warrant requirement in Rhode Island

2011A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the circumstances fall within one of the few well-established and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 365 (R.I.1983) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

2011A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the circumstances fall within one of the few well-established and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 365 (R.I.1983) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

2011In so doing, the trial justice cited to this Court’s opinion in State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 366 (R.I.1983), where we said: “One of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances.

2011A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the circumstances fall within one of the few well-established and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 365 (R.I.1983) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

2023Because we conclude that the detectives were engaged in hot pursuit, we need not address these arguments. - 28 - “One such recognized exception is that of exigent circumstances * * *.” State v. Portes, 840 A.2d 1131, 1136 (R.I. 2004); see also State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 366 (R.I. 1983) (“In certain cases, ‘the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’”) (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 ).

2017See Portes, 840 A.2d at 1136 .

2023“From [the Fourth] [A]mendment derives one of the most fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence—that entries and ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable * * * subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1239 (quoting Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)). “[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (quoting Brigham City, Utah v.

2023“From [the Fourth] [A]mendment derives one of the most fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence—that entries and ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable * * * subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1239 (quoting Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)). “[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (quoting Brigham City, Utah v.

2023“From [the Fourth] [A]mendment derives one of the most fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence—that entries and ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable * * * subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1239 (quoting Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1362 (R.I. 1984)). “[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (quoting Brigham City, Utah v.

2017However, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ).

2017See State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1169 (R.I.1987) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly prohibited the warrantless search of a dwelling based only on probable cause to believe the dwelling contains contraband” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 )); see also State v. Alexander, 433 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1981) (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.” (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 , 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970))).

2017See State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1169 (R.I. 1987) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly prohibited the warrantless search of a dwelling based only on probable cause to believe the dwelling contains contraband” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 )); see also State v. Alexander, 433 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1981) (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.” (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970))).

2017This Court consistently has declared that these exceptions are “narrowly defined and jealously guarded.” State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).

2016State v. Beau-mier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I.1984). 10 The state argues that this case falls within two exceptions to the warrant requirement; it contends: (1) that the entry to the home was consented to; and (2) that there were exigent circumstances present which justified a warrantless entry.

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeely, 138 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeely, 138 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

1983This exception to the warrant requirement emanated from the opinion of the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and was most recently explicated in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

1983This exception to the warrant requirement emanated from the opinion of the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and was most recently explicated in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

2026See State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1147 (R.I. 2016).

2023“The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1164 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ).

1980Justice Harlan stated his belief that the Chambers majority’s approval of warrantless, delayed searches and seizures was not “consistent with our insistence in other areas that departures from the warrant requirement strictly conform to the exigency presented.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. at 1987 , 26 L.Ed.2d at 435 .

1980Justice Harlan stated his belief that the Chambers majority’s approval of warrantless, delayed searches and seizures was not “consistent with our insistence in other areas that departures from the warrant requirement strictly conform to the exigency presented.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. at 1987 , 26 L.Ed.2d at 435 .

2017The warrant requirement serves to guard the privacy and sanctity of the home from “zealous” police officers “thrust[ing] themselves into a home” while ardently “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

2017The warrant requirement serves to guard the privacy and sanctity of the home from “zealous” police officers “thrust[ing] themselves into a home” while ardently “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 14 (1948).

2016State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).10 The 8 The same rules which apply to the seizure of property inside of a home also apply to the arrest of an individual inside his home; “the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 9 We note that the officers needed to have obtained only an arrest warrant for Mr. Gonzalez and not a search warrant for the apartment because, “[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer

2016State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).10 The 8 The same rules which apply to the seizure of property inside of a home also apply to the arrest of an individual inside his home; “the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 9 We note that the officers needed to have obtained only an arrest warrant for Mr. Gonzalez and not a search warrant for the apartment because, “[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer

2016See State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1134 (R.I. 2006). - 38 - contends that, even if the consent and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement do not apply, any error resulting from the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful entry into defendant’s home was harmless due to the “truly overwhelming” evidence of defendant’s guilt.

2016See State v. Casas, 900 A.2d 1120, 1134 (R.I. 2006). - 38 - contends that, even if the consent and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement do not apply, any error resulting from the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful entry into defendant’s home was harmless due to the “truly overwhelming” evidence of defendant’s guilt.

2016State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).10 The 8 The same rules which apply to the seizure of property inside of a home also apply to the arrest of an individual inside his home; “the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 9 We note that the officers needed to have obtained only an arrest warrant for Mr. Gonzalez and not a search warrant for the apartment because, “[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer

2016State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).10 The 8 The same rules which apply to the seizure of property inside of a home also apply to the arrest of an individual inside his home; “the warrantless arrest of a person is a species of seizure required by the [Fourth] Amendment to be reasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 9 We note that the officers needed to have obtained only an arrest warrant for Mr. Gonzalez and not a search warrant for the apartment because, “[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer

2016See Harrison, 66 A.3d at 441 .

2016See Harrison, 66 A.3d at 441 .

2023“The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1164 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ).

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeeley, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).

1983This exception to the warrant requirement emanated from the opinion of the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and was most recently explicated in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

1983This exception to the warrant requirement emanated from the opinion of the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and was most recently explicated in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

2023“As the Supreme Court has recognized, ‘[t]he relevant test is not the reasonableness of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976)).

2004As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he relevant test is not the reasonableness of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).

2017However, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 , 120 S.Ct. 7 , 145 L.Ed.2d 16 (1999); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ).

2017However, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ).

2017See State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1169 (R.I.1987) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly prohibited the warrantless search of a dwelling based only on probable cause to believe the dwelling contains contraband” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 )); see also State v. Alexander, 433 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1981) (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.” (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 , 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970))).

2017See State v. DeLaurier, 533 A.2d 1167, 1169 (R.I. 1987) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly prohibited the warrantless search of a dwelling based only on probable cause to believe the dwelling contains contraband” (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 )); see also State v. Alexander, 433 A.2d 965, 967 (R.I. 1981) (“Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant.” (quoting Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970))).

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

2025And, just six weeks later, in Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 , 141 - 28 - S.Ct. 2011 (2021), the Court reiterated that it has “repeatedly declined to expand the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 303 , 141 S.Ct. at 2019 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025And, just six weeks later, in Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 141 - 28 - S.Ct. 2011 (2021), the Court reiterated that it has “repeatedly declined to expand the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 303, 141 S.Ct. at 2019 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025And, just six weeks later, in Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 141 - 28 - S.Ct. 2011 (2021), the Court reiterated that it has “repeatedly declined to expand the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 303, 141 S.Ct. at 2019 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025And, just six weeks later, in Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 141 - 28 - S.Ct. 2011 (2021), the Court reiterated that it has “repeatedly declined to expand the scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 303, 141 S.Ct. at 2019 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023“Although most police searches must be undertaken pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, a warrant is not a requirement for all lawful searches.” State v. Grant, 840 A.2d 541, 550 (R.I. 2004).

2023“As the Supreme Court has recognized, ‘[t]he relevant test is not the reasonableness of the opportunity to procure a warrant, but the reasonableness of the seizure under all the circumstances.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976)).