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87 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stockwell v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The filing of a second criminal action after dismissing the first is not a per se violation of the federal due process clause, United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (cited in Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797 , 573 P.2d 116 (1977), or of the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 1986The filing of a second criminal action after dismissing the first is not a per se violation of the federal due process clause, United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (cited in Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797 , 573 P.2d 116 (1977), or of the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. | 5 | 6 |
State v. Micah Abraham Wulffgreen2 sentences2020In addition, we noted that, although McNeely could be construed narrowly as applying only to exigency, “the better reading is ‘that implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules.’ ” Id. at 614, 377 P.3d at 1077 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421 , 337 P.3d at 580 ). 2020In addition, we noted that, although McNeely could be construed narrowly as applying only to exigency, “the better reading is ‘that implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules.’ ” Id. at 614, 377 P.3d at 1077 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421 , 337 P.3d at 580 ). | 4 | 13 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2014The Court held that instead, “exigency in this context must be determined case by ease based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 2 In other words, the body’s ability to metabolize alcohol is just one factor that a court can consider as part of the totality of circumstances test. 3 The Court in McNeely cited State v. Woolery as a jurisdiction that has held the body’s natural dissipation of alcohol alone provides a per se exception to the warrant requirement in DUI eases. 2014The Court noted that some circumstances would make obtaining a warrant so impractical that the body’s natural dissipation of alcohol could support exigency, but that was “a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in Schmerber , not to accept the ‘considerable overgeneralization’ that a per se rule would reflect.” Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1561 , 185 L.Ed.2d at 707 . | 2 | 4 |
Garcia v. STATE TAX COM'N OF STATE OF IDgreen2 sentences2008Garcia v. State Tax Comm’n of the State of Idaho, 136 Idaho 610, 615 , 38 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2002). 2008Garcia v. State Tax Comm’n of the State of Idaho, 136 Idaho 610, 615 , 38 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2016Id. 1 In Tomlinson, this Court, applying Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 153 Idaho 200 , 280 P.3d 703 (2012), held that a per se violation of I.C. § 18-8004 may be shown by test results from an approved and properly administered test of blood, breath, or urine. 2016Id. 1 In Tomlinson, this Court, applying Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 153 Idaho 200 , 280 P.3d 703 (2012), held that a per se violation of I.C. § 18-8004 may be shown by test results from an approved and properly administered test of blood, breath, or urine. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Robinettgreen2 sentences2016In Robinett , this Court held that "a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result back to the time of the alleged offense.” Id. 2016In Robinett, this Court held that “a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result back to the time of the alleged offense.” Id. 6 that are generally inadmissible at trial as long as it is the type of fact that is generally relied upon by experts in that field. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Sutliffgreen2 sentences2012We stated: *204 Id. (quoting State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). *203 Where the prosecution elects to use the per se method, the question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken. 2012We stated: *204 Id. (quoting State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 523, 524 , 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976)). *203 Where the prosecution elects to use the per se method, the question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Greensweiggreen2 sentences2025In State v. Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794 , 641 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1982), this Court rejected a per se rule prohibiting evidence of subsequent acts when relevant to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other 5 that proof of one tends to establish the other, and other similar issues. 2025In State v. Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794 , 641 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1982), this Court rejected a per se rule prohibiting evidence of subsequent acts when relevant to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other 5 that proof of one tends to establish the other, and other similar issues. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wrenngreen2 sentences2025Id. at 798 , 641 P.2d at 344 ; see also State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 , 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978).2 We observed that there was no logical distinction between prior and subsequent crimes to justify a per se rule and that a person may claim he was honestly mistaken or lacked the requisite intent if the act stands alone; however, the probabilities of an honest mistake diminish as the number of similar transactions indicating a scheme or system increase. 2025Id. at 798 , 641 P.2d at 344 ; see also State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 , 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978).2 We observed that there was no logical distinction between prior and subsequent crimes to justify a per se rule and that a person may claim he was honestly mistaken or lacked the requisite intent if the act stands alone; however, the probabilities of an honest mistake diminish as the number of similar transactions indicating a scheme or system increase. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2019State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371 , 883 P.3d 726 , 729 (Ct. App. 1994). “[J]oint representation of defendants does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless [an] actual conflict is demonstrated.” Giles, 125 Idaho at 923 , 877 P.2d at 367 . 2011State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371 , 883 P.2d 726, 729 (Ct. App. 1994). | 1 | 2 |
