per se rule in South Carolina

2004In State v. Simmons, 308 S.C. 80 , 417 S.E.2d 92 (1992), our Supreme Court noted the court had adopted a per se rule requiring the trial court to hold an in camera hearing in such situations.

2004In State v. Simmons, 308 S.C. 80 , 417 S.E.2d 92 (1992), our Supreme Court noted the court had adopted a per se rule requiring the trial court to hold an in camera hearing in such situations.

2023This inquiry is fundamentally at odds with the 12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173 (Pa. 2017) ("In recent years, a multitude of courts in our sister states have interpreted their respective—and similar—implied consent provisions and have concluded that the legislative proclamation that motorists are deemed to have consented to chemical tests is insufficient to establish the voluntariness of consent that is necessary to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) ("[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rul

2023Although the Wisconsin court considered the constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision, 12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173 (Pa. 2017) ("In recent years, a multitude of courts in our sister states have interpreted their respective—and similar—implied consent provisions and have concluded that the legislative proclamation that motorists are deemed to have consented to chemical tests is insufficient to establish the voluntariness of consent that is necessary to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) ("

2015See Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299 , 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (adopting, as a matter of policy, a per se rule of recusal that a judge who presided over a defendant’s criminal trial cannot preside over a subsequent post-conviction relief proceeding).

2015See Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299 , 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (adopting, as a matter of policy, a per se rule of recusal that a judge who presided over a defendant’s criminal trial cannot preside over a subsequent post-conviction relief proceeding).

2023This inquiry is fundamentally at odds with the 12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173 (Pa. 2017) ("In recent years, a multitude of courts in our sister states have interpreted their respective—and similar—implied consent provisions and have concluded that the legislative proclamation that motorists are deemed to have consented to chemical tests is insufficient to establish the voluntariness of consent that is necessary to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) ("[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rul

2023Although the Wisconsin court considered the constitutionality of the incapacitated driver provision, 12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1173 (Pa. 2017) ("In recent years, a multitude of courts in our sister states have interpreted their respective—and similar—implied consent provisions and have concluded that the legislative proclamation that motorists are deemed to have consented to chemical tests is insufficient to establish the voluntariness of consent that is necessary to serve as an exception to the warrant requirement."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) ("

2017The victim is a young child, whom one cannot reasonably expect to recall the exact dates of the sexual abuse."); State v. Wade, 306 S.C. 79, 82-83 , 409 S.E.2d 780, 781-82 (1991) (refusing to adopt a per se rule that a two year time period in an indictment was unconstitutionally overbroad).

2017The victim is a young child, whom one cannot reasonably expect to recall the exact dates of the sexual abuse."); State v. Wade, 306 S.C. 79, 82-83 , 409 S.E.2d 780, 781-82 (1991) (refusing to adopt a per se rule that a two year time period in an indictment was unconstitutionally overbroad).

2000See again Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n. v. Berry, [ 31 Ariz. 39 , 250 P. 356 (1926) ]; Peanut Growers’ Exch. v. Bobbitt, [ 188 N.C. 335 , 124 S.E. 625 (1924) ]; State v. Thomlinson, supra. I would adopt a per se rule of disqualification from jury service for members of an electric cooperative who is a party to the case.

2000See again Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n. v. Berry, [ 31 Ariz. 39 , 250 P. 356 (1926) ]; Peanut Growers’ Exch. v. Bobbitt, [ 188 N.C. 335 , 124 S.E. 625 (1924) ]; State v. Thomlinson, supra. I would adopt a per se rule of disqualification from jury service for members of an electric cooperative who is a party to the case.

1988The new business rule as a per se rule of nonrecoverability of lost profits was firmly established in this state in Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris , 81 S.C. 181, 187 , 62 S.E. 150, 152 (1907): "When a business is in contemplation, but not established or not in actual operation, profit merely hoped for is too uncertain and conjectural to be considered." McMeekin v. Southern Ry.

1988The new business rule as a per se rule of nonrecoverability of lost profits was firmly established in this state in Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris , 81 S.C. 181, 187 , 62 S.E. 150, 152 (1907): "When a business is in contemplation, but not established or not in actual operation, profit merely hoped for is too uncertain and conjectural to be considered." McMeekin v. Southern Ry.

2016“Although [the court] in Council declined to recognize a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence, it indicated that the ‘admissibility of this type of scientific evidence should be analyzed under Rules 702 and 403, SCRE and the [State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723 , 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979) ] factors.’ ” Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533 , 657 S.E.2d 771, 778 (2008) (quoting Council, 335 S.C. at 24 , 515 S.E.2d at 520 ).

2016“Although [the court] in Council declined to recognize a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence, it indicated that the ‘admissibility of this type of scientific evidence should be analyzed under Rules 702 and 403, SCRE and the [State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723 , 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979) ] factors.’ ” Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533 , 657 S.E.2d 771, 778 (2008) (quoting Council, 335 S.C. at 24 , 515 S.E.2d at 520 ).

2021Univ. of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 73 , 492 S.E.2d 62, 74 (1997) ("[A]lthough the Court condemns ex parte communication, it has refused to adopt a per se rule automatically reversing rulings which result from ex parte communications.

