56 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Troxel v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2023See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-74 , 120 S. Ct. at 2064 , supra; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 , 120 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (Souter, J., concurring), supra; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85 -86 and 89, 120 S. Ct. at 2070 -71 and 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (substantive due process protects “parent-child relationship from arbitrary [state] impairment” but no Supreme Court precedent supports a per se requirement for “a showing of actual or potential ‘harm’ to the child” as prerequisite to nonparent visitation rights—Court has “never held that the parent’s 10 We have similarly narrowly held that a state law “best intere 2023See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-74 , 120 S. Ct. at 2064 , supra; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 78 , 120 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (Souter, J., concurring), supra; Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85 -86 and 89, 120 S. Ct. at 2070 -71 and 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (substantive due process protects “parent-child relationship from arbitrary [state] impairment” but no Supreme Court precedent supports a per se requirement for “a showing of actual or potential ‘harm’ to the child” as prerequisite to nonparent visitation rights—Court has “never held that the parent’s 10 We have similarly narrowly held that a state law “best intere | 2 | 2 |
Knopp v. Knoppgreen2 sentences2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf 2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf | 2 | 2 |
Henderson v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf 2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf | 2 | 2 |
In Re Parenting of JNPgreen2 sentences2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf 2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf | 2 | 2 |
Polasek v. Omuragreen2 sentences2023See similarly Kulstad, ¶¶ 58, 60-63, and 68-70 (nothing in § 40-4-228, MCA, “limits its application to a finding of abuse or neglect” as defined in Title 41, chapter 3, MCA—citing § 40-4-228(5), MCA, and Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 , 120 S. Ct. at 2064 (plurality opinion passing on question of whether constitutional rights of existing parent effects a per se requirement for a showing of actual or potential parental harm as condition precedent to infringement by recognition of nonparent visitation rights), and distinguishing Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, ¶¶ 14-15 , 332 Mont. 157 , 136 P.3d 519 (sta 2023See similarly Kulstad, ¶¶ 58, 60-63, and 68-70 (nothing in § 40-4-228, MCA, “limits its application to a finding of abuse or neglect” as defined in Title 41, chapter 3, MCA—citing § 40-4-228(5), MCA, and Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 , 120 S. Ct. at 2064 (plurality opinion passing on question of whether constitutional rights of existing parent effects a per se requirement for a showing of actual or potential parental harm as condition precedent to infringement by recognition of nonparent visitation rights), and distinguishing Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, ¶¶ 14-15 , 332 Mont. 157 , 136 P.3d 519 (sta | 2 | 2 |
cluster 587351green2 sentences2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . 21 ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “construct 2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “constructive | 2 | 2 |
State, City of Bozeman v. Hethgreen2 sentences2014Belgarde, ¶ 16 (discussing State v. Heth, 230 Mont. 268, 272 , 750 P.2d 103, 105 (1988)). 2014Belgarde, ¶ 16 (discussing State v. Heth, 230 Mont. 268, 272 , 750 P.2d 103, 105 (1988)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Siegalgreen2 sentences1998The reliability of a citizen informant is generally shown by the very nature of the circumstances under which the incriminating information became known Siegal, 281 Mont. at 281 , 934 P.2d at 194 (citation omitted). 1998The reliability of a citizen informant is generally shown by the very nature of the circumstances under which the incriminating information became known Siegal, 281 Mont. at 281 , 934 P.2d at 194 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Blufford Hayes, Jr. v. Jill Brown, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentingreen2 sentences2026Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); State v. Wright, 2011 MT 92, ¶ 28 , 360 Mont. 246 , 253 P.3d 838 . 2011We note that in Hayes , the Ninth Circuit stated that Napue does not create a per se rule of reversal. 399 F.3d at 984 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2002Accordingly, Hiebert cannot succeed, as a matter of law, based on the theory that Bellusci negligently suppressed exculpatory evidence. ¶45 [5] We have held that an “intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution is a per se violation of due process.” State v. Baker, 2000 MT 235, ¶ 15 , 301 Mont. 323, ¶ 15 , 8 P.3d 817, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509, ¶ 24 , 982 P.2d 468, ¶ 24 ). 2002Accordingly, Hiebert cannot succeed, as a matter of law, based on the theory that Bellusci negligently suppressed exculpatory evidence. ¶45 [5] We have held that an “intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution is a per se violation of due process.” State v. Baker, 2000 MT 235, ¶ 15 , 301 Mont. 323, ¶ 15 , 8 P.3d 817, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Brown, 1999 MT 133, ¶ 24 , 294 Mont. 509, ¶ 24 , 982 P.2d 468, ¶ 24 ). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Kareem A. Nagibgreen2 sentences1997Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 718 ; I&&b, 56 F.3d at 801 . 1997Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 718 ; Nagib, 56 F.3d at 801. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kirk Spencergreen2 sentences2021See Wright, 497 U.S. at 823 , 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (determining that “the use of corroborating evidence . . . would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility”).2 2 We noted these distinctions and their possible impacts upon our precedent in State v Spencer, 2007 MT 245, ¶ 33 , 339 Mont. 227 , 169 P.3d 384 . 32 ¶45 Nonethe 2021See Wright, 497 U.S. at 823 , 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (determining that “the use of corroborating evidence . . . would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility”).2 2 We noted these distinctions and their possible impacts upon our precedent in State v Spencer, 2007 MT 245, ¶ 33 , 339 Mont. 227 , 169 P.3d 384 . 32 ¶45 Nonethe | 1 | 1 |
