143 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2021Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2531 . ¶87 Justice Clarence Thomas would have gone farther than the plurality and concluded that the Court should apply the per se rule he proposed in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013). 2020Thus, our conclusion is a far cry from a per se rule that would apply in other cases, such as a run-of-the- 12 No. 2018AP2269-CR mill OWI investigation in which police encounter the driver at the time the driver is still operating a vehicle or shortly thereafter. ¶30 For all these reasons, we conclude that an objectively reasonable officer in Oswald’s position would have believed that a delay of even 40 minutes to obtain a warrant before ordering a blood draw would have “significantly undermin[ed] the efficacy of the search.” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 . | 3 | 10 |
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2016However, as McNeely explained, the State's interests are adequately addressed under a case-by-case analysis and do not justify "the 'considerable overgeneralization' that a per se rule would 18 No. 2014AP304-CR.awb reflect." 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997)). ¶136 Ultimately, every rationale offered by the lead opinion in defense of its assertion that it has not created a per se rule is logically and legally unsound. 2016However, as McNeely explained, the State's interests are adequately addressed under a case-by-case analysis and do not justify "the 'considerable overgeneralization' that a per se rule would 18 No. 2014AP304-CR.awb reflect." 133 S. Ct. at 1561 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997)). ¶136 Ultimately, every rationale offered by the lead opinion in defense of its assertion that it has not created a per se rule is logically and legally unsound. | 3 | 5 |
United States v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2016In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment embodies "a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). ¶128 Prior to Jones, courts employed the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in analyzing the Fourth Amendment's protections. 2016In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment embodies "a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates." United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). ¶128 Prior to Jones, courts employed the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in analyzing the Fourth Amendment's protections. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2018This court has recognized Mimms as 1 No. 2015AP756-CR.awb establishing a clear directive, "a per se rule that an officer may order a person out of his or her vehicle incident to an otherwise valid stop for a traffic violation." State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶23 , 299 Wis. 2d 675 , 729 N.W.2d 182 (emphasis added); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶24 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 . ¶42 Therein lies the rub. 2018This court has recognized Mimms as 1 No. 2015AP756-CR.awb establishing a clear directive, "a per se rule that an officer may order a person out of his or her vehicle incident to an otherwise valid stop for a traffic violation." State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶23 , 299 Wis. 2d 675 , 729 N.W.2d 182 (emphasis added); State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶24 , 377 Wis. 2d 394 , 898 N.W.2d 560 . ¶42 Therein lies the rub. | 2 | 6 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2008To adopt Schaefer's position would require us to create a per se rule that defense counsel is ineffective when counsel fails to subpoena police reports and other similar materials prior to a preliminary examination. ś 87 This court operates under the principles adopted by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2008To adopt Schaefer's position would require us to create a per se rule that defense counsel is ineffective when counsel fails to subpoena police reports and other similar materials prior to a preliminary examination. ś 87 This court operates under the principles adopted by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Michael R. Tullberggreen2 sentences2025State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . 2025State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶27 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . | 2 | 3 |
Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen2 sentences2020Concluding that the latter "hardly rises to the level of a 'petty indignity'" the Supreme Court concluded that "[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety." Id. at 111 (quoted source and footnote omitted). ¶21 Brown argues Rodriguez narrowed the per se rule of Mimms to allow removal from a vehicle only if attendant to the mission of the stop. 2020Concluding that the latter "hardly rises to the level of a 'petty indignity'" the Supreme Court concluded that "[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety." Id. at 111 (quoted source and footnote omitted). ¶21 Brown argues Rodriguez narrowed the per se rule of Mimms to allow removal from a vehicle only if attendant to the mission of the stop. | 2 | 3 |
Norton v. Rookergreen2 sentences2017See Rooker v. Norton, 1 Pin. 195 (1842). 26 Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 517 , 133 N.W.2d 632 (1911). 27 Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 755 , 761 (1861); Killingstad, 147 Wis. at 514-15 . 28 No. 2016AP923-W ¶63 Shortly after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court declared that limited use of referees was constitutional because their use dated to pre-constitution days.28 The state constitution "did not take away this right of reference, but only provided that the right of trial by jury should remain as it was before . . . ."29 ¶64 Although these early cases recognized that a refere 2017See Rooker v. Norton, 1 Pin. 195 (1842). 26 Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 517 , 133 N.W.2d 632 (1911). 27 Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 755 , 761 (1861); Killingstad, 147 Wis. at 514-15 . 28 No. 2016AP923-W ¶63 Shortly after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court declared that limited use of referees was constitutional because their use dated to pre-constitution days.28 The state constitution "did not take away this right of reference, but only provided that the right of trial by jury should remain as it was before . . . ."29 ¶64 Although these early cases recognized that a refere | 2 | 2 |
Knips v. Stefangreen2 sentences2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). 2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). | 2 | 2 |
