per se rule in New Hampshire

2005Mankoski v. Briley, 137 N.H. 308, 313 (1993).

2001Rather, “[a]n individual witness’s qualifications must be determined on a case-by-case basis, not by application of a per se rule of exclusion or inclusion.” Mankoski, 137 N.H. at 313 .

2021Attorney Gen., 169 N.H. 509, 527-28 (2016).

2020Id. at 519-20 ; see Lambert v. Belknap County Convention, 157 N.H. 375, 382-86 (2008) (describing the balancing test used to determine whether public records are exempt from disclosure because their release would constitute an invasion of privacy).

2002In State v. Fennelly, 123 N.H. 378 (1983), we stated that, due to the probability of unfairness, a per se rule of disqualification applies when a judge “has pecuniary interests in the outcome, ... has become personally embroiled in criticism from a party before him,... has heard evidence in secret at a prior proceeding, or ... is related to a party.” Fennelly, 123 N.H. at 384 (quotation omitted).

2002In State v. Fennelly, 123 N.H. 378 (1983), we stated that, due to the probability of unfairness, a per se rule of disqualification applies when a judge “has pecuniary interests in the outcome, ... has become personally embroiled in criticism from a party before him,... has heard evidence in secret at a prior proceeding, or ... is related to a party.” Fennelly, 123 N.H. at 384 (quotation omitted).

2021See Union Leader Corp.,173 N.H. at 353-57 (overruling Union Leader Corp. v. Fenniman, 136 N.H. 624, 627 (1993), to the extent that it applied a per se rule, rather than a balancing test, precluding the disclosure of records falling within the exemption for “internal personnel practices”); Reid v. N.H.

2020Nevertheless, in Fenniman, we eschewed the balancing test we had applied to the disclosure of “confidential” and “financial” information in favor of a per se rule of exemption for records pertaining to “internal personnel practices” because, we said, “the legislature [had] plainly made its own determination that [internal personnel practices] documents are categorically exempt.” Fenniman, 136 N.H. at 627 .

2011In Angley-Cook & Cook, we joined the majority of states that “allow the obligor credit for his or her child support obligation as a per se rule.” Angley-Cook & Cook, 151 N.H. at 259 .

2006“We choose to follow the majority of States and allow the obligor credit for his or her child support obligation as a per se rule.” In the Matter of Angley-Cook & Cook, 151 N.H. 257, 259 (2004); see also Annotation, Right to Credit on Child Support Payments for Social Security or Other Government Dependency Payments Made for Benefit of Child, 34 A.L.R.5TH 447 (2004 & Supp. 2005).

2023State v. Hight, 146 N.H. 746, 749 (2001) (quotation omitted).

2017Id.

1981A per se rule of disqualification due to the probability of unfairness, “applies when the trier has pecuniary interests in the outcome,” when the trier has become personally embroiled in criticism from a party before him, or when he has heard evidence in secret at a prior proceeding, or when he is related to a party.” State v. Aubert, 118 N.H. 739, 741 , 393 A.2d 567, 568 (1978) (citations omitted).

1981A per se rule of disqualification due to the probability of unfairness, “applies when the trier has pecuniary interests in the outcome,” when the trier has become personally embroiled in criticism from a party before him, or when he has heard evidence in secret at a prior proceeding, or when he is related to a party.” State v. Aubert, 118 N.H. 739, 741 , 393 A.2d 567, 568 (1978) (citations omitted).

2023State v. Kay, 162 N.H. 237, 242 (2011) (“Our interpretation of a trial court order is a question of law, which we review de novo.”).

2020See State v. Moore, 151 N.H. 288, 290 (2004) (concluding that the “case-specific, objective facts” supported a finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion); see also, e.g., Sage, 170 N.H. at 610; Livingston, 153 N.H. at 405 .

2020See Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 232 (2013) (assuming that our prior holding “conforms to legislative intent” when it had “been over four years since we issued our [prior] decision and the legislature [had] not seen fit to amend the statute”); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 511, 514 (1973) (noting that “[i]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evi

2020See State v. Balch, 167 N.H. 329, 335 (2015) (deciding that a rule that “is a simple rule to apply and understand . . . has retained its practicality and simplicity”).

2020See McKinnon-Andrews, 151 N.H. at 25-26 .