Idaho v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2021The Wright Court opined, in dicta, that “the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 825 , 110 S. Ct. at 3151 . 2021The Wright Court opined, in dicta, that “the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 825 , 110 S. Ct. at 3151 . | 1 | 1 |
Cuyler v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2019Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S., at 350, 348 , 100 S.Ct., at 1719, 1718 (footnote omitted). 2019Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S., at 350, 348 , 100 S.Ct., at 1719, 1718 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dorian Douglas Whaleygreen2 sentences2016See also United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 , 107 S. Ct. 164 (1986); United States v. Whaley, 788 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 . 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986). 2016See also United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 , 107 S. Ct. 164 (1986); United States v. Whaley, 788 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 . 107 S. Ct. 458 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Norman C. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zaragoza v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haselden v. Hamergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirtley v. Sovereign Life Insurance (In Re Durability Inc.)green | 1 | 1 |
| Osnes Livestock Co. v. Warrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Schultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a Corporation, and Harbor Belt Line, a Partnershipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Khaliel v. Norton Health Care Inc. Retirement Plangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Valleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Charlene Davis v. The Prudential Insurance Company of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Norukgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Asch v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bolin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Broers v. Montana Department of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. General Mills, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Francogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| King v. Commissionergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Peters v. Kiffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Sadowski
green
2 sentences1994Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). 1994Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). | 3 | 1993–1994 |
Fitzpatrick v. Crist
green
2 sentences1978In Fitzpatrick v. Crist, (1974), 165 Mont. 382 , 528 P.2d 1322 , a delay of seven months was held not to be “* * * a per se violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to peti *390 tioner.” 165 Mont. 388 , 528 P.2d 1326 . 1978In Fitzpatrick v. Crist, (1974), 165 Mont. 382 , 528 P.2d 1322 , a delay of seven months was held not to be “* * * a per se violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to peti *390 tioner.” 165 Mont. 388 , 528 P.2d 1326 . | 3 | 1977–1978 |
Matter of Guardianship of Doney
green
2 sentences2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf 2023See In re Parenting of J.N.P., 2001 MT 120, ¶ 26 , 305 Mont. 351 , 27 P.3d 953 ; In re Doney, 174 Mont. at 286-87 , 570 P.2d at 578 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 174 Mont. 1, 8-10 , 568 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1977). 30 liberty interest . . . establish[es] a rigid constitutional shield[] protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of harm”—protection of parental rights against arbitrary state interference should not preclude “States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority . . . [not] motivated by an interest in the welf | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Martin v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . 21 ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “construct 2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “constructive | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Hollingsworth v. United States
green
2 sentences2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . 21 ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “construct 2016The Supreme Court thus recognized that a per se Sixth Amendment violation may arise where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 , 104 S. Ct. at 2047 . ¶43 The test that has emerged within the various federal jurisdictions for substitution motions, which presume prejudice and a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment or “constructive | 2 | 2016–2017 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences1984In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , the United States Supreme Court considered the additional question, whether when such remarks are made by a prosecutor so as to cause constitutional error, it must adopt a per se rule, that such error automatically required a reversal. 1984In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , the United States Supreme Court considered the additional question, whether when such remarks are made by a prosecutor so as to cause constitutional error, it must adopt a per se rule, that such error automatically required a reversal. | 2 | 1984–2000 |
State v. Steward
green
2 sentences1998There we held that: We emphasize this delay is not considered a per se violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to petitioner. ¶26 In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C. 1998There we held that: We emphasize this delay is not considered a per se violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to petitioner. ¶26 In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C. | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Isaiah Hedgepeth, Jr. v. United States
green
2 sentences1998There we held that: We emphasize this delay is not considered a per se violation of petitioner's right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to petitioner. ¶ 26 In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C.Cir.1972), 464 F.2d 823, 825 , where that court held that: A delay of over one year between arrest and trial raises a Sixth Amendment claim of "prima facie merit." Hedgepeth 1998There we held that: We emphasize this delay is not considered a per se violation of petitioner's right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to petitioner. ¶ 26 In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C.Cir.1972), 464 F.2d 823, 825 , where that court held that: A delay of over one year between arrest and trial raises a Sixth Amendment claim of "prima facie merit." Hedgepeth | 2 | 1998–1999 |
United States v. Edward Rucker, Jr.