Giles v. Stategreen2 sentences2019State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371 , 883 P.3d 726 , 729 (Ct. App. 1994). “[J]oint representation of defendants does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless [an] actual conflict is demonstrated.” Giles, 125 Idaho at 923 , 877 P.2d at 367 . 2019State v. Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371 , 883 P.3d 726 , 729 (Ct. App. 1994). “[J]oint representation of defendants does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel unless [an] actual conflict is demonstrated.” Giles, 125 Idaho at 923 , 877 P.2d at 367 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Dennis John Halsethgreen2 sentences2015In State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423 , 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014), the Court concluded that “the district court properly concluded that Idaho’s implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant requirement,” recognizing that "Idaho's implied consent statute operated as a per se exception,” and thus it "does not fall under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” However, approximately a month after Wulff , the Court decided State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643 , 339 P.3d 368 (2014), another case involving Idaho’s implied consent statute. 2015In State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423 , 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014), the Court concluded that “the district court properly concluded that Idaho’s implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant requirement,” recognizing that "Idaho's implied consent statute operated as a per se exception,” and thus it "does not fall under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” However, approximately a month after Wulff , the Court decided State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643 , 339 P.3d 368 (2014), another case involving Idaho’s implied consent statute. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shirleygreen2 sentences1995The Frye rule derives from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and has been interpreted to establish a per se rule, conditioning “the admissibility of evidence based on a new scientific method of proof on a showing that the technique has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community in which it developed.” People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 251 , 723 P.2d 1354, 1362 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 , 103 S.Ct. 133 , 74 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982). 1995The Frye rule derives from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and has been interpreted to establish a per se rule, conditioning “the admissibility of evidence based on a new scientific method of proof on a showing that the technique has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community in which it developed.” People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 251 , 723 P.2d 1354, 1362 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 , 103 S.Ct. 133 , 74 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Calegargreen2 sentences1983In State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526 , 531 n. 5, 661 P.2d 311 , 316 n. 5 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court said: [In Wyrick ] the Eighth Circuit had interpreted Edwards to be a “per se” rule. 1983In State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526 , 531 n. 5, 661 P.2d 311 , 316 n. 5 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court said: [In Wyrick ] the Eighth Circuit had interpreted Edwards to be a “per se” rule. | 1 | 2 |
| Carroll v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Manuel Casas Jimenezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Louis Moschiano and Robert Fred Bishop, in Re Stephen M. Komiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Elendtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schoenhalsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Rickie Lee Boatwrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leslie Mayfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stratfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Florida v. Bostickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio v. Robinettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pennsylvania v. Mimmsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Longgreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Santa Clara v. Dollgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Asbury Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hickmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Duckmantongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cook
green
2 sentences2013In its decision, the Court refused to adopt a per se rule regarding the treatment of public defenders’ offices under the rules. 2 Id. 2010In Cook, this Court concluded that a per se rule imputing conflicts of interest to affiliated public defenders is inappropriate “where there is no indication the conflict would hamper an attorney‟s ability to effectively represent a client.” Id. | 3 | 2009–2013 |
Payne v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences2008Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 , 111 S.Ct. at 2609 , 115 L.Ed.2d at 736 . 2008Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 , 111 S.Ct. at 2609 , 115 L.Ed.2d at 736 . | 3 | 2004–2008 |
State v. Iwakiri
green
2 sentences1991In fashioning a rule for the admissibility of this type of evidence, the Court rejected the per se rule of general acceptability of reliability established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 106 Idaho at 623-25 , 682 P.2d at 576-78 . 1991In fashioning a rule for the admissibility of this type of evidence, the Court rejected the per se rule of general acceptability of reliability established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 106 Idaho at 623-25 , 682 P.2d at 576-78 . | 3 | 1986–1993 |
State v. Kirk Murray Charlson
green
2 sentences2020In addition, we noted that, although McNeely could be construed narrowly as applying only to exigency, “the better reading is ‘that implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules.’ ” Id. at 614, 377 P.3d at 1077 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421 , 337 P.3d at 580 ). 2020In addition, we noted that, although McNeely could be construed narrowly as applying only to exigency, “the better reading is ‘that implied consent is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se exception to the warrant requirement because the Court repeatedly expressed disapproval for categorical rules.’ ” Id. at 614, 377 P.3d at 1077 (quoting Wulff, 157 Idaho at 421 , 337 P.3d at 580 ). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Swan v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2019Swan v. Kentucky , 384 S.W.3d 77 , 93-94 (2012) (holding that a defendant's failure to re-raise his Faretta motion to a new judge constituted abandonment of his request to proceed pro se or as co-counsel). 2019Swan v. Kentucky, 384 S.W.3d 77 , 93–94 (2012) (holding that a defendant’s failure to re-raise his Faretta motion to a new judge constituted abandonment of his request to proceed pro se or as co-counsel). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Kenner
green
