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20 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paul Peter Solina, Jr. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2005Under those circumstances, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that this constituted a per se violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to “assistance of counsel.” Id. at 167 . 2005See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1983) (representation by person who had failed twice to pass the New York state bar examination and was not a member of any other bar was a per se violation of the right to counsel); cf. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1990) (representation by attorney who gained law license through fraud was a per se Sixth Amendment violation). | 2 | 2 |
Holloway v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences1996Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). 1992Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
State v. McCroygreen2 sentences2005The Nebraska Supreme Court has nonetheless noted that some courts “have held that in certain circumstances, legal representation by a particular individual constitutes a per se violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the particulars of such representation.” State v. McCroy, 259 Neb. 709, 713 , 613 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (2000). 2005The Nebraska Supreme Court has nonetheless noted that some courts “have held that in certain circumstances, legal representation by a particular individual constitutes a per se violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, regardless of the particulars of such representation.” State v. McCroy, 259 Neb. 709, 713 , 613 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Christopher McIver United States of America v. Brian Eberlegreen1 sentence2002United States v. McIver, 186 F3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1177 (2000) (holding that video surveillance of marijuana garden in National Forest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.1d 88 (1998)(refusing to adopt a per se rule requiring the state to obtain a search warrant any time it wishes to use video surveillance of residential property). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holdengreen1 sentence2002United States v. McIver, 186 F3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1177 (2000) (holding that video surveillance of marijuana garden in National Forest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.1d 88 (1998)(refusing to adopt a per se rule requiring the state to obtain a search warrant any time it wishes to use video surveillance of residential property). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Valenciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. John Novak
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1983) (representation by person who had failed twice to pass the New York state bar examination and was not a member of any other bar was a per se violation of the right to counsel); cf. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1990) (representation by attorney who gained law license through fraud was a per se Sixth Amendment violation). 2005Likewise, in U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990), the federal appellate court followed a similar rationale in holding that representation by a lawyer who had been admitted to the bar only on the basis of false representations regarding his legal education constituted a per se Sixth Amendment violation. | 2 | 1996–2005 |
Richards v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2001As the Supreme Court stated in Richards v. Wisconsin, supra, “if a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable — albeit hypothetical — risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock and announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” Reversed and remanded. 2001In rejecting the Wisconsin rule, the Court explained that “if a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable — albeit hypothetical — risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” See id. at 394 . | 2 | 1999–2001 |
Burger v. Kemp
green
2 sentences1989Turning to the contention that defense counsel was ineffective because there was a conflict of interest between Humphrey and appellant, in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) , it was held that one attorney may be appointed to represent two or more defendants without such representation constituting a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 1988In the recent case of Burger v. Kemp,_U.S_, 107 S.Ct. 3114 ,_L.Ed.2d_(1987), the Supreme Court recounted the rule that requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not a per se violation of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Stanford v. Kentucky
red
2 sentences2019Code Ann. §§ 5-10-101 (c) (Supp. 1995), 5-4-615 (Repl. 1993), and 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 1995); Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (permitting imposition of death penalty on offenders aged at least sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime); Ward v. State , 293 Ark. 88 , 99, 733 S.W.2d 728 , 733 (1987) (stating that the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). 2019Code Ann. §§ 5-10-101 (c) (Supp. 1995), 5-4-615 (Repl. 1993), and 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 1995); Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (permitting imposition of death penalty on offenders aged at least sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime); Ward v. State , 293 Ark. 88 , 99, 733 S.W.2d 728 , 733 (1987) (stating that the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ward v. State
green
2 sentences2019Code Ann. §§ 5-10-101 (c) (Supp. 1995), 5-4-615 (Repl. 1993), and 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 1995); Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (permitting imposition of death penalty on offenders aged at least sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime); Ward v. State , 293 Ark. 88 , 99, 733 S.W.2d 728 , 733 (1987) (stating that the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). 2019Code Ann. §§ 5-10-101 (c) (Supp. 1995), 5-4-615 (Repl. 1993), and 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 1995); Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U.S. 361 , 109 S.Ct. 2969 , 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (permitting imposition of death penalty on offenders aged at least sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime); Ward v. State , 293 Ark. 88 , 99, 733 S.W.2d 728 , 733 (1987) (stating that the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
green
2 sentences2016Also, Ozarks asserts that invalidating the arbitration clause on this basis would result in a per se rule that singles out or disfavors arbitration, which would violate AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), and would employ what Ozarks describes as a “bootstrapping” argument to avoid arbitration that was rejected in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc, v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L,Ed.2d 1038 (2006). 2016Also, Ozarks asserts that invalidating the arbitration clause on this basis would result in a per se rule that singles out or disfavors arbitration, which would violate AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), and would employ what Ozarks describes as a “bootstrapping” argument to avoid arbitration that was rejected in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc, v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L,Ed.2d 1038 (2006). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
