per se rule in Rhode Island

2005E White and Lyonnais The defendant’s next argument posits that the trial justice violated his right to confront witnesses White and Lyonnais, the two men who aided defendant in acquiring the murder weapon, concerning whether either witness had received a benefit in exchange for their testimony in this trial. “[W]e have adopted a per se error rule in reviewing cases in which a trial justice totally precludes cross-examination by defense counsel of the state’s key witness on the issues of motive' or bias. * * * Total preclusion of this type results in constitutional error irrespective of any att

2002This Court has adopted a per se error rule only when a trial justice “totally precludes cross-examination by defense counsel of the state’s key witness on the issues of motive or bias.” Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357 (citing Freeman, 473 A.2d at 1154 ).

2008See DeBarros, 441 A.2d at 552 (recognizing a per se error rule in situations when a trial justice bars an attempt to place before a jury the witness’s bias or motive).

1998Rather in light of the distinctions between the bias circumstances here and those in Davis , the case at bar would not fit the mold for application of the Davis court’s per se error rule as it was adopted by this court in State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 552 (R.I.1982).

1988State v. Fernandes, 526 A.2d 495, 501 (R.I.1987); State v. Heredia, 493 A.2d 831, 834 (R.I.1985).

1986We have declined to adopt a per-se rule of dismissal of an indictment for every violation of a rule of criminal procedure, such as Rule 6(e), State v. Heredia, 493 A.2d 831, 833-34 (R.I.1985).

2002This Court has adopted a per se error rule only when a trial justice “totally precludes cross-examination by defense counsel of the state’s key witness on the issues of motive or bias.” Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357 (citing Freeman, 473 A.2d at 1154 ).

1987We further suggested that in State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549 (R.I.1982), and State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149 (R.I. 1984), we had established a per se error rule in which the defendant has been fully precluded from effective cross-examination on a pertinent issue.

2018"We have expressly stated that such a per se rule would 'often frustrate rather than promote justice in situations wherein an identification is reliable despite its unnecessarily suggestive nature.' " Texter , 923 A.2d at 574 (quoting State v. Turner , 561 A.2d 869 , 871 (R.I. 1989) ).

2007We have expressly stated that such a per se rule would “often frustrate rather than promote justice in situations wherein an identification is reliable despite its unnecessarily suggestive nature.” Turner, 561 A.2d at 871 .

2018"We have expressly stated that such a per se rule would 'often frustrate rather than promote justice in situations wherein an identification is reliable despite its unnecessarily suggestive nature.' " Texter , 923 A.2d at 574 (quoting State v. Turner , 561 A.2d 869 , 871 (R.I. 1989) ).

2018"We have expressly stated that such a per se rule would 'often frustrate rather than promote justice in situations wherein an identification is reliable despite its unnecessarily suggestive nature.' " Texter , 923 A.2d at 574 (quoting State v. Turner , 561 A.2d 869 , 871 (R.I. 1989) ).

2010Cf. State v. Jackson , 570 A.2d 1115 , 1117 (R.I. 1990) (explaining that the Court's supervisory power " should be exercised with great restraint after balancing carefully the societal interests involved ") (citing United States v. Payner , 447 U.S. 727 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980))." (emphasis added).

2001Cf. State v. Jackson, 570 A.2d 1115, 1117 (R.I.1990) (explaining that the Court’s supervisory power “should be exercised with great restraint after balancing carefully the societal interests involved”) (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 , 100 S.Ct. 2439 , 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980)).

2018See , e.g. , United States v. Bergman , 599 F.3d 1142 , 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) ("We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and adopt a narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, represented by someone who has not been admitted to any bar * * *."); United States v. Mitchell , 216 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (D.C.

2018Cir. 2000) ("We decline * * * to extend the per se ineffectiveness rule beyond cases in which a defendant is represented by a person never properly admitted to any bar."); Commonwealth v. Thibeault , 28 Mass.App.Ct. 787 , 556 N.E.2d 403 , 405 (1990) ("It is now accepted that a person convicted of crime who has unknowingly been represented in the matter by an imposter-one pretending to be an attorney but in fact never licensed to practice anywhere-is entitled to have his or her conviction set aside * * *."); State v. Jorbin , 151 Ariz. 496 , 728 P.2d 1246 , 1246, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (rej

2018Cir. 2000) ("We decline * * * to extend the per se ineffectiveness rule beyond cases in which a defendant is represented by a person never properly admitted to any bar."); Commonwealth v. Thibeault , 28 Mass.App.Ct. 787 , 556 N.E.2d 403 , 405 (1990) ("It is now accepted that a person convicted of crime who has unknowingly been represented in the matter by an imposter-one pretending to be an attorney but in fact never licensed to practice anywhere-is entitled to have his or her conviction set aside * * *."); State v. Jorbin , 151 Ariz. 496 , 728 P.2d 1246 , 1246, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (rej

2018See , e.g. , United States v. Bergman , 599 F.3d 1142 , 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) ("We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and adopt a narrow per se rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, represented by someone who has not been admitted to any bar * * *."); United States v. Mitchell , 216 F.3d 1126 , 1132 (D.C.

