per se rule in Texas

2019Compare Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 294 , 296–97 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (no constitutional violation in investigative detention when canine unit arrived 20 minutes after officer issued warning citation), with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 707–09 (1983) (90-minute detention of defendant’s luggage to await drug dog was prolonged seizure that exceeded limits of Terry stop); see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–88 (declining to “establish a per se rule that a 20–minute detention is too long” under Terry).

2019Compare Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 294 , 296–97 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (no constitutional violation in investigative detention when canine unit arrived 20 minutes after officer issued warning citation), with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 707–09 (1983) (90-minute detention of defendant’s luggage to await drug dog was prolonged seizure that exceeded limits of Terry stop); see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–88 (declining to “establish a per se rule that a 20–minute detention is too long” under Terry).

2017See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 65 (“neither our prior cases nor any other case law of which we were aware institutes a per se rule requiring an officer to immediately obtain the driver’s license and registration information and initiate the relevant background checks before asking questions.”).

2017See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 65 (“neither our prior cases nor any other case law of which we were aware institutes a per se rule requiring an officer to immediately obtain the driver’s license and registration information and initiate the relevant background checks before asking questions.”).

2009Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225 ("Because we find (1) our precedent does not favor creating a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for sex offenses, and (2) the rationale of the out-of-state cases creating a universal sexual offense exception is unpersuasive, we decline to create a per se exception to the Rule 608(b) for sexual offenses.”). 24 .

2009Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225 ("Because we find (1) our precedent does not favor creating a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for sex offenses, and (2) the rationale of the out-of-state cases creating a universal sexual offense exception is unpersuasive, we decline to create a per se exception to the Rule 608(b) for sexual offenses."). 24.

2018“Licensure or certification in the particular discipline is not a per se requirement.” Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, pet. ref’d).

2015“Licensure or certification in the particular discipline is not a per se requirement.” Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d).

2016The Court rejected such a per se rule and- explained that “the reasonableness of a warrantless search under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1560 .

2016The Court rejected such a per se rule and explained that “the 10 reasonableness of a warrantless search under the exigency exception to the warrant requirement must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1560 .

2025In Creager, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly “disavow[ed] any implication in the Dunn opinion that the per se rule of inadmissibility that results from a violation of the warning statute applies to an officer’s remarks made during the subsequent interrogation.” Creager, 952 S.W.2d at 856 .

2006The Court of Criminal Appeals in Creager ". . . disavow[ed] any implication in the Dunn opinion that the per se rule of inadmissibility that results from a violation of the warning statute applies to an officer's remarks made during the subsequent interrogation." Creager , 952 S.W.2d at 856 .

2019As to factors one and two, counsel had been administratively suspended for failure to pay dues, which is not the type of violation that suggests incompetence to handle a 2 Cantu v. State, 930 S.W.2d 594, 602 (Tex. Crim.

2007App. 1996), holding that "once an attorney has fulfilled the 'threshold' requirements for legal practice, a per se rule cannot be justified on a jurisdictional basis regardless of the subsequent change in status." Id. at 598 .

2002Emery v. State , 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim.

1998The court of criminal appeals has held, nevertheless, that no definite period of time has been held to be a per se violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial ...” Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

2016Instead, the relevant question in assessing whether a detention extends beyond a reasonable duration is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.’” Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42 , 51–52 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (quoting United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 511 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)); see also Kothe 152 S.W.3d at 64–65 (“The Supreme Court has expressly rejected placing a rigid time limitation on Terry [investigative] stops.”) (citing Sharpe, 470 U.

2015Id. at 685 (citation omitted). 42 Brigham, 382 F.3d at 511 (″neither our prior cases nor any other caselaw of which we are aware institutes a per se rule requiring an officer immediately to obtain the driver’s license and registration information and initiate the relevant background checks before asking questions. … There is … no constitutional stopwatch on traffic stops.

2025Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31. 3 In the instant case, the time between Appellant’s arrest on July 19, 2017, and the date the trial court considered Appellant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on May 5, 2023, was approximately five years and nine months.3 See State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. Crim.

2020Id. –7– There is no set or defined period of time that has been held to be a per se violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.

