71 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Watkins; People v. Pullengreen2 sentences2022Id. at 366. 2022Id. at 366. | 3 | 3 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023That is, in merely concluding that defendant’s habitual- offender status was a “relevant circumstance” of her plea without going on to analyze whether defendant was sufficiently aware of the entirety of the “relevant circumstances” of the plea, the majority seems to set forth the very per se rule that it denies it is creating, contrary to the totality approach required by Brady. 35 I again emphasize that the extent of the misunderstanding is important in assessing a plea in its entirety to determine whether a defendant was sufficiently aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequence 2023That is, in merely concluding that defendant’s habitual- offender status was a “relevant circumstance” of her plea without going on to analyze whether defendant was sufficiently aware of the entirety of the “relevant circumstances” of the plea, the majority seems to set forth the very per se rule that it denies it is creating, contrary to the totality approach required by Brady. 35 I again emphasize that the extent of the misunderstanding is important in assessing a plea in its entirety to determine whether a defendant was sufficiently aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequence | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bendergreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, I continue to believe that the nature of “incommunicado interrogation requires a per se rule that can be implemented with ease and practicality to protect a suspect’s rights to remain silent and to counsel.” Bender, 452 Mich at 617 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.). 2014The lead opinion declined to adopt a “totality-of-the-circumstances test,” because the “inherently coercive nature of incommunicado interrogation requires a per se rule that can be implemented with ease and practicality to protect a suspect’s rights to remain silent and to counsel.” Bender, 452 Mich at 617 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J.). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Contegreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Conte, 421 Mich at 753-754 (opinion by BOYLE, J.); id. at 761 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J., concurring in part with BOYLE, J.); id. at 761-762 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part with BOYLE, J.). 21 defendant and the conviction of the officers’ belief in defendant’s guilt weighs against a finding that defendant’s inculpatory statements were made of a free and voluntary mind. 2023See, e.g., Conte, 421 Mich at 753-754 (opinion by BOYLE, J.); id. at 761 (opinion by BRICKLEY, J., concurring in part with BOYLE, J.); id. at 761-762 (opinion by CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part with BOYLE, J.). 21 defendant and the conviction of the officers’ belief in defendant’s guilt weighs against a finding that defendant’s inculpatory statements were made of a free and voluntary mind. | 2 | 2 |
Robinson v. City of Lansinggreen2 sentences2017See Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 21 ; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) (stating that we should avoid interpreting a statute in a way that renders any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory). 4 MCL 205.426(6) requires OTP “received or acquired within this state” to “bear the name and address of the person making the first purchase or any other markings the department prescribes.” The statute is silent with regard to who bears the responsibility of ensuring that the proper markings are on the OTP that is received or acquired. 2017See Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 21 ; 782 NW2d 171 (2010) (stating that we should avoid interpreting a statute in a way that renders any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory). 4 MCL 205.426(6) requires OTP “received or acquired within this state” to “bear the name and address of the person making the first purchase or any other markings the department prescribes.” The statute is silent with regard to who bears the responsibility of ensuring that the proper markings are on the OTP that is received or acquired. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Herreragreen2 sentences2020Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant that “would in effect give ‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.’ ” Riley, 573 US at 399, quoting Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 345 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009); see also People v Herrera, 357 P3d 1227, 1228, 1233 ; 2015 CO 60 (Colo, 2015) (holding that allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that eviden 2020Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant that “would in effect give ‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.’ ” Riley, 573 US at 399, quoting Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 345 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009); see also People v Herrera, 357 P3d 1227, 1228, 1233 ; 2015 CO 60 (Colo, 2015) (holding that allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that eviden | 1 | 3 |
People v. Roygreen2 sentences1990See People v Duke, supra; People v Roy, supra; People v Forrest, 159 Mich App 329 ; 406 NW2d 290 (1987). 1990See People v Duke, supra ; People v Roy, supra ; People v Forrest, 159 Mich App 329 ; 406 NW2d 290 (1987). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Morsegreen2 sentences2025See Morse, 231 Mich App at 431-433 . 14 probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. [Morse, 231 Mich App at 435 , citing Pulizzano, 155 Wis 2d at 651-652 .] Morse noted the caution expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Budis, 125 NJ at 533, which directed courts to consider the trauma to the child and the invasion of the child’s privacy when assessing the prejudicial effect of eliciting evidence of prior sexual abuse of the child. 2025See Morse, 231 Mich App at 431-433 . 14 probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. [Morse, 231 Mich App at 435 , citing Pulizzano, 155 Wis 2d at 651-652 .] Morse noted the caution expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Budis, 125 NJ at 533, which directed courts to consider the trauma to the child and the invasion of the child’s privacy when assessing the prejudicial effect of eliciting evidence of prior sexual abuse of the child. | 1 | 1 |