2018We note, however, that "[t]his Court never has adopted a per se rule of exclusion when police officers have employed a procedure in which they show * * * a single individual to a witness for the purpose of identifying a suspect." Patel , 949 A.2d at 411 .

2018"Moreover, as this Court has previously indicated, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate that exigent circumstances existed which necessitated the use of a show-up procedure rather than another type of procedure." Id. ; see also *58 Patel , 949 A.2d at 411 (concluding that "we never have required the state to show evidence of exigency when [a show-up] procedure is used").

2014This Court has further concluded that a warrantless arrest made under our state statutes is “constitutionally sound * * * to the extent that it meets the requirement of probable cause[.]” Id. at 856 , 391 A.2d at 111 ; cf. Ryan, 731 F.3d at 70 (noting that Moore “implies that an extraterritorial arrest is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment”).

2013State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 147 (R.I.2009). 10 .

2013In the event an indictment is not returned any notes of a stenographer and transcriptions of such notes, and any other recordings of the proceedings, shall be delivered to and impounded by the court.” We have “consistently declined to apply a per-se rule of dismissal of an indictment for violations of Rule 6(e).” State v. Cassey, 543 A.2d 670, 676 (R.I.1988).

2013We have also stated that “dismissal as a sanction for an alleged irregularity during the grand jury proceeding is an extreme remedy that is unwarranted except in limited and very rare circumstances.” Id.

2009See Cohen , 970 A.2d at 563 , 565 (giving no effect to the Superior *Page 14 Court's opinion that "breathing new life" into the Chanler Hotel nonconforming use by repairing or modernizing the structure was a violation of Newport Zoning Ordinance § 17.28.030); accord Gagne v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co. , 367 A.2d 613 (Me. 1976) ("reject[ing] a per se rule that prolongation [of a nonconforming use] alone, without consideration of any other circumstance, constitutes `enlargement' as a matter of law-at least when, as here, the ordinance itself purports to make no such provision").

2009See Cohen , 970 A.2d at 563 , 565 (giving no effect to the Superior *Page 14 Court's opinion that "breathing new life" into the Chanler Hotel nonconforming use by repairing or modernizing the structure was a violation of Newport Zoning Ordinance § 17.28.030); accord Gagne v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co. , 367 A.2d 613 (Me. 1976) ("reject[ing] a per se rule that prolongation [of a nonconforming use] alone, without consideration of any other circumstance, constitutes `enlargement' as a matter of law-at least when, as here, the ordinance itself purports to make no such provision").

2008Compare United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 119 (6th Cir.1979) (adopting a per se rule against the use of a prior inconsistent statement as the sole substantive evidence supporting a conviction); Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 645, 648 (Alaska Ct.App.1986) (ruling that prior inconsistent statements of a witness which are repudiated at trial are insufficient, standing alone, to permit a conviction); and State v. White Water, 194 Mont. 85 , 634 P.2d 636 , 639 *1061 (1981) (holding that a conviction cannot rest solely on prior inconsistent statements); with State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588 , 682 A.2

2008Compare United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 119 (6th Cir.1979) (adopting a per se rule against the use of a prior inconsistent statement as the sole substantive evidence supporting a conviction); Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 645, 648 (Alaska Ct.App.1986) (ruling that prior inconsistent statements of a witness which are repudiated at trial are insufficient, standing alone, to permit a conviction); and State v. White Water, 194 Mont. 85 , 634 P.2d 636 , 639 *1061 (1981) (holding that a conviction cannot rest solely on prior inconsistent statements); with State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588 , 682 A.2

2008Compare United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 119 (6th Cir.1979) (adopting a per se rule against the use of a prior inconsistent statement as the sole substantive evidence supporting a conviction); Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 645, 648 (Alaska Ct.App.1986) (ruling that prior inconsistent statements of a witness which are repudiated at trial are insufficient, standing alone, to permit a conviction); and State v. White Water, 194 Mont. 85 , 634 P.2d 636 , 639 *1061 (1981) (holding that a conviction cannot rest solely on prior inconsistent statements); with State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588 , 682 A.2