2021Univ. of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 73 , 492 S.E.2d 62, 74 (1997) ("[A]lthough the Court condemns ex parte communication, it has refused to adopt a per se rule automatically reversing rulings which result from ex parte communications.

2020BEATTY, C.J., concurring in result only. exception to the warrant requirement."); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939 , 946 (Nev. 2014) (holding Nevada's implied consent statute that permitted law enforcement to use force to obtain a sample and did not give the individual the right to withdraw consent could not be considered voluntary consent under the consent exception); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 (Idaho 2014) ("[I]rrevocable implied consent operates as a per se rule that cannot fit under the consent exception because it does not always analyze the voluntariness of that consent."); State v. B

2020See State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 220-21 , 776 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (2015) (holding "testimony of the factors that are relevant to the trial court's determination whether the interviewee's statement is trustworthy is not appropriate for the jury" because it is improper bolstering of a minor's credibility); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 359-60 , 737 S.E.2d 490, 500-01 (2013) (setting forth examples of statements to which the forensic interviewer may or may not properly testify).

2020See State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 220-21 , 776 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (2015) (holding "testimony of the factors that are relevant to the trial court's determination whether the interviewee's statement is trustworthy is not appropriate for the jury" because it is improper bolstering of a minor's credibility); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 359-60 , 737 S.E.2d 490, 500-01 (2013) (setting forth examples of statements to which the forensic interviewer may or may not properly testify).

2020See State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 220-21 , 776 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (2015) (holding "testimony of the factors that are relevant to the trial court's determination whether the interviewee's statement is trustworthy is not appropriate for the jury" because it is improper bolstering of a minor's credibility); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 359-60 , 737 S.E.2d 490, 500-01 (2013) (setting forth examples of statements to which the forensic interviewer may or may not properly testify).

2020See State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 220-21 , 776 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (2015) (holding "testimony of the factors that are relevant to the trial court's determination whether the interviewee's statement is trustworthy is not appropriate for the jury" because it is improper bolstering of a minor's credibility); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 359-60 , 737 S.E.2d 490, 500-01 (2013) (setting forth examples of statements to which the forensic interviewer may or may not properly testify).

2017Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (finding defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights by speaking to police during a custodial interrogation after stating he would not give a written statement until his attorney was present, but he was willing to speak to the police); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U

2017Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (finding defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights by speaking to police during a custodial interrogation after stating he would not give a written statement until his attorney was present, but he was willing to speak to the police); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U

2017Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979))); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (finding defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights by speaking to police during a custodial interrogation after stating he would not give a written statement until his attorney was present, but he was willing to speak to the police); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U

2016“Although [the court] in Council declined to recognize a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence, it indicated that the ‘admissibility of this type of scientific evidence should be analyzed under Rules 702 and 403, SCRE and the [State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723 , 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979) ] factors.’ ” Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533 , 657 S.E.2d 771, 778 (2008) (quoting Council, 335 S.C. at 24 , 515 S.E.2d at 520 ).

2016“Although [the court] in Council declined to recognize a per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence, it indicated that the ‘admissibility of this type of scientific evidence should be analyzed under Rules 702 and 403, SCRE and the [State v. Jones, 273 S.C. 723 , 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979) ] factors.’ ” Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 533 , 657 S.E.2d 771, 778 (2008) (quoting Council, 335 S.C. at 24 , 515 S.E.2d at 520 ).

2015See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

2015See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

2015See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35, 39-40 (1996) (rejecting a per se rule that would render consent involuntary if an officer failed to advise a motorist he was free to go before requesting consent and finding the failure to give such advice to be only one factor to consider in the overall analysis). 1 Because we determined the continued detention of Alston was permissible based on Deputy Gilbert's objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity, we need not address whether the traffic stop evolved into a consensual encounter.

2015Furthermore, the harmless error analysis is an appellate doctrine arising from the principle that "appellate courts will not set aside judgments due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result." Way v. State, 410 S.C. 377, 384 , 764 S.E.2d 701, 705 (2014).

2015Furthermore, the harmless error analysis is an appellate doctrine arising from the principle that “appellate courts will not set aside judgments due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result.” Way v. State, 410 S.C. 377, 384 , 764 S.E.2d 701, 705 (2014).

2014Compare Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299 , 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (adopting “a per se rule of recusal” when the same judge who presided over a criminal trial is asked to preside over a post-conviction relief proceeding for the same defendant), with State v. Watkins, 406 S.C. 360, 363-64 , 752 S.E.2d 261, 262 (2013) (holding a judge is not automatically disqualified from presiding over a retrial after granting post-conviction relief).

2014Compare Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299 , 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (adopting “a per se rule of recusal” when the same judge who presided over a criminal trial is asked to preside over a post-conviction relief proceeding for the same defendant), with State v. Watkins, 406 S.C. 360, 363-64 , 752 S.E.2d 261, 262 (2013) (holding a judge is not automatically disqualified from presiding over a retrial after granting post-conviction relief).