per se rule in Kansas

2021The Sharpe Court found a per se rule that 20-minute detentions are too long is "clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area." 470 U.S. at 686 .

2019The Court also found that establishing a per se rule that 20-minute detentions are too long is "clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in this area." 470 U.S. at 686 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 .

2017The Supreme Court concluded that "while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, . . . [w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." 569 U.S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 1563 . 29 Importantly, in McNeely, given the circumstances of an ordinary DUI car stop, the State argued for a per se rule and did not contend there were additional exigent factors to justify a warrantless blood draw.

2017The Supreme Court concluded that "while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, . . . [w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." 569 U.S. at ___ , 133 S. Ct. at 1563 . 29 Importantly, in McNeely, given the circumstances of an ordinary DUI car stop, the State argued for a per se rule and did not contend there were additional exigent factors to justify a warrantless blood draw.

2008On the other hand, the Court observed that the type of claim presented in Cuyler warrants a more limited presumption which does not equal a per se rule of prejudice, but rather requires a showing of an actual conflict that affects the lawyer’s performance. 466 U.S. at 692 .

2008On the other hand, the Court observed that the type of claim presented in Cuyler warrants a more limited presumption which does not equal a per se rule of prejudice, but rather requires a showing of an actual conflict that affects the lawyer's performance. 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

2008This court considered the issue in State v. Ryan, 29 Kan.

2008This court considered the issue in State v. Ryan, 29 Kan.App.2d 297, 299 , 26 P.3d 707 , rev. denied 272 Kan. 1422 (2001).

2026Another panel of this court in State v. Gamble, 20 Kan.

2025State v. G.O., 318 Kan. 386 , 397-98, 543 P.3d 1096 (2024).

2024Fenton noted two paths for applying due process protection against involuntary confessions: (1) Those that are inherently coercive and a per se violation of the Due Process Clause and (2) those where a state actor uses interrogation techniques that because of the unique circumstances of the suspect are coercive. 474 U.S. at 109 .

2024The first path relates to interrogation techniques that in isolation are inherently offensive to a civilized system of justice. 474 U.S. at 109 .

2022That said, this basis for personal jurisdiction does not "replace the need to demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment, that is conduct by the nonresident defendant that invoked the benefits and protections of the state or was otherwise purposely directed toward a state resident." (Emphasis added.) Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 294 Kan. 258, 282 , 275 P.3d 869 (2012); see also Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts finding personal jurisdiction based upon an intentional tort analysis have not created a per se rule that an a

2022That said, this basis for personal jurisdiction does not "replace the need to demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment, that is conduct by the nonresident defendant that invoked the benefits and protections of the state or was otherwise purposely directed toward a state resident." (Emphasis added.) Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. v. Filardo, 294 Kan. 258, 282 , 275 P.3d 869 (2012); see also Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1078 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[C]ourts finding personal jurisdiction based upon an intentional tort analysis have not created a per se rule that an a

2018In Cahow , 286 Kan. 1134 , 192 P.3d 614 , the issue was whether a claims-made insurance policy covered the claim when the insured did not disclose the potential claim during the insurance application.

2018In Cahow , 286 Kan. 1134 , 192 P.3d 614 , the issue was whether a claims-made insurance policy covered the claim when the insured did not disclose the potential claim during the insurance application.

2017Office of State Finance, 184 P.3d 467, 476 (Okla. 2008) (constitutional provision requiring special appropriations bills to address single subject permits mixing appropriations and substantive legislation, but all provisions must be closely related to the bill's subject); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1114-15 (Utah 2013) (declining a per se rule that appropriations cannot mix with substantive legislation under single- subject rule); State v. Acevedo, 78 Wash. App. 886, 891 , 899 P.2d 31 (1995) (holding appropriations and substantive legislation may be in the same bill so long as one-sub

2017Office of State Finance, 184 P.3d 467, 476 (Okla. 2008) (constitutional provision requiring special appropriations bills to address single subject permits mixing appropriations and substantive legislation, but all provisions must be closely related to the bill's subject); Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1114-15 (Utah 2013) (declining a per se rule that appropriations cannot mix with substantive legislation under single- subject rule); State v. Acevedo, 78 Wash. App. 886, 891 , 899 P.2d 31 (1995) (holding appropriations and substantive legislation may be in the same bill so long as one-sub

2016See, e.g; People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 8, 10 , 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2014) (reading McNeely to suggest that “refusal to submit to a chemical test under an implied consent law operates as a withdrawal of consent and renders any subsequent test noncon-sensual” but deciding testing in that case was permitted on grounds that “there is nothing in the implied consent law to indicate that such measures are within the scope of the consent, and so in these cases the implied consent law gives way to the constitutional rules of Schmerber and its progeny”); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 ,

2016See, e.g; People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 8, 10 , 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2014) (reading McNeely to suggest that “refusal to submit to a chemical test under an implied consent law operates as a withdrawal of consent and renders any subsequent test noncon-sensual” but deciding testing in that case was permitted on grounds that “there is nothing in the implied consent law to indicate that such measures are within the scope of the consent, and so in these cases the implied consent law gives way to the constitutional rules of Schmerber and its progeny”); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 ,

2016And while McNeely clearly set aside refiance on a per se rule relating to evanescent evidence, some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Courts subsequent remand of Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. _ , 134 S. Ct. 902 , 187 L.

2016And while McNeely clearly set aside refiance on a per se rule relating to evanescent evidence, some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Courts subsequent remand of Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. _ , 134 S. Ct. 902 , 187 L.

2016And while McNeely clearly set aside refiance on a per se rule relating to evanescent evidence, some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Courts subsequent remand of Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. _ , 134 S. Ct. 902 , 187 L.

2016And while McNeely clearly set aside refiance on a per se rule relating to evanescent evidence, some courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Courts subsequent remand of Aviles v. Texas, 571 U.S. _ , 134 S. Ct. 902 , 187 L.

2016See, e.g; People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 8, 10 , 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2014) (reading McNeely to suggest that “refusal to submit to a chemical test under an implied consent law operates as a withdrawal of consent and renders any subsequent test noncon-sensual” but deciding testing in that case was permitted on grounds that “there is nothing in the implied consent law to indicate that such measures are within the scope of the consent, and so in these cases the implied consent law gives way to the constitutional rules of Schmerber and its progeny”); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 ,

2016See, e.g; People v. Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 8, 10 , 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (2014) (reading McNeely to suggest that “refusal to submit to a chemical test under an implied consent law operates as a withdrawal of consent and renders any subsequent test noncon-sensual” but deciding testing in that case was permitted on grounds that “there is nothing in the implied consent law to indicate that such measures are within the scope of the consent, and so in these cases the implied consent law gives way to the constitutional rules of Schmerber and its progeny”); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 ,