green
2 sentences1999In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C.Cir.1972), 464 F.2d 823, 825 , where that court held that: A delay of over one year between arrest and trial raises a Sixth Amendment claim of “prima facie merit.” Hedgepeth v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 291 , 364 F.2d 684 (1966). 1998There we held that: We emphasize this delay is not considered a per se violation of petitioner's right to a speedy trial, but under the circumstances here it is thought long enough to shift to the state the burden of explaining the reason for the delay and showing absence of prejudice to petitioner. ¶ 26 In State v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 389 , 543 P.2d 178, 181 , we cited with approval United States v. Rucker (D.C.Cir.1972), 464 F.2d 823, 825 , where that court held that: A delay of over one year between arrest and trial raises a Sixth Amendment claim of "prima facie merit." Hedgepeth | 2 | 1998–1999 |
John Castellanos v. United States of America, Kevin B. Streete v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 718 ; I&&b, 56 F.3d at 801 . 1997Castellanos, 26 F.3d at 718 ; Nagib, 56 F.3d at 801. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Halter
green
2 sentences1994Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). 1994Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Gollehon
green
2 sentences1994Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). 1993Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1264 -65 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79 , 805 P.2d 537, 547 ; and State v. Halter (1989) r 238 Mont. 408, 412 , 777 P.2d 1313, 1316 ). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Craig
green
2 sentences1988The standard in Montana for intentional or negligent suppression of evidence was enunciated in the case of State v. Craig (1976), 169 Mont. 150, 153 , 545 P.2d 649, 651 , holding: “Only intentional or deliberate suppression of evidence is a per se violation of due process sufficient to reverse or nullify a conviction. . . 1988The standard in Montana for intentional or negligent suppression of evidence was enunciated in the case of State v. Craig (1976), 169 Mont. 150, 153 , 545 P.2d 649, 651 , holding: “Only intentional or deliberate suppression of evidence is a per se violation of due process sufficient to reverse or nullify a conviction. . . | 2 | 1983–1988 |
United States v. James Vincent Keogh
green
2 sentences1983United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir.). 1983United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir.). | 2 | 1976–1983 |
State v. Wright
green
2 sentences2026Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); State v. Wright, 2011 MT 92, ¶ 28 , 360 Mont. 246 , 253 P.3d 838 . 2026Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); State v. Wright, 2011 MT 92, ¶ 28 , 360 Mont. 246 , 253 P.3d 838 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| United States v. Cronic green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| House of Wheat v. Wright green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Maynard v. Bowen green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Schwarz green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Farmer neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Abdella v. O'TOOLE green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| United States v. Paul Levy, Frank Moten, Donald Verna, Nicholas Visceglia. Appeal of Donald Verna green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Weaver green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ristaino v. Ross green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Hansen neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Wild green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Williams v. Selstad green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hobby v. United States green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gray v. Mississippi green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Grey green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Marriage of Bonamarte v. Bonamarte green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Scheffer green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Michaels green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Gladue green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation District green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Manson v. Brathwaite green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.