per se rule in Oklahoma

2020Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston , 1981 OK 104 , ¶ 13, 640 P.2d 948, 951 (finding an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor setting up an exclusive territory within which the distributor will have exclusive rights to sell does not in itself violate antitrust provisions); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc. , 1978 OK 159 , ¶ 9, 587 P.2d 1360, 1363 ("It is, however, well settled that it is not a per se violation of antitrust law for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with the distributor to give him an exclusive franchise or distributorship, even if this means cutting off another distrib

2020Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston , 1981 OK 104 , ¶ 13, 640 P.2d 948, 951 (finding an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor setting up an exclusive territory within which the distributor will have exclusive rights to sell does not in itself violate antitrust provisions); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc. , 1978 OK 159 , ¶ 9, 587 P.2d 1360, 1363 ("It is, however, well settled that it is not a per se violation of antitrust law for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with the distributor to give him an exclusive franchise or distributorship, even if this means cutting off another distrib

2020Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston , 1981 OK 104 , ¶ 13, 640 P.2d 948, 951 (finding an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor setting up an exclusive territory within which the distributor will have exclusive rights to sell does not in itself violate antitrust provisions); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc. , 1978 OK 159 , ¶ 9, 587 P.2d 1360, 1363 ("It is, however, well settled that it is not a per se violation of antitrust law for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with the distributor to give him an exclusive franchise or distributorship, even if this means cutting off another distrib

2020Crown Paint Co. v. Bankston , 1981 OK 104 , ¶ 13, 640 P.2d 948, 951 (finding an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor setting up an exclusive territory within which the distributor will have exclusive rights to sell does not in itself violate antitrust provisions); Teleco, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc. , 1978 OK 159 , ¶ 9, 587 P.2d 1360, 1363 ("It is, however, well settled that it is not a per se violation of antitrust law for a manufacturer or supplier to agree with the distributor to give him an exclusive franchise or distributorship, even if this means cutting off another distrib

1992Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1014 ; Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr. 1984).

1992Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1014 ; Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr. 1984).

2019The traffic offense violation shall constitute probable cause for purposes of Section 752 of this title and the procedures found in Section 752 of this title shall be followed to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled dangerous substances within the driver's blood system. ¶7 This statute "creates a per se rule requiring nonconsensual blood testing of a driver involved in an accident who could be cited for a traffic offense, where the accident involves either a fatality or great bodily injury of any person, including the driver ." Cripps , 2016 OK CR 14, ¶ 8 , 387 P.3d at 909 (emphasis

2019The traffic offense violation shall constitute probable cause for purposes of Section 752 of this title and the procedures found in Section 752 of this title shall be followed to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled dangerous substances within the driver's blood system. ¶7 This statute "creates a per se rule requiring nonconsensual blood testing of a driver involved in an accident who could be cited for a traffic offense, where the accident involves either a fatality or great bodily injury of any person, including the driver ." Cripps , 2016 OK CR 14, ¶ 8 , 387 P.3d at 909 (emphasis

2016See also Schmerber , 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835 (noting that absent an emergency, search warrants are generally required for searches of dwellings and "no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned."). ¶7 Nothing in McNeely endorses application of a per se rule in this context which disregards the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches.

2016See also Schmerber , 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S. Ct. at 1835 (noting that absent an emergency, search warrants are generally required for searches of dwellings and "no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned."). ¶7 Nothing in McNeely endorses application of a per se rule in this context which disregards the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches.

1987See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 , 60 S.Ct. 321, 322 , 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) (appointment of counsel in a capital case three days before trial did not constitute ineffective assistance per se).

1987See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 , 60 S.Ct. 321, 322 , 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940) (appointment of counsel in a capital case three days before trial did not constitute ineffective assistance per se).

1987See Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr. 1984); Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285, 296 (Okl.Cr. 1983).

1987See Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr.1984); Stafford v. State, 669 P.2d 285, 296 (Okl.Cr.1983).

1987See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-14 , 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616-17 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982-83 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (refused to adopt a per se rule requiring reversal or an evidentiary hearing following tardy appointment of counsel).

1987See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-14 , 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616-17 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982-83 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (refused to adopt a per se rule requiring reversal or an evidentiary hearing following tardy appointment of counsel).

2019Id. ¶5 In Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 145, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1556, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), the Supreme Court made clear that the body's natural dissipation of alcohol does not itself create a per se rule of exigency which permits a warrantless search and seizure of a suspect's blood in every drunk-driving case.

2019Id. ¶5 In Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 145, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1556, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), the Supreme Court made clear that the body's natural dissipation of alcohol does not itself create a per se rule of exigency which permits a warrantless search and seizure of a suspect's blood in every drunk-driving case.

2022To be sure, the Supreme Court has refused "to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel." Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970). ¶23 Our review of the record shows this is not a situation where the presumption of prejudice is appropriate.

2022To be sure, the Supreme Court has refused "to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel." Chambers v. Maroney , 399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970). ¶23 Our review of the record shows this is not a situation where the presumption of prejudice is appropriate.

2019Such a per se rule is contrary to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized [.]" Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 371 , 124 S. Ct. 795, 800 , 157 L.

2019Such a per se rule is contrary to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized [.]" Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 371 , 124 S. Ct. 795, 800 , 157 L.

2008See U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 , 92 S.Ct. 1126 , 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972).

2008See U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 , 92 S.Ct. 1126 , 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972).

1992Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1014 ; Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr. 1984).

1992Fisher, 736 P.2d at 1014 ; Coleman v. State, 693 P.2d 4, 7 (Okl.Cr. 1984).

2009Although some Federal * #1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posa-do, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (CAS 1995), United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United States

2009Although some Federal * *1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (C.A.5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United State

2009Although some Federal * #1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posa-do, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (CAS 1995), United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United States

2009Although some Federal * *1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (C.A.5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United State

2009Although some Federal * #1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posa-do, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (CAS 1995), United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United States

2009Although some Federal * *1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (C.A.5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United State

2009Although some Federal * #1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posa-do, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (CAS 1995), United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United States

2009Although some Federal * *1266 Courts of Appeals have abandoned the per se rule excluding polygraph evidence, leaving its admission or exclusion to the discretion of district courts under Daubert, see, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (C.A.5 1995); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (C.A.9 1997), at least one Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed its per se ban, see United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (C.A.4 1997), and another recently noted that it has "not decided whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible." United State