turner ¶40 Turner’s first argument is that $2,496.50 in attorney fees awarded to the Plan should be eliminated from the overall award because these fees relate to an issue on which it “did not prevail”—specifically, a statement of discovery issues Turner filed that was granted in part and denied in part.7 In support of his argument, he simply asserts that Gilbert Development Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361 , 246 P.3d 131 , establishes a per se rule that “[w]here a prevailing party in litigation was unsuccessful on motions within the litigati | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hatchett
green
1 sentence2020Examples of improper police conduct that constitute entrapment, “depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case,” include inducement by means of “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money,” Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 , as well as “personalized highpressure tactics, and appeals to extreme vulnerability,” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 20181042-CA 7 2020 UT App 61 State v. Hatchett ¶13 Hatchett argues that “even though [his] response[s] to the polic | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Swann
green
1 sentence2020See, e.g., Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 204 (Fla. 2007) (“As we held in Green and reaffirmed in Beber, ‘a prior inconsistent statement standing alone is insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (citations omitted)); State v. Giant, 37 P.3d 49, 58 (Mont. 2001) (“Rather, in order to create a clear, bright-line rule for trial courts and practitioners, we reaffirm our holdings in White Water and in Gommenginger that require prior inconsistent statements admitted as substantive evidence of guilt be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction.”), overruled in | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Kourbelas
green
1 sentence2020Examples of improper police conduct that constitute entrapment, “depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each case,” include inducement by means of “[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money,” Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503 , as well as “personalized highpressure tactics, and appeals to extreme vulnerability,” State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 20181042-CA 7 2020 UT App 61 State v. Hatchett ¶13 Hatchett argues that “even though [his] response[s] to the polic | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re Copeland green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Allen green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Chavez-Barragan green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Soto green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Menzies v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Fuentes v. Shevin green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Rettenberger green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Boyd green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Sulzen v. Williams green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Darren Andrew Blandin green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| United States v. Ricky E. Butler green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| United States v. George Raymond Dyba green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Winston v. Lee green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Nichols green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.