warrant requirement in Iowa

2020“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 568 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 107 ).

2020“The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101 , 107–08 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted).

2025“The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement,” we have declared, “must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only those interests it was created to serve.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Iowa 2007).

2024And “[a] search conducted without a valid search warrant is per se unreasonable unless one of the well-known exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2007).

2025He argued that the search of the Chrysler’s trunk did not satisfy the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement under State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1 , 7–14 (Iowa 2015).

2025He argued that the search of the Chrysler’s trunk did not satisfy the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement under State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1 , 7–14 (Iowa 2015).

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2019First, as noted in Ingram , our recent cases have embraced a strong warrant-preference interpretation of article I, section 8. 914 N.W.2d at 816 ; see Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d at 7 (" 'A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable' unless an exception applies." (quoting State v. Moriarty , 566 N.W.2d 866 , 868 (Iowa 1997) )); Short , 851 N.W.2d at 502 ("[W]e have little interest in allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to override the warrant clause in the context of home searches and reject the cases suggesting otherwise."); Baldon , 829 N.W.2d at 791 ("It is well-sett

2022LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.2(b) (5th ed. 2012)). 306Id. at 802. 307State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Iowa 2014). 308Id. at 478–79. 309Id. at 506. 310Id. at 497–99. 102 the alleged impracticality provided an exception to the warrant requirement.311 We held that such notion “was wrong then and it is even more wrong today.”312 F. Summary.

2020See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 502 (Iowa 2014) (expressing “little interest in allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to override the warrant clause in the context of home searches”).

2025See Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 145 (“The Supreme Court has recognized a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.

2025See State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017) (“The Supreme Court has recognized a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.

2019First, as noted in Ingram, our 86 recent cases have embraced a strong warrant-preference interpretation of article I, section 8. 914 N.W.2d at 816 ; see Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 7 (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Short, 851 N.W.2d at 502 (“[W]e have little interest in allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to override the warrant clause in the context of home searches and reject the cases suggesting otherwise.”); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 791 (“It is well-settled

2019First, as noted in Ingram , our recent cases have embraced a strong warrant-preference interpretation of article I, section 8. 914 N.W.2d at 816 ; see Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d at 7 (" 'A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable' unless an exception applies." (quoting State v. Moriarty , 566 N.W.2d 866 , 868 (Iowa 1997) )); Short , 851 N.W.2d at 502 ("[W]e have little interest in allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to override the warrant clause in the context of home searches and reject the cases suggesting otherwise."); Baldon , 829 N.W.2d at 791 ("It is well-sett

2020“The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id.

2020“The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id.

2022Rev. 291 (1986) [hereinafter LaFave, The Forgotten Motto]. 29Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454–55 (second omission in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ; then quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1971); and then quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 30Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 25 search, and permit the court to “prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”31 In this case, we deal with an innovative and historically strange exception to the

2018While the traditional touchstone of Fourth Amendment law under prior Supreme Court cases was the warrant requirement, see, e.g. , Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ; Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ; Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958), the new innovative touchstone under the more recent Supreme Court cases is a free-floating and open-ended concept of "reasonableness" that is unhinged from the warrant requirement expressly con

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2019See, e.g. , Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 285 ("[W]arrantless searches and seizures that d[o] not fall within one of the 'jealously and carefully drawn exceptions' are unreasonable." (quoting State v. Strong , 493 N.W.2d 834 , 836 (Iowa 1992) )); State v. McGrane , 733 N.W.2d 671 , 677 (Iowa 2007) ("The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only those interests it was created to serve.").

2019In State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149 , 171–72 (Iowa 2013), we held that any special needs exception to the warrant requirement was not available because the purpose of the search was investigative in nature.

2019In State v. Kern , 831 N.W.2d 149 , 171-72 (Iowa 2013), we held that any special needs exception to the warrant requirement was not available because the purpose of the search was investigative in nature.

2015Importantly, however, “[t]he [SITA] exception to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only those interests it was created to serve.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Iowa 2007); accord Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 786–87; State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 410 (N.H. 1995) (noting the proper scope of a SITA “is limited by the exception’s very specific justifications”); State v. Valdez, 224 P.3d 751 , 758–59 (Wash. 2009) (“The [SITA] exception . . . arises from the necessity to provide for officer safety and the preservation of evidence of the crime of arr

2015See id. at 790 (affirming the defendant’s conviction without deciding the ineffective-assistance claim and stating, “In Gant, the Supreme Court noted that even if the Belton analysis, as limited by Gant, does not uphold the constitutionality of a search, other exceptions to the warrant requirement authorizing 78 240 (Iowa 1974) (noting that we do not “assume a partisan role and undertake [a party’s] research and advocacy”).

2019The warrant requirement is designed to provide broad protection by “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 17 intrusion by government officials.” State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537, 541 (Iowa 2003) (quoting State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Iowa 1997)).

2015The deputy’s suspicion or investigation of OWI is a criminal consideration and is therefore subject to the reasonable-suspicion— and not the community-caretaker—exception to the warrant requirement. 8 traffic stops proper—see, e.g., State v. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d 537 , 543–44 (Iowa 2003)—and others improper—see, e.g., State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 , 205– 06 (Iowa 2004).5 [C]ommunity caretaking cases require a three-step analysis: (1) was there a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?; (2) if so, was the police conduct bona fide community caretaker activity?; and (3) if so, did the

2020Both federal and state courts recognize a “‘well-delineated’ exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.” State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2008) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).

2017“The [United States] Supreme Court has recognized a ‘specifically established and well-delineated’ exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.” State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2008).

2020Both federal and state courts recognize a “‘well-delineated’ exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.” State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2008) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).

