warrant requirement in Missouri

2016In light of these conclusions, the trial court should have severed the valid portions of the warrant from the invalid portion (i.e., the corpse provision) and admitted evidence seized pursuant to the valid portion.14 “‘[I]t would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for 14 When a criminal defendant files a motion to suppress, he “has the burden of establishing that his constitutional rights we

2004He asserts he “had a *586 legitimate expectation of privacy in the film container, in that the arresting officers opened the film container without probable cause and without a search warrant.” “[T]he burden is on the State to justify a warrantless search and to demonstrate that such falls within an exception to the warrant requirement....” State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990).

2000The “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement “applies when: (1) the evidence is observed in plain view while the officer is in a place where he has a right to be; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) it is apparent to the police that they have evidence before them.” State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo. banc 1987).

1993It allows seizure of evidence, without a search warrant, when: (1) the evidence is observed in plain view while the officer is in a place he has a right to be; (2) the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent; and (3) it is apparent to the officer that he has evidence before him. 736 S.W.2d at 399 [4], The doctrine applies where the initial intrusion that brings the officer within plain view of the evidence is authorized by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as the exigent circumstances exception.

2018One exception to the warrant requirement is known as a " Terry stop." Id.

2003Id.; State v. Tackett, 12 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Mo.App.2000). 5 The Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 , 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), “approved the ‘plain-feel’ exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1220 , 117 S.Ct. 1713 , 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997).

2023The State relies on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), to argue that "[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." "Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search." State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999).

2019“The automobile exception is such an exception.” Id.5 “[T]he automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to search a vehicle and seize contraband when probable cause exists.” Id. (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999)).

2010One exception to the warrant requirement is known as a “Terry stop.” Id. 4 Pursuant to this exception, police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.

2003Specific and well-delineated exceptions do exist to the warrant requirement such as a Terry stop, and the state has the burden to prove that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception. 4 State v. Martin, 79 S.W.3d 912, 916 [7, 8] (Mo.App.2002).

2003In Epperson , the Court discussed the exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the “need for help” and “emergency” situations encompassed in the “exigent circumstances” exception. 571 S.W.2d at 264 .

1996“Among the exceptions [to the warrant requirement] are ... searches with consent....” State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 263 [3] (Mo.banc 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2820 , 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979).

2021“If the scope of the 7 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding officers may seize evidence in plain view if there is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime or is contraband); State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Mo. banc 1997) (“[A]n officer who is lawfully located in a place from which the object can plainly be seen may seize the object so long as there is probable cause to believe that the object is connected to the crime.”). 8 The state did not assert in the circuit court that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, and this Court “will not, on revi

2003We observe that the "[t]he plain-view exception to the warrant requirement expresses the Fourth Amendment’s conviction that a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy diminishes as to items that are readily visible in an otherwise private location into which police are invited or a public location to which all have access.” State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1150 , 118 S.Ct. 1171 , 140 L.Ed.2d 181 (1998); see State v. Kriley, 976 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo.App.1998).

2013See also Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d at 184 (holding that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and the burden of placing the search within an exception to the warrant requirement falls on the State).

1999State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990).

2014And we must remember that “[t]he exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for police incursion into a home ... is narrowly drawn.” Rowland, 73 S.W.3d at 822 ; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (explaining “exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn’” (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958))).

2014And we must remember that “[t]he exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for police incursion into a home ... is narrowly drawn.” Rowland, 73 S.W.3d at 822 ; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (explaining “exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn’” (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958))).

2023A further exception “to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).

2015Walker argued that the search violated Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), which addressed the application of the “search incident to arrest” exception to *85 the warrant requirement for a vehicle.

2021“If the scope of the 7 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding officers may seize evidence in plain view if there is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime or is contraband); State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Mo. banc 1997) (“[A]n officer who is lawfully located in a place from which the object can plainly be seen may seize the object so long as there is probable cause to believe that the object is connected to the crime.”). 8 The state did not assert in the circuit court that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, and this Court “will not, on revi

2015The plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows officers to seize evidence in plain view “when the evidence is in an area where the items described in the search warrant might be, and the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately apparent.” State v. Robinson, 379 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 , 107 S.Ct. 1149 , 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).

2023The State relies on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), to argue that "[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." "Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search." State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999).

2016See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (“We conclude that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed contain-ers_”) (emphasis added).

