warrant requirement in Massachusetts

2025Another applicable exception to the warrant requirement is the motor vehicle exception, which provides that “[w]hen an automobile is stopped on a public way and probable cause exists to search it, the inherent mobility of the motor vehicle provides the exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search.” Commonwealth v. Holness, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 374 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997).

2023The motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement provides that “[w]hen an automobile is stopped on a public way and probable cause exists to search it, the inherent mobility of the motor vehicle provides the exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search.” Commonwealth v. Holness, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 368, 374 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997).

2019"Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 'there must be a showing that it was impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant, and the standards as to exigency are strict.' " Id . at 97 , 112 N.E.3d 796 , quoting Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 800, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2019"Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 'there must be a showing that it was impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant, and the standards as to exigency are strict.' " Id . at 97 , 112 N.E.3d 796 , quoting Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 800, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2025To avoid suppression of evidence seized in such searches, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that “the search ‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974).

2023To avoid suppression of evidence seized in such searches, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that “the search ‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974).

2012As the motion judge concluded, the search of the vehicle was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 7 Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, subject only to “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 623-624 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990).

2011Third, the officers could have ordered the defendant out of the car for pragmatic reasons, e.g., to facilitate an independently permissible warrantless search of the car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. [11] See Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990); Commonwealth v. Correia, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 177-178 (2006).

2025To avoid suppression of evidence seized in such searches, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that “the search ‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974).

2023To avoid suppression of evidence seized in such searches, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that “the search ‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974).

2015The Supreme Court has had three instances to address the emergency exception to the warrant requirement: Mincey, supra; 1 Brigham City, supra; 2 and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009). 3 In each of those opinions, the Supreme Court draws from Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.

2011Although there is no “murder scene exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978), police had been called to an emergency and that emergency had not subsided.

2022Thus, in seeking to justify a warrantless search, the Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating that it “‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” Perkins, 465 Mass. at 603 , quoting Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57 (1974).

2020Because the trooper had no search warrant, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that the stop and frisk "exception[] to the warrant requirement" applies.4 Perkins, supra at 603 . 4 "In 'stop and frisk' cases, there is a two-step analysis: whether the initiation of the investigation by the police was permissible in the circumstances and whether the scope of the search was justified." Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 672 (2001).

2018This exception requires (1) the presence of "objectively reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency exists" and (2) that "the conduct of the police following the entry [is] reasonable under the circumstances, which here means that the protective sweep must be limited in scope to its purpose-a search for victims or suspects." Commonwealth v. Peters , 453 Mass. 818 , 823 (2009). "[T]he burden of proof is on the Commonwealth to show that the warrantless entry falls within the exception [to the warrant requirement] and that there were reasonable grounds for the ... police to believe (an objec

2018The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "applies when the purpose of the police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property." Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bates , 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217 , 219 (1990).

2023"Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the search of a motor vehicle [wa]s reasonable and permissible." Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 383 , quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011). b.

2020"A warrantless search such as [occurred in this case] is presumptively unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 unless one of the 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement apply." Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 875 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 (2011), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)).

2015The judge concluded that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925), there was enough evidence to “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ . . . that the handgun would be in the vehicle, perhaps in the trunk and out of sight.” The judge reasoned that the six hours that had passed between the robbery and the automobile stop were not fatal where “it was reasonable to think that one or both of the occupants at the time of the stop had probably been using the vehicle at the time

1988Consider these words in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973), referring to the exception to the warrant requirement as to automobiles created by Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925): “The Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles.

2020"A warrantless search such as [occurred in this case] is presumptively unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 unless one of the 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement apply." Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 875 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 48 (2011), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)).

1984Id. at 357 n. 19. 12 Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at 735-736, listed ten exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 [1967]); exigent circumstances in house search (United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 [1951]); automobile search (United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 [1982]); search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [1969]; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 [1973]; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 [1981]); search at border or “functional equivalent” (Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266

2007The officers’ initial entry fell within the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 18 “Exigencies which may justify a procedure without warrant are a narrow category and must be established by the Commonwealth which bears the burden of proof.” Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981).

1985Although- we need not decide whether the search fell within a further exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, we add that the police officer’s actions were justified by the exception for exigent circumstances. “[Wjhether an exigency existed, and whether the response of the police was reasonable and therefore lawful, are matters to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it could appear to the officers at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis.” Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456 (1981).

2022See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 255 (2015) (“government-compelled production of the defendant’s CSL records . . . constituted a search in the constitutional sense to which the warrant requirement of art. 14 applied”).

2021The defendant's cell phone records in this case included subscriber information, call logs, and CSLI.5 The subscriber information and the call logs are not subject to the warrant requirement under Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 251 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015).

2017See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974), and cases cited; Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 742-743 (1991), and cases cited.

2013“The purpose, long established, of a search incident to an arrest is to prevent an individual from destroying or concealing evidence of the crime for which the police have probable cause to arrest, or to prevent an individual from acquiring a weapon to resist arrest or to facilitate an escape.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 410 Mass. 737, 743 (1991).

2025The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "permits the police to enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there may be someone inside who is injured or in imminent danger of physical harm." Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 819 (2009).