Drennan v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2025Drennan does not establish a per se rule that a defendant must be informed of the details of why he is being arrested; rather, it provides that the police are obliged not to “excite the suspicion of the defendant” or “induce him to believe the officer was acting in bad faith.” Id. 2025Moreover, MCL 764.19 provides that the requirement that an officer making a warrantless arrest “shall inform the person arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest” does not apply “when the person arrested . . . forcibly resists arrest before the officer has time to inform him.” Here, where defendant was belligerent from the moment the police arrived, clinging to his two-year-old son and threatening to fight the police, we conclude that the officers did not have a reasonable opportunity to inform him of the circumstances of his arrest. 1 Justice CHRISTIANCY’s seriatim opinion was sig | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pulizzanogreen1 sentence2025See Morse, 231 Mich App at 431-433 . 14 probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. [Morse, 231 Mich App at 435 , citing Pulizzano, 155 Wis 2d at 651-652 .] Morse noted the caution expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Budis, 125 NJ at 533, which directed courts to consider the trauma to the child and the invasion of the child’s privacy when assessing the prejudicial effect of eliciting evidence of prior sexual abuse of the child. | 1 | 1 |
Rock v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2025In that case, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the per se rule was unconstitutional and significantly adversely affected the petitioner’s ability to -14- testify, explaining that a state may not “apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony.” Id. at 55-57 . 2025See id. at 57 . | 1 | 1 |
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany & Albany County Board of Electionsgreen1 sentence2023See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v Albany Co, 522 F3d 182 , 184 & n 2 (CA 2, 2008) (explaining why the pro bono nature of representation might affect “the nature of representation and type of work involved in a case” and is among the “relevant circumstances” to consider when determining what a reasonable client would expect to pay for the purpose of calculating an attorney-fee award under the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 13 compliance with FOIA requests. 30 But in establishing a per se rule that courts cannot consider that a representation is pro bono when awarding reasonabl | 1 | 1 |
| Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Management Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Woods v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Hayes' Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Anderson Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| King Drug Co of Florence Inc v. Smithkline Beecham Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kernen v. Homestead Development Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Charles R. Chadwick v. Calvin E. Green, Superintendent, Wayne Correctional Institution, Odum, Georgiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barney Earl Crutchfield v. Louie L. Wainwright, Jim Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bryan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Knight-Morley Corp. v. Employment Security Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| McNeal v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Detroit v. Township of Redford
green
2 sentences2022See Bronner v Detroit, 507 Mich 158 , 173 n 11; 968 NW2d 310 (2021) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means ‘[e]xpress mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.’ ”), quoting Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456 ; 235 NW 217 (1931) (alteration in Bronner). 2022See Bronner v Detroit, 507 Mich 158 , 173 n 11; 968 NW2d 310 (2021) (“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means ‘[e]xpress mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things.’ ”), quoting Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456 ; 235 NW 217 (1931) (alteration in Bronner). | 3 | 2022–2022 |
King v. Nash (In Re Estate of Erwin)
green
2 sentences2022The majority opinion states that “nothing in Erwin limits the inquiry to direct contacts between spouses;” rather, according to the majority opinion, Erwin suggests that indirect contact may be sufficient to establish that there is not willful absence. 18 Noting that “Erwin recognized that the term ‘absent’ can mean that one is ‘exhibiting inattentiveness toward another,’ ” the majority opinion claims that a spouse is “not ‘exhibiting inattentiveness toward another’ if they are communicating with a spouse 16 Id. at 21 . 17 Id. at 25 . 2022The majority opinion states that “nothing in Erwin limits the inquiry to direct contacts between spouses;” rather, according to the majority opinion, Erwin suggests that indirect contact may be sufficient to establish that there is not willful absence. 18 Noting that “Erwin recognized that the term ‘absent’ can mean that one is ‘exhibiting inattentiveness toward another,’ ” the majority opinion claims that a spouse is “not ‘exhibiting inattentiveness toward another’ if they are communicating with a spouse 16 Id. at 21 . 17 Id. at 25 . | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Forrest
neutral
2 sentences1999In Peo *431 pie v Forrest, 159 Mich App 329, 336 ; 406 NW2d 290 (1987), we noted that [w]e recognize that some jurisdictions have held that the government’s conduct in providing drugs is “reprehensible.” However, we refuse to adopt a similar per se rule. 1999In Peo *431 pie v Forrest, 159 Mich App 329, 336 ; 406 NW2d 290 (1987), we noted that [w]e recognize that some jurisdictions have held that the government’s conduct in providing drugs is “reprehensible.” However, we refuse to adopt a similar per se rule. | 3 | 1988–1999 |
Haynes v. Washington
green