Killingstad v. Meigsgreen2 sentences2017See Rooker v. Norton, 1 Pin. 195 (1842). 26 Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 517 , 133 N.W.2d 632 (1911). 27 Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 755 , 761 (1861); Killingstad, 147 Wis. at 514-15 . 28 No. 2016AP923-W ¶63 Shortly after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court declared that limited use of referees was constitutional because their use dated to pre-constitution days.28 The state constitution "did not take away this right of reference, but only provided that the right of trial by jury should remain as it was before . . . ."29 ¶64 Although these early cases recognized that a refere 2017See Rooker v. Norton, 1 Pin. 195 (1842). 26 Killingstad v. Meigs, 147 Wis. 511, 517 , 133 N.W.2d 632 (1911). 27 Brown v. Runals, 14 Wis. 755 , 761 (1861); Killingstad, 147 Wis. at 514-15 . 28 No. 2016AP923-W ¶63 Shortly after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court declared that limited use of referees was constitutional because their use dated to pre-constitution days.28 The state constitution "did not take away this right of reference, but only provided that the right of trial by jury should remain as it was before . . . ."29 ¶64 Although these early cases recognized that a refere | 2 | 2 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2016Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)). ¶63 Likewise, it is undisputed that pursuant to McNeely a per se rule authorizing warrantless blood draws based on dissipation of evidence in the bloodstream is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. 2016Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)). ¶63 Likewise, it is undisputed that pursuant to McNeely a per se rule authorizing warrantless blood draws based on dissipation of evidence in the bloodstream is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gardnergreen2 sentences2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr 2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr | 2 | 2 |
Blea v. Sandovalgreen2 sentences2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330 , 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554 , 761 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1988) ("Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to obtain a default 2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330 , 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554 , 761 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1988) ("Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to obtain a default | 2 | 2 |
Sutter v. Paynegreen2 sentences2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330 , 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554 , 761 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1988) ("Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to obtain a default 2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330 , 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554 , 761 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1988) ("Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to obtain a default | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Roger Welbeckgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Bangertgreen | 2 | 2 |
Ohio v. Robinettegreen2 sentences2016The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," and "[r]easonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 ). 2004The Supreme Court has "eschewed bright-line rules [in Fourth Amendment inquiries], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule in favor of an inquiry into "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988) (rejecting the parties' proposals for bright-line rules in favor of a fact specific analysis); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) ("The constitutional validity of a warrantless | 1 | 4 |
State v. RREgreen2 sentences2005"Thus, 'the determination of whether "shall" is mandatory or directory is not governed by a per se rule.'" Macht, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. R.R.E, 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707 , 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991)). 2005"Thus, 'the determination of whether "shall" is mandatory or directory is not governed by a per se rule.'" Macht, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶ 15 (quoting State v. R.R.E, 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707 , 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991)). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Ndinagreen2 sentences2014State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 . 18 No. 2011AP1673-CRNM draw results under McNeely, he questions whether exigent circumstances justified the police's action.12 ¶44 Foster points out that the facts of this case are strikingly similar to those of McNeely.13 As a result, he asks this court to hold that the blood draw violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, just as the United States Supreme Court did in McNeely. ¶45 We note that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether the facts of McNeely constituted s 2014State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29 , 315 Wis. 2d 653 , 761 N.W.2d 612 . 18 No. 2011AP1673-CRNM draw results under McNeely, he questions whether exigent circumstances justified the police's action.12 ¶44 Foster points out that the facts of this case are strikingly similar to those of McNeely.13 As a result, he asks this court to hold that the blood draw violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, just as the United States Supreme Court did in McNeely. ¶45 We note that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether the facts of McNeely constituted s | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 ("While we therefore reject the per se rule which the Illinois courts appear to have accepted, we also decline to adopt any alternative per se or 'but for' rule."); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984). 2010The Court rejected a per se rule and held that the application of Wong Sun "must be answered on the facts of each case." Id. at 603 . | 1 | 2 |
| State Ex Rel. Marberry v. MacHtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Manson v. Brathwaitegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Wentela v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lockhart v. Fretwellgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Edwards v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauergreen | 1 | 2 |
| Patrick F. Andrews v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Predick v. O'CONNORgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Howes v. Fieldsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marks v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Wisconsingreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Marshland Acres, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Laskygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Navdeep S. Brargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Gatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Antonio Aviles v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cocciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamiltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Florida v. Jimeno
green