2019The "burden rests with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that a warrantless search . . . fits within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement." Entwistle, supra at 215 , quoting Peters, supra. See Snell, 428 Mass. at 774-775 . i. Objectively reasonable belief.

2019The "burden rests with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that a warrantless search . . . fits within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement." Entwistle, supra at 215 , quoting Peters, supra. See Snell, 428 Mass. at 774-775 . i. Objectively reasonable belief.

2018The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement "applies when the purpose of the police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or property." Commonwealth v. Snell , 428 Mass. 766 , 774, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bates , 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217 , 219 (1990).

2022See also Duncan, 467 Mass. at 749-750 (describing "'narrow category' of cases where an exception to the warrant requirement is justified").

2019The emergency aid doctrine establishes one such "narrow exception to the warrant requirement." See Commonwealth v. Duncan , 467 Mass. 746 , 754, 7 N.E.3d 469 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 224 , 190 L.Ed.2d 170 (2014).

2019Pursuant to both art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment, the exigent circumstances doctrine establishes another "well-recognized," King , 563 U.S. at 460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , yet "narrow" exception to the warrant requirement, see Tyree , 455 Mass. at 691 , 919 N.E.2d 660 .

2019Pursuant to both art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment, the exigent circumstances doctrine establishes another "well-recognized," King , 563 U.S. at 460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , yet "narrow" exception to the warrant requirement, see Tyree , 455 Mass. at 691 , 919 N.E.2d 660 .

2018Third, the officers could have ordered the defendant out of the car for pragmatic reasons, e.g., to facilitate an independently permissible warrantless search of the car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Cruz , 459 Mass. at 466-467 (citations omitted).

2014The Commonwealth argues that the smell of marijuana supported probable cause to search the back seat of the defendant’s vehicle, rendering the search proper under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 6 The Commonwealth contends that these circumstances differ from those in *20 Cruz, supra, because that case involved the smell of burnt marijuana, whereas the officers in this case perceived an odor of unburnt marijuana.

2017Because the Commonwealth has failed to show that the war-rantless search of the digital camera fell within one of the “ ‘permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement,” Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014), the search was unreasonable and, thus, art. 14 requires the exclusion of evidence seized during the search.

2016We have not previously considered whether police officers are authorized to seize a bag worn by a suspect at the time of arrest and later search it pursuant to an inventory policy, where police lack probable cause to seize or search it, and no other exception to the warrant requirement applies. 6 Cf. Commonwealth v. Craan, 469 Mass. 24, 28 (2014) (“When a search is conducted without a warrant, the burden is on the Commonwealth to show that the search ‘falls within a narrow class of permissible exceptions’ to the warrant requirement” [citation omitted]).

2015The Supreme Court has had three instances to address the emergency exception to the warrant requirement: Mincey, supra; 1 Brigham City, supra; 2 and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009). 3 In each of those opinions, the Supreme Court draws from Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.

2015Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, its recent jurisprudence on the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is instructive. 5 The Supreme Court has had three instances to address the emergency exception to the warrant requirement: Mincey, supra;1 Brigham City, supra;2 and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009).3 In each of those opinions, the Supreme Court draws from Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.

1999The law that the judge found applicable to these facts was summarized by the Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Bates, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 219-220 (1990), as follows: “Unless this entry fell within ‘a well defined exception’ to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, it was a search ‘conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate’ and was ‘per se unreasonable.’ Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984).

1990Unless this entry fell within “a well defined exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, it was a search “conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate” and was “per se unreasonable.” Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984).

2025"Warrantless searches may be justifiable, however, if the Because we affirm based on the emergency aid doctrine, we 2 do not reach the defendant's additional challenge to the judge's finding that entry into the home was supported by Figueroa's valid consent. 2 circumstances of the search fall within an established exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 610 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Tuschall, 476 Mass. 581, 584 (2017).

2025Commonwealth v. Arias, 481 Mass. 604, 610 (2019).

2025In these circumstances, " the Commonwealth bears the burden to establish that a warrantless search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 217 (2019) (citations omitted).

2020Moreover, "[f]or evidence seized without a warrant to be admissible, the Commonwealth bears the burden to establish that a warrantless search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 217 (2019) (internal and external citations omitted).

2007A search incident to an arrest is a limited exception to the warrant requirement, justified by “the need ‘to remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.” New York v. Belton, supra at 457 , quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).

1984Id. at 357 n. 19. 12 Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at 735-736, listed ten exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 [1967]); exigent circumstances in house search (United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 [1951]); automobile search (United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 [1982]); search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [1969]; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 [1973]; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 [1981]); search at border or “functional equivalent” (Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266

1990See Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 350 (1983). 8 The warrantless search of the closed containers found in the trunk under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights was lawful. “ ‘[I]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ (emphasis added.) United States v. Ross, supra at 825 .

1984Id. at 357 n. 19. 12 Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. at 735-736, listed ten exceptions to the warrant requirement: hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 [1967]); exigent circumstances in house search (United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 [1951]); automobile search (United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 [1982]); search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [1969]; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 [1973]; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 [1981]); search at border or “functional equivalent” (Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266