2 sentences2023“The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this” that involve “fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused,” Haynes v Washington, 373 US 503, 515 ; 83 S Ct 1336 ; 10 L Ed 2d 513 (1963). 2023“The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this” that involve “fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused,” Haynes v Washington, 373 US 503, 515 ; 83 S Ct 1336 ; 10 L Ed 2d 513 (1963). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Jemison
green
2 sentences2023At common law the rule was easily applied since co-conspirators were always tried jointly and a per se rule fulfilled the rationale underlying the common-law no one-man conspiracy rule, precluding inherently defective or inconsistent verdicts. [Id. at 36 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).] This rule, however, does not apply when coconspirators are tried “before separate factfinders.” People v Jemison, 187 Mich App 90, 93 ; 466 NW2d 378 (1991). 2023At common law the rule was easily applied since co-conspirators were always tried jointly and a per se rule fulfilled the rationale underlying the common-law no one-man conspiracy rule, precluding inherently defective or inconsistent verdicts. [Id. at 36 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).] This rule, however, does not apply when coconspirators are tried “before separate factfinders.” People v Jemison, 187 Mich App 90, 93 ; 466 NW2d 378 (1991). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Cummings
neutral
2 sentences2023When multiple fact-finders are involved, there is “no inherent defect or inconsistency between the different verdicts.” People v Cummings, 139 Mich App 286, 295 ; 362 NW2d 252 (1984). 2023When multiple fact-finders are involved, there is “no inherent defect or inconsistency between the different verdicts.” People v Cummings, 139 Mich App 286, 295 ; 362 NW2d 252 (1984). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
2 sentences2020While the police would surely be deterred by a per se rule of exclusion, the Court opined that “[t]he police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures under the totality rule, as well as the per se one, for fear that their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable.” Id. 2020The Court was most concerned with the administration of justice in that if the trier of fact was denied “reliable evidence” by a per se rule of exclusion, then “it may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free.” Id. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Workman v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2013The Court of Appeals in Bierbusse also stated, “While agreeing that the statute should be interpreted in a manner that allows an insurer to reasonably calculate the scope of risk and the premium incidental thereto, we do not believe that a per se rule excluding from coverage any relative not domiciled in the same household as the named insured is in accord with the legislative intent.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 58 Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497 ; In re High, 2 Doug at 523. 59 The rule I propose is consistent with this Court’s decision in Volk in which the child was determined to be domiciled w 2013The Court of Appeals in Bierbusse also stated, “While agreeing that the statute should be interpreted in a manner that allows an insurer to reasonably calculate the scope of risk and the premium incidental thereto, we do not believe that a per se rule excluding from coverage any relative not domiciled in the same household as the named insured is in accord with the legislative intent.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 58 Workman, 404 Mich at 496-497 ; In re High, 2 Doug at 523. 59 The rule I propose is consistent with this Court’s decision in Volk in which the child was determined to be domiciled w | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Wright
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 617 , 551 N.W.2d 71 . [8] The lead opinion in Bender states the issue and a holding that was supported by three justices of this Court: In this case, we are asked to consider whether, under Michigan law, a suspect's waiver of his rights to remain silent and to counsel is valid when the police fail to inform him, before he gives a statement, that a specific, retained attorney is immediately available to consult with him. 2000Id. at 617 . | 2 | 1998–2000 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences1990People v Wolff, 23 Mich App 550 ; 179 NW2d 206 (1970); People v Allen, 109 Mich App 147 ; 311 NW2d 734 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 913 (1982). 1990People v Wolff, 23 Mich App 550 ; 179 NW2d 206 (1970); People v Allen, 109 Mich App 147 ; 311 NW2d 734 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 913 (1982). | 2 | 1986–1990 |
People v. Wolff
green
2 sentences1986At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel argued that the per se rule of People v Wolff, 23 Mich App 550 ; 179 NW2d 206 (1970), applied and defendant’s confessions must be suppressed simply *572 because the police did not immediately take defendant before the juvenile court. 1986At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel argued that the per se rule of People v Wolff, 23 Mich App 550 ; 179 NW2d 206 (1970), applied and defendant’s confessions must be suppressed simply *572 because the police did not immediately take defendant before the juvenile court. | 2 | 1986–1990 |
Zeni v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1986The Court noted that Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976), abandoned the per se rule and adopted a standard providing that a statutory violation establishes a prima facie case of negligence. 1986The Court noted that Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976), abandoned the per se rule and adopted a standard providing that a statutory violation establishes a prima facie case of negligence. | 2 | 1977–1986 |
Mott v. Stanlake
neutral
2 sentences2025While there is some suggestion in the caselaw that this should not be construed as a per se bar on such conveyances, see Mott v Stanlake, 63 Mich App 440, 442 ; 234 NW2d 667 (1975), there must at minimum be some indication of the grantor’s intent. 2025While there is some suggestion in the caselaw that this should not be construed as a per se bar on such conveyances, see Mott v Stanlake, 63 Mich App 440, 442 ; 234 NW2d 667 (1975), there must at minimum be some indication of the grantor’s intent. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Courtney C. Brown