2 sentences2019For instance, in People v. Kenner , 223 Cal.App.3d 56 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 551 , 554-55 (1990), the California court of appeals adopted a per se test wherein the defendant was deemed to have abandoned or withdrawn his request for self-representation where he "had both time and opportunity to follow up on his request for a hearing on his Faretta motion, and failed to do so." Kentucky has adopted a similar approach. 2019For instance, in People v. Kenner , 223 Cal.App.3d 56 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 551 , 554-55 (1990), the California court of appeals adopted a per se test wherein the defendant was deemed to have abandoned or withdrawn his request for self-representation where he "had both time and opportunity to follow up on his request for a hearing on his Faretta motion, and failed to do so." Kentucky has adopted a similar approach. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Pate v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2015“The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.” Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62 , 90 P.3d at 287 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 , 86 S.Ct. 836 , 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)); see also I.C. § 18-210. 2015“The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.” Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62 , 90 P.3d at 287 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)); see also I.C. § 18-210. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Lovelace
green
2 sentences2015“The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.” Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62 , 90 P.3d at 287 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)); see also I.C. § 18-210. 2015“The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.” Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62 , 90 P.3d at 287 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)); see also I.C. § 18-210. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Frye v. United States
red
2 sentences1995The Frye rule derives from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and has been interpreted to establish a per se rule, conditioning “the admissibility of evidence based on a new scientific method of proof on a showing that the technique has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community in which it developed.” People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 251 , 723 P.2d 1354, 1362 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 , 103 S.Ct. 133 , 74 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982). 1991In fashioning a rule for the admissibility of this type of evidence, the Court rejected the per se rule of general acceptability of reliability established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). 106 Idaho at 623-25 , 682 P.2d at 576-78 . | 2 | 1991–1995 |
State v. Koch
green
2 sentences1994Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 923 , 877 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Koch, 116 Idaho at 574 , 777 P.2d at 1247 . 1994Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 923 , 877 P.2d 365, 367 (1994); Koch, 116 Idaho at 574 , 777 P.2d at 1247 . | 2 | 1991–1994 |
United States v. Billy Edward Davis, Sr., and Dennis Bates Fletcher
green
2 sentences1986The filing of a second criminal action after dismissing the first is not a per se violation of the federal due process clause, United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (cited in Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797 , 573 P.2d 116 (1977), or of the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 1977United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974). | 2 | 1977–1986 |
Sierra v. United States
green
2 sentences1986The filing of a second criminal action after dismissing the first is not a per se violation of the federal due process clause, United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (cited in Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797 , 573 P.2d 116 (1977), or of the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 1977United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974). | 2 | 1977–1986 |
Harris v. United States
green
2 sentences1986The filing of a second criminal action after dismissing the first is not a per se violation of the federal due process clause, United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (cited in Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797 , 573 P.2d 116 (1977), or of the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution. 1977United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981 , 94 S.Ct. 1573 , 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974). | 2 | 1977–1986 |
| United States v. Billy Gene Thomas green | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Martin v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs
green
2 sentences1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal. App.2d 484 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant's right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. 1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal.App.2d 484 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant’s right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Mosley v. Smith
green
2 sentences1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal.App.2d 484 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant’s right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. 1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal.App.2d 484 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant’s right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Isby green | 2 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Hobson
green
2 sentences1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal.App.2d 484 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant’s right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. 1981Although a few courts have held to the contrary, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 , 93 S.Ct. 2758 , 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973); People v. Isby, 267 Cal.App.2d 484 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1968); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 , 348 N.E.2d 894 (1976), most courts that have considered the matter agree that a defendant’s right to counsel can be waived without notice to or permission from defense counsel. | 2 | 1981–1981 |
| United States v. Santillan green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Blancas green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Tipton green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| United States v. Darrell Mark Babcock green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Dunson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Maryland v. Wilson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Robinson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Rodriguez v. United States green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Severson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Lewis green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Rhonda Trusdall green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Derek Michael Arrotta green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Blackledge v. Perry green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Cronic green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Booth v. Maryland red | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Asch v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Bolin v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Peter Spitz green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Browning v. Vernon green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Ricks green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Crea green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Gleason green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.