per se rule in Hawaii

2021That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber[ v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], not to accept the "considerable overgeneralization" that a per se rule would reflect.

2016That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 [ 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ] (1966)], not to accept the considerable overgeneralization that a per se rule would reflect.

2016Id. at 1561 (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). 4 In support of its decision to reject a categorical finding of exigency based on the risk of blood alcohol dissipation, the Supreme Court in McNeely maintained that “[t]he context of blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in which the police are truly confronted with a ‘now or never’ situation.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561 .

2015The categorical nature of the dissent’s exception is incompatible with the principle that the validity of warrantless searches is contingent upon “all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1560 ; see Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 665 (holding that Texas’ implied consent statute created an impermissible categorical exception to the warrant requirement).

2014Davis, 122 Hawai'i at 445 n. 35, 228 P.3d at 325 n. 35.

2010Additionally, as the majority recognizes, " Atlantic Richfield involved a judicially recognized per se antitrust violation, whereas the per se violation of Hawai`i antitrust law in this case is established by HRS § 481B-14." Majority opinion at ___, 228 P.3d at 325 n. 35.

2010Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 35 495 U.S. 328, 341 , 110 S.Ct. 1884 , 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990), the Court “rejected] respondent’s suggestion that no antitrust injury need be shown where a per se violation is involved.” “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-red'itcmp' aspect or. effect of the defendant’s behavior.

2010Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 35 495 U.S. 328, 341 , 110 S.Ct. 1884 , 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990), the Court “rejected] respondent’s suggestion that no antitrust injury need be shown where a per se violation is involved.” “The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-red'itcmp' aspect or. effect of the defendant’s behavior.

2025“We should be particularly sensitive to this last point, for if we establish a per se rule that a specified time period is too long to support an inference of retaliation, well-advised retaliators will simply wait until that period has passed” and then “retaliate with impunity.” Id.

2020A non-solicitation clause is not a per se violation of federal antitrust law, id. (citing Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1983)).

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2018App. Div. 2017) (determining that the prosecutor's argument that the "defendant 'lie[d] to the police about his alcohol consumption' prior to operating his motor vehicle ... was fair comment on the evidence" (brackets in original) ); United States v. Sullivan , 522 F.3d 967 , 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the prosecutor's assertions that the defendant "lied or misled the bankruptcy court" and "[told] lies to bankruptcy counsel" during closing argument did not constitute misconduct because "they were a fair inference" from facts supported by evidence at trial (brackets in original) ); St

2016The dissent thus rejects the long-established principle that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Stachler, 58 Haw. at 416 , 570 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ).

2016The dissent thus rejects the long-established principle that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Stachler, 58 Haw. at 416 , 570 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ).

2016The dissent thus rejects the long-established principle that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Stachler, 58 Haw. at 416 , 570 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ).

2016The dissent thus rejects the long-established principle that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Stachler, 58 Haw. at 416 , 570 P.2d at 1326 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ).

2015See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126, 137 , 681 P.2d 553, 562 (1984); Ganal, 81 Hawaii at 368 , 917 P,2d at 380.

2014Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 , 88 S.Ct. 869 , 19 L.Ed.2d 998 (1968), overruled by Khan, 522 U.S. at 19 , 118 S.Ct. 275 .

2013In the quoted passage from Marshall , the Marshall court explained that, “ ‘[w]e know of no reason, in the present case, why the invalid vote of one member of the council should be held to invalidate the perfectly legal vote of the other four members.’” Id. at 248, 624 P.2d at 1371 (quoting Marshall, 41 A. at 995 ) (emphasis added).

2013In the quoted passage from Marshall , the Marshall court explained that, “ ‘[w]e know of no reason, in the present case, why the invalid vote of one member of the council should be held to invalidate the perfectly legal vote of the other four members.’” Id. at 248, 624 P.2d at 1371 (quoting Marshall, 41 A. at 995 ) (emphasis added).