green
1 sentence2022Because the mission of the stop continued, officer safety remained a viable concern and the per se rule of Mimms fully applies. [State v Brown, 392 Wis 2d 454 , 470; 2020 WI 63 ; 945 NW2d 584 (2020)]. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Pylican
green
2 sentences2022Accord: Hill v State, 360 Ga App 683, 688; 859 SE2d 891 (2021) (Recognizing that the officer did not exceed his authority by asking the defendant to exit the vehicle after completing the ticket paperwork and returning to defendant’s vehicle), State v Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 754 ; 477 P3d 180 (2020) (Concluding that Rodriguez did not abrogate Mimms; “Instead, Rodriguez stands for the proposition that the underlying safety concerns which justify exit orders do not extend to general criminal investigations that are undertaken when the purpose of the lawful stop has been abandoned”), and United St 2022Accord: Hill v State, 360 Ga App 683, 688; 859 SE2d 891 (2021) (Recognizing that the officer did not exceed his authority by asking the defendant to exit the vehicle after completing the ticket paperwork and returning to defendant’s vehicle), State v Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 754 ; 477 P3d 180 (2020) (Concluding that Rodriguez did not abrogate Mimms; “Instead, Rodriguez stands for the proposition that the underlying safety concerns which justify exit orders do not extend to general criminal investigations that are undertaken when the purpose of the lawful stop has been abandoned”), and United St | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Washington
green
1 sentence2022Accord: Hill v State, 360 Ga App 683, 688; 859 SE2d 891 (2021) (Recognizing that the officer did not exceed his authority by asking the defendant to exit the vehicle after completing the ticket paperwork and returning to defendant’s vehicle), State v Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 754 ; 477 P3d 180 (2020) (Concluding that Rodriguez did not abrogate Mimms; “Instead, Rodriguez stands for the proposition that the underlying safety concerns which justify exit orders do not extend to general criminal investigations that are undertaken when the purpose of the lawful stop has been abandoned”), and United St | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re MKK
green
2 sentences2021Until the Legislature provides more guidance, I believe the In re MKK[, 286 Mich App 546 (2009),] framework should be used by the trial court to determine whether to allow a paternity action to reach its natural conclusion before a contemporaneously filed adoption proceeding, regardless of which action was filed first, and regardless of which party filed a motion to stay or whether, like here, the stay is entered sua sponte by the trial court.”), and id. at 864 n 4 (“The majority, by contrast, appears to create a per se rule that, unless a putative father files a motion to stay the adoption pr 2021Until the Legislature provides more guidance, I believe the In re MKK[, 286 Mich App 546 (2009),] framework should be used by the trial court to determine whether to allow a paternity action to reach its natural conclusion before a contemporaneously filed adoption proceeding, regardless of which action was filed first, and regardless of which party filed a motion to stay or whether, like here, the stay is entered sua sponte by the trial court.”), and id. at 864 n 4 (“The majority, by contrast, appears to create a per se rule that, unless a putative father files a motion to stay the adoption pr | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2020Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant that “would in effect give ‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.’ ” Riley, 573 US at 399, quoting Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 345 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009); see also People v Herrera, 357 P3d 1227, 1228, 1233 ; 2015 CO 60 (Colo, 2015) (holding that allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that eviden 2020Such a per se rule would effectively nullify the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of cell-phone data and rehabilitate an impermissible general warrant that “would in effect give ‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.’ ” Riley, 573 US at 399, quoting Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 345 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009); see also People v Herrera, 357 P3d 1227, 1228, 1233 ; 2015 CO 60 (Colo, 2015) (holding that allowing a search of an entire device for evidence of a crime based upon the possibility that eviden | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Pouncey green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Pool Water Products v. Olin Corporation green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Coates v. City of Cincinnati green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kolender v. Lawson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Escanaba & Land Superior Railroad Co. v. Keweenaw Land Association green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Lansing Schools Education Ass'n v. Lansing Board of Education green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Robert A. Anderson green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Huddleston v. United States green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Anderson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Flowers green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Houston green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Williams neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Cipriano green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Sherman v. United States green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Duke neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Department of Treasury green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Stanley green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Bunting neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Young green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.