At&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
green
2 sentences2016Also, Ozarks asserts that invalidating the arbitration clause on this basis would result in a per se rule that singles out or disfavors arbitration, which would violate AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), and would employ what Ozarks describes as a “bootstrapping” argument to avoid arbitration that was rejected in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc, v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L,Ed.2d 1038 (2006). 2016Also, Ozarks asserts that invalidating the arbitration clause on this basis would result in a per se rule that singles out or disfavors arbitration, which would violate AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 , 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), and would employ what Ozarks describes as a “bootstrapping” argument to avoid arbitration that was rejected in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc, v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L,Ed.2d 1038 (2006). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
McGahey v. State
green
2 sentences2007McGahey v. State, 362 Ark. 513 , 210 S.W.3d 49 (2005). 2007McGahey v. State, 362 Ark. 513 , 210 S.W.3d 49 (2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Yancey v. State
green
2 sentences2006Yancey, 345 Ark. 103 , 44 S.W.3d 315 . 2006Yancey, 345 Ark. 103 , 44 S.W.3d 315 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2006NOTES [1] A companion case, Davis v. State, CR 06-91, 367 Ark. 341 , 240 S.W.3d 110 , 2006 WL 2781357 (2006), is also decided this date. [2] We take this opportunity to note that while an issuing magistrate's concurrent employment with the State Attorney General's office is not a per se violation of the "neutral and detached" requirement, this is not an encouraged practice as it could give rise to the appearance of impropriety. [3] There is no substantive distinction between the terms "reasonable" and "probable" cause. 2006NOTES [1] A companion case, Davis v. State, CR 06-91, 367 Ark. 341 , 240 S.W.3d 110 , 2006 WL 2781357 (2006), is also decided this date. [2] We take this opportunity to note that while an issuing magistrate's concurrent employment with the State Attorney General's office is not a per se violation of the "neutral and detached" requirement, this is not an encouraged practice as it could give rise to the appearance of impropriety. [3] There is no substantive distinction between the terms "reasonable" and "probable" cause. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Little v. State
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Morin v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2002United States v. McIver, 186 F3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1177 (2000) (holding that video surveillance of marijuana garden in National Forest did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.1d 88 (1998)(refusing to adopt a per se rule requiring the state to obtain a search warrant any time it wishes to use video surveillance of residential property). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Payne v. Tennessee
green
1 sentence2001We agree that the seminal case in the area of victim-impact evidence is Payne v. Tennessee, supra, where the United States Supreme Court overruled past precedent and held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not erect a per se bar against states providing for the admission of victim-impact evidence. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
South Carolina v. Gathers
red
1 sentence1998Ed. 2d 1110 ] (1991).” In Payne, the United States Supreme Court overruled the per se bar to victim-impact evidence, established in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and upheld a state’s choice to permit the admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Nooner v. State
green
2 sentences1998In Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87 , 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), we were concerned with whether Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl. 1997) should be applied retroactively. 1998In Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87 , 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), we were concerned with whether Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl. 1997) should be applied retroactively. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Booth v. Maryland
red
1 sentence1998Ed. 2d 1110 ] (1991).” In Payne, the United States Supreme Court overruled the per se bar to victim-impact evidence, established in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and upheld a state’s choice to permit the admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Peter Cancilla
green
1 sentence1996See Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1983); Novak v. United States, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990); and United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984), respectively. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ice v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); High v.Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok. 1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Dalton Prejean v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); High v.Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok. 1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Battle
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); High v.Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok. 1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Trimble v. State
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Thompson v. State
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); High v.Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok. 1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
High v. Zant
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Cannaday v. State
green
2 sentences1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 *734 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.1984); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok.1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). 1987State v. Valencia, 124 Ariz. 139 , 602 P.2d 807 (1979); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St.2d 351 , 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); High v.Zant, 250 Ga. 693 , 300 S.E.2d 654 (1983); Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Ok. 1986); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387 , 478 A.2d 1143 (1984); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1983); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor red | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Roviaro v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Chambers v. Maroney green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.