2018Id. " 'Probable cause to search an automobile exists when objective facts, under the totality of the circumstances at the time of the search, would lead a reasonably prudent individual to believe that contraband was located in the automobile.' " Id. (quoting State v. Irvin , 210 S.W.3d 360 , 362 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) ).

2012Specifically, the State argues, “[u]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers who have probable cause that contraband is located within a vehicle can search anywhere in the vehicle where such contraband can be found.” State v. Irvin, 210 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo.App.2006) (citation omitted).

2017Id. ; State v. Hampton , 959 S.W.2d 444 , 450 (Mo. banc 1997) ("Searches of automobiles, because they are mobile, are generally excepted from the warrant requirement."); State v. Ritter , 809 S.W.2d 175 , 177 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991) ("[A] broad and well-established exception to the warrant requirement arises where an automobile is the subject of the search.").

2016“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search a vehicle and seize [evidence] found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains [evidence] and exigent circumstances necessitate the search.” Walker, 460 S.W.3d at 85 (internal quotation omitted).

2016It bears emphasizing that “‘[t]he exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for police incursion into a home . . . is narrowly drawn,” and only exists “‘in cases of emergency.’” State v. Hastings, 450 S.W.3d 479, 485 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (quoting State v. Rowland, 73 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)). 9 The evidence at the suppression hearing and at trial does not support invocation of the exigent circumstances doctrine in this case.

2014And we must remember that “[t]he exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for police incursion into a home ... is narrowly drawn.” Rowland, 73 S.W.3d at 822 ; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (explaining “exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn’” (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958))).

2003Gantt, 87 S.W.3d at 333 (recognizing these exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2003Thus, a further exception to the warrant requirement arises when the police discover contraband in plain view or by plain feel. 3 For this exception to apply, three conditions must exist: (1) the police must comply with the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the police must have a lawful right of access to the evidence itself; and (3) the incriminating character of the evidence seized must be “immediately apparent.” Gantt, 87 S.W.3d at 333 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).

2007The state argues that “[t]he Trial Court erred in suppressing methamphetamine found in a match case on the defendant during a ‘Terry protective frisk, because the Court ruled the frisk was proper and since the officer testified that based upon his experience, training and circumstances, the officer believed the match ease was being used to hold controlled substances, the evidence should be admissible, in that the suppression of evidence was improper under the ‘Plain Feel’ and ‘Plain View’ doctrines....” 3 The genesis of the “plain feel” exception to the warrant requirement for conducting a sea

2007The state argues that “[t]he Trial Court erred in suppressing methamphetamine found in a match case on the defendant during a ‘Terry protective frisk, because the Court ruled the frisk was proper and since the officer testified that based upon his experience, training and circumstances, the officer believed the match ease was being used to hold controlled substances, the evidence should be admissible, in that the suppression of evidence was improper under the ‘Plain Feel’ and ‘Plain View’ doctrines....” 3 The genesis of the “plain feel” exception to the warrant requirement for conducting a sea

2011Chimel v. California originally justified the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement based on the rationales of officer safety and prevention of evidence destruction. 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

2011Chimel v. California originally justified the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement based on the rationales of officer safety and prevention of evidence destruction. 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

2016The Court held that a search of the arrestee’s person is “not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id.

2000In the case of a lawful arrest, “ ‘a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but it is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.’ ” State v. Esquivel, 987 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Mo.App.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 441 (1973)).

2022Creutz testified the vehicle belonged to his mother and Officer Garcia testified the vehicle was registered to Creutz’s mother. 11 “Inventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 865 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Mo. banc 1993) (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)).

2004As our Missouri Supreme Court recognized in State v. Jones, 865 S.W.2d at 660 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 , 107 S.Ct. at 741 ), “Inventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” In the case of a valid inventory search, the Fourth Amendment “policies requiring a warrant or probable cause” are not implicated.

2021“If the scope of the 7 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding officers may seize evidence in plain view if there is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a crime or is contraband); State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Mo. banc 1997) (“[A]n officer who is lawfully located in a place from which the object can plainly be seen may seize the object so long as there is probable cause to believe that the object is connected to the crime.”). 8 The state did not assert in the circuit court that an exception to the warrant requirement applies, and this Court “will not, on revi

2012Further, it has repeatedly been held by reviewing courts that, in relation to the subjective state of mind of the officer, ‘[t]he fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in area and duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement.' U.S. v. Roberts, 928 F.Supp. 910, 933 (W.D.Mo.1996) (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)).