2015Ed. 2d 389 , 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), when the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure, we reversed, reiterating that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of ″all the circumstances surrounding [***355] the encounter.″ Id., at 439 . [1B]We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search.

2015United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“[F]or the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (expressly disavowing any “litmus-paper test” or single “sentence or . . . paragraph . . . rule,” in recognition of the “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” implicating the Fourth Amendment); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-573 (1988) (rejecting bright-line rule urged by the parties as contrary to the “traditional contextual approach”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (rejecting a per s

2017In conducting a comparative analysis to determine whether there has been any disparate treatment of black panelists-the last factor listed above-the struck panelists need not be compared "only to jurors who are identical in all respects (save race): 'A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.' " Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting Miller-El , 545 U.S. at 247 n.6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ).

2017In conducting a comparative analysis to determine whether there has been any disparate treatment of black panelists-the last factor listed above-the struck panelists need not be compared "only to jurors who are identical in all respects (save race): 'A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters.' " Davis , 268 S.W.3d at 512 (quoting Miller-El , 545 U.S. at 247 n.6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ).

1999In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not erect a per se bar to the introduction of victim impact evidence.

1999In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not erect a per se bar to the introduction of victim impact evidence.

2012The Forest Oil court, however, expressly declined to adopt “a per se rule that a disclaimer automatically precludes a fraudulent-inducement claim” and stated that its holding “should not be construed to mean that a mere disclaimer standing alone will forgive intentional lies regardless of context.” Id. at 61 .

2012The Forest Oil court, however, expressly declined to adopt “a per se rule that a disclaimer automatically precludes a fraudulent-inducement claim” and stated that its holding “should not be construed to mean that a mere disclaimer standing alone will forgive intentional lies regardless of context.” Id. at 61 .

2020In specifically overruling Smith and Plair, the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Easley v. State, that the trial court’s limitation of an accused’s voir dire presentation is not a per se violation of the right to counsel. 424 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. Crim.

2020In specifically overruling Smith and Plair, the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Easley v. State, that the trial court’s limitation of an accused’s voir dire presentation is not a per se violation of the right to counsel. 424 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. Crim.

2024Dunn v. State, 721 S.W.2d 325, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

1991A per se rule of inadmissibility applies if the evidence is uncontroverted that the officer told the accused that his confession could be used “for or against him.” Dunn, 721 S.W.2d at 341 ; Williams v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 347 , 298 S.W.2d 590, 593 (App.1956).

2009In United States v. Posado , 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit held that a per se rule was inappropriate, and that a trial court must make a judgment about the admissibility of polygraph evidence like any other proposed scientific evidence that has not had general acceptance.

2009In United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit held that a per se rule was inappropriate, and that a trial court must make a judgment about the admissibility of polygraph evidence like any other proposed scientific evidence that has not had general acceptance.

2009Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 , 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2713 , 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007).

2009Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 , 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2713 , 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007).

2015United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“[F]or the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (expressly disavowing any “litmus-paper test” or single “sentence or . . . paragraph . . . rule,” in recognition of the “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” implicating the Fourth Amendment); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-573 (1988) (rejecting bright-line rule urged by the parties as contrary to the “traditional contextual approach”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (rejecting a per s

2014United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 , 122 S.Ct. 2105 , 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (“[F]or the most part per se rules are inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (expressly disavowing any “litmus-paper test” or single “sentence or ... paragraph ... rule,” in recognition of the “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” implicating the Fourth Amendment); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-573 , 108 S.Ct. 1975 , 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (rejecting bright-line rule urged by the parties as contrary t

2018As noted in Garcia-Cantu, the use of a spotlight does not create a per se rule for or against a finding of a detention. 253 S.W.3d at 244 .

2012Although the Court recognized that some cases have discussed whether the use of emergency flashing lights in certain circumstances would be considered a detention, see id. at 50, 51-52 ; see also Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 243 n. 43; Hudson v. State, 247 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet.) (“when a person stops in response to a patrol car’s emergency lights rather than of his own accord, an investigatory detention has occurred .... ”), emergency lights were not used in Crain , and the Court did not create a per se rule that the use of emergency lights amounted to a detention.