2020See Appeal of Phillips, 165 N.H. 226, 232 (2013) (assuming that our prior holding “conforms to legislative intent” when it had “been over four years since we issued our [prior] decision and the legislature [had] not seen fit to amend the statute”); cf. New Hampshire Retail Grocers Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 113 N.H. 511, 514 (1973) (noting that “[i]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a longstanding practical and plausible interpretation given a statute of doubtful meaning by those responsible for its implementation without any interference by the legislature is evi

2020Id. at 519-20 ; see Lambert v. Belknap County Convention, 157 N.H. 375, 382-86 (2008) (describing the balancing test used to determine whether public records are exempt from disclosure because their release would constitute an invasion of privacy).

2020In the future, the balancing test we have used for the other categories of records listed in RSA 91-A:5, IV shall apply to records relating to “internal personnel practices.” See Prof’l Firefighters of N.H., 159 N.H. at 707 (setting forth the three-step analysis required to determine whether disclosure will result in an invasion of privacy).

2020Duran, 158 N.H. at 154 ; see Reid, 169 N.H. at 520-21 ; Seacoast Newspapers, 173 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 6-8). “[W]e owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations.” Duran, 158 N.H. at 155 (quotation omitted).

2020Duran, 158 N.H. at 154 ; see Reid, 169 N.H. at 520-21 ; Seacoast Newspapers, 173 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 6-8). “[W]e owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations.” Duran, 158 N.H. at 155 (quotation omitted).

2016In Arcidi, we noted that, in Burrows, we relied upon Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687, 691 (1977), “which provides for attorney’s fees when an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right and the opposing party has acted in bad faith.” Arcidi, 150 N.H. at 704 .

2016However, in Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694 (2004), we clarified that our holding in Burrows “did not establish a per se rule that entitles all successful plaintiffs in inverse condemnation cases to recover attorney’s fees and costs.” Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694, 704 (2004).

2016However, in Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694 (2004), we clarified that our holding in Burrows “did not establish a per se rule that entitles all successful plaintiffs in inverse condemnation cases to recover attorney’s fees and costs.” Arcidi v. Town of Rye, 150 N.H. 694, 704 (2004).

2016Whereas in medical malpractice cases, we have held that expert testimony is required to prove proximate cause, Beckles v. Madden, 160 N.H. 118, 125 (2010), we have declined to adopt a similar per se rule in legal malpractice cases, see Yager, 166 N.H. at 573 .

2016Whereas in medical malpractice cases, we have held that expert testimony is required to prove proximate cause, Beckles v. Madden, 160 N.H. 118, 125 (2010), we have declined to adopt a similar per se rule in legal malpractice cases, see Yager, 166 N.H. at 573 .

2016See Yager, 166 N.H. at 573-74 (eschewing a per se rule that expert witness testimony is not required to prove a breach of the standard of care when a legal malpractice claim is premised upon the failure to file a claim within an applicable statute of limitations).

2014See id. at 674-75 ; Carbone v. Tierney, 151 N.H. 521, 528 (2004).

2014See, e.g., Lux, 484 S.E.2d at 152 ; McClellan, 216 P.2d at 961; People v. Davenport, 760 N.W.2d 743, 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).

2014See Whitaker v. Com., 895 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Ky. 1995) (if the switching attorney “engaged in a substantial and personal participation in the defendant’s case,” the defendant need not show prejudice); Croka, 646 S.W.2d at 393 (where switching attorney “acquired knowledge about the case” from the defendant while acting as his appointed counsel, when attorney joined the prosecutor’s office, “that office was thereby disqualified from prosecuting the case irrespective of the assumed facts that [the attorney] revealed no confidences and did not himself participate in the prosecution”).

2014Another reason is that a per se rule “would unnecessarily limit mobility in the legal profession and inhibit the ability of prosecuting attorney’s offices to hire the best possible employees. . . .” State v. Kinkennon, 747 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Neb. 2008); see State v. Jones, 429 A.2d 936, 942-43 (Conn. 1980) (per se rule “would result in many unnecessary withdrawals, limit mobility in the legal profession, and restrict the state in the assignment of counsel where no breach of confidentiality has in fact occurred”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Powell, 442 A.2d 939 (Conn. 1982).