2 sentences2016The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," and "[r]easonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 ). 2016The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," and "[r]easonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250 ). | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Guthrie v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
green
2 sentences2005In Guthrie v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 111 Wis. 2d 447 , 331 N.W.2d 331 (1983), we did establish a per se rule that a judge in administrative proceedings must disqualify himself or herself, if the judge had acted as counsel for one of the parties in the same action or proceeding. 2005In Guthrie v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 111 Wis. 2d 447 , 331 N.W.2d 331 (1983), we did establish a per se rule that a judge in administrative proceedings must disqualify himself or herself, if the judge had acted as counsel for one of the parties in the same action or proceeding. | 3 | 1990–2005 |
Jae Lee v. United States
green
2 sentences2021The State also cites Lee for the proposition that a defendant with no viable defense “will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial.” Id. ¶30 The State fails to acknowledge, however, that the Lee Court declined the government’s request to adopt a per se rule “that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.” Id. 2021The State also cites Lee for the proposition that a defendant with no viable defense “will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial.” Id. ¶30 The State fails to acknowledge, however, that the Lee Court declined the government’s request to adopt a per se rule “that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.” Id. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Stone v. Merrill
neutral
2 sentences2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). 2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Best v. Pike
neutral
2 sentences2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). 2017For example, a referee's report was 28 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216). 29 Dunning, 20 Wis. at 228 (*216); Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 499 , (1861). 30 Best v. Pike, 93 Wis. 408, 414 , 67 N.W. 697 (1896); Knips v. Stefan, 50 Wis. 286 , 6 N.W. 877, 880 (1880); Stone v. Merrill, 43 Wis. 72 (1877). 31 Knips v. Stephan, 50 Wis. 286, 290 , 6 N.W. 877 (1880) ("The right to have the issues determined by a referee and the court, against the consent of either party, is the exception . . . ."). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Bohling
red
2 sentences2016Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539-40 . 2016Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d at 539-40 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Kolisnitschenko
green
2 sentences2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr 2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2014Jones, 2002 WI App 208, ¶ 9 . 2014Jones, 2002 WI App 208, ¶9 . | 2 | 2004–2014 |
Gibson v. State
green
2 sentences2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr 2014Why does the majority opinion create a new per se rule that is inconsistent with the 5 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d at 40, 41-42 . 6 Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32 . 7 Kolisnitschenko, 84 Wis. 2d 492 . 8 Gibson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 110 , 197 N.W.2d 813 (1972). 3 No. 2011AP1467-CR.ssa overlapping aspects of the NGI and involuntary intoxication defenses?9 ¶49 I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion, which reaches what on its face appears to be a conclusion contrary to the statutes and case law. ¶50 In any event, the real dispute between the parties focuses on whether the defendant's use of a combination of pr | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Gee
green
2 sentences2008Id. ¶ 23 While we did emphasize the likely usefulness of the sentencing transcript in our Brown decision, we did not intend for that to be construed as a per se rule that circuit courts must read the original sentencing transcript before every reconfinement hearing. 2007Although we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion, this court has held in a decision ordered published on February 28, 2007, State v. Gee, 2007 WI App 32, ¶ 15 , 299 Wis. 2d 518 , 729 N.W.2d 424, 430 , that Brown did create a per se rule, even though Brown itself did not so treat its suggestion that recon-finement courts "should consider" the original sentencing transcript. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Days Inns Acquisition Corp. v. Hutchinson
green
2 sentences2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Ark. 1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 761 P.2d 432, 437 (N.M. 2008Where . . . relief against one defendant is completely dependent upon the liability of a co-defendant, it would be improper to allow the final judgment to be entered until the liability of the co-defendant has been decided. [56] See id. at 751-52 & n. 6. [57] See Opening Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc. at 3, 36. [58] Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330 , 989 S.W.2d 887, 889 (1999). [59] Id. [60] See, e.g., Blea v. Sandoval, 107 N.M. 554 , 761 P.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1988) ("Plaintiffs should not have been allowed to obtain a default | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp.
green
2 sentences2007The Johnsons urged this court to adopt a per se rule "prohibiting dismissal absent a showing that the party itself bears some responsibility for the failure of its attorney-representative to comply with the court's orders." Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 281 . ¶ 60. 2007The Johnsons urged this court to adopt a per se rule "prohibiting dismissal absent a showing that the party itself bears some responsibility for the failure of its attorney-representative to comply with the court's orders." Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 281 . ś 60 This court declined to adopt such a rule, concluding that it was unworkable and would undermine the circuit court's ability to effectively administer judicial business. | 2 | 1999–2007 |
| Theriault v. State green | 2 | 2003–2005 |
| Michigan v. Mosley green | 2 | 1980–2002 |
| Solem v. Stumes green | 2 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Mohr green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State Ex Rel. Harris v. Schmidt green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Shirk v. Bowling, Inc. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Leipske v. Guenther green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Clappes green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Anderson v. MSI Preferred Insurance green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Powell green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Newbold v. United States green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Gruetzmacher green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Richter green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.