2017“The Supreme Court has recognized a ‘specifically established and well- delineated’ exception to the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents.” State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2008) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991)). “[T]his exception is applicable when probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the car is stopped by police.” State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa 1981).

2025“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable” unless they “fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 568 (cleaned up).

2020“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 568 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 107 ).

2023“Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring.” Id. (quoting State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 170 (Iowa 2015)).3 “The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement . . . is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).

2022The trial court concluded the officer “was engaged in a community caretaking function when he opened the car door and attempted to check on the safety of and the condition of [Green].” The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).

2019See State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Iowa 2006) (“Unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant per se unreasonable.”).

2019Rather, in deciding whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists, “the court must assess a police officer’s conduct based on an objective standard.” Id.

2024State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997) (“When a warrantless search is challenged, the State must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search came within an exception to the warrant requirement.”).

2021We have stated that Iowa courts “strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to ‘jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992)); see also State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) (“ ‘A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable’ unless an exception applies.” (quoting State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997))); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 285 (“We have also generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.”). 3.

2020Exceptions to the warrant requirement now go well beyond those recognized at the time of enactment of the Fourth Amendment and include consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 222–23 (1973), investigatory detentions, Terry [v. Ohio,] 392 U.S. [1,] 27 [(1968)], and an increasingly broad category of administrative searches and special needs exceptions.

2019First, as noted in Ingram , our recent cases have embraced a strong warrant-preference interpretation of article I, section 8. 914 N.W.2d at 816 ; see Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d at 7 (" 'A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable' unless an exception applies." (quoting State v. Moriarty , 566 N.W.2d 866 , 868 (Iowa 1997) )); Short , 851 N.W.2d at 502 ("[W]e have little interest in allowing the reasonableness clause to be a generalized trump card to override the warrant clause in the context of home searches and reject the cases suggesting otherwise."); Baldon , 829 N.W.2d at 791 ("It is well-sett

2023The United States Supreme Court has stated there is an exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).

2022It extended search and seizure protections to pat-down searches and roadside stops.53 Yet, it permitted an exception to the warrant requirement and the requirement of probable cause.54 The Terry opinion, however, stressed that the exception was “narrowly drawn”55 and that objective facts drove the analysis.56 Under Terry, police must have articulate and particularized facts to support the search: inchoate hunches are simply not good enough.57 Further, the Terry case recognized the constitutional interests of citizens, noting that even a limited search of outer clothing “constitutes a severe, t

2020See State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004); see also State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Iowa 2001) (noting that warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable unless they fall within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2017See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”); State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Iowa 2013) (“One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent.”); State v. Reiner, 628 N.W.2d 460 , 464–65 (Iowa 2001) (“One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted by consent.”).

2023“Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring.” Id. (quoting State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 170 (Iowa 2015)).3 “The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement . . . is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).

2022Even if we presume a seizure occurred when the officer opened the car door and attempted to check on Green’s safety, we agree with the trial court that the officer was engaged in a community caretaking function and exempted from the warrant requirement. 9 “Clearly, a community caretaking seizure of a motorist must be supported by objective grounds to believe the motorist or a third party affected by the motorist may need assistance.” Coffman, 914 N.W.2d at 257 .

2025It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment. 9 Id. at 235 .

2025The search incident to arrest would, in turn, justify the warrantless seizure of the contraband [found in the defendant’s pocket].” (citations omitted)); State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995) (“The full search of the arrestee’s person ‘is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.’ ” (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 )), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1997) (en banc), overruled in part by, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2

2016State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 1970). 40 Third, while the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez and other later cases has sought to shrink the warrant requirement through radiations emanating from a highly pliable reasonableness clause, we have declined to adopt this additional revision of traditional search and seizure law under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

2016State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 1970). 39 Third, while the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez and other later cases has sought to shrink the warrant requirement through radiations emanating from a highly pliable reasonableness clause, we have declined to adopt this additional revision of traditional search and seizure law under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

2025The warrant requirement places the determination of probable cause in the hands of “a neutral and detached magistrate” and not “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 13–14 (1948) (Jackson, J.).

2025The warrant requirement places the determination of probable cause in the hands of “a neutral and detached magistrate” and not “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 , 13–14 (1948) (Jackson, J.).

2021“Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id.

2018"One of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement is that formulated in Terry v. Ohio , which allows an officer to stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring." State v. Kinkead , 570 N.W.2d 97 , 100 (Iowa 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21-22 (1968) ).

2025Warrantless searches and seizures “are per se unreasonable if they do not fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 169 (Iowa 2015) (cleaned up).

2023“Under the emergency aid doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring.” Id. (quoting State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 170 (Iowa 2015)).3 “The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement . . . is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).

2021Relying on Gaskins, Pettijohn held “a warrantless breath test to determine the [blood alcohol content] of an arrestee suspected of operating a boat while intoxicated does not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 8.” 899 N.W.2d at 25 .

2021Relying on Gaskins, Pettijohn held “a warrantless breath test to determine the [blood alcohol content] of an arrestee suspected of operating a boat while intoxicated does not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 8.” 899 N.W.2d at 25 .

2022Rev. 291 (1986) [hereinafter LaFave, The Forgotten Motto]. 29Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454–55 (second omission in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ; then quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1971); and then quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 30Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 25 search, and permit the court to “prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”31 In this case, we deal with an innovative and historically strange exception to the

2021In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that “the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate[] . . . are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement [of a warrant].” 333 U.S. 10, 15 , 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948). 49 A few years later, the Supreme Court stated that the warrant requirement was not “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481 , 91 S. Ct. at 2046