warrant requirement in Maryland

2025The Fourth Amendment requires that the “steps preceding the seizure” of evidence in plain view “be lawful.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 , 462–63 (2011) (explaining that “law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made”). “‘Plain view’ is perhaps better understood, therefore, not as an 29 independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.” Brown,

2010Exceptions to the warrant requirement have also been carved out for: consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); items in plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); searches in heavily regulated industries, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707-09 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 , 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987); “special needs” searches, Vernonia Sch.

2022As such, the case dealt with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also known as the “Carroll doctrine,” which allows an officer to “search an automobile, without a warrant, if he or she has 5 The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this enforcement regime for those who have obtained marijuana “directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice.” CR § 5-601(a)(1). 12 probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or contraband goods.” Id. at 468 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); W

2022With respect to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, in Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 , the Supreme Court held that, if there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, then a law enforcement officer may search the vehicle without a warrant given that a vehicle can be quickly moved from one jurisdiction to another, thereby making obtainment of a warrant impractical.

2022“A search conducted pursuant to valid consent, i.e[.], voluntary and with actual or apparent authority to do so, is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

2022“A search conducted pursuant to valid consent, i.e[.], voluntary and with actual or apparent authority to do so, is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

2015It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id. at 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 .

2015It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id. at 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 .

2013With this in mind, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that searches and seizures “conducted outside the judicial process,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), i.e., without “a judicial warrant ... issued by a neutral magistrate after finding probable cause,” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), are both “presumptively unreasonable,” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , or “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment^]” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 . 2 But the warrant requiremen

2013With this in mind, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that searches and seizures “conducted outside the judicial process,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), i.e., without “a judicial warrant ... issued by a neutral magistrate after finding probable cause,” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), are both “presumptively unreasonable,” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , or “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment^]” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 . 2 But the warrant requiremen

2020“Whether a particular warrantless action on the part of the police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pacheco, 465 Md. at 321 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (internal quotations omitted)). 11 Pacheco and the Odor of Marijuana The relevant exception to the warrant requirement in the present case is the search incident to arrest exception set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

2019This case gives rise to consideration of two exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment: the so-called “automobile exception” announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and the search incident to arrest exception announced in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

2022One prominent exception to the warrant requirement is known as the “Terry Stop,” named after the Supreme Court decision Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), which permits an officer “with reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity ‘may be afoot[]’” to “stop and detain a person, briefly, for investigative purposes.” Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 506 , 924 A.2d 1129, 1140 (2007) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S. Ct. at 1884 ).

2022One prominent exception to the warrant requirement is known as the “Terry Stop,” named after the Supreme Court decision Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), which permits an officer “with reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity ‘may be afoot[]’” to “stop and detain a person, briefly, for investigative purposes.” Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 506 , 924 A.2d 1129, 1140 (2007) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S. Ct. at 1884 ).

2022App. 144, 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004), as she pointed out the dual or twin purpose of a warrantless Carroll Doctrine search of a vehicle: The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases harkening back almost 80 years, has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence 34 of a crime, to search the vehicle for that contraband or evidence of a crime and seize it, without a warrant.

2022App. 144, 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004), as she pointed out the dual or twin purpose of a warrantless Carroll Doctrine search of a vehicle: The United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases harkening back almost 80 years, has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence 34 of a crime, to search the vehicle for that contraband or evidence of a crime and seize it, without a warrant.

2003See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (consent as an exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (exigent circumstances as an exception).

2003See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (consent as an exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (exigent circumstances as an exception).

2026One principal category of cases under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement involves the “destruction or removal of evidence.” Id. at 213 .

2012The leading exception to the warrant requirement for home invasions to execute a search or seizure is the presence of “exigent circumstances.” See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). 10 The exigent circumstances exception “is to be construed narrowly,” Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 215-16 , 468 A.2d 333 (1983), and the Court has stated that “[t]he meaning of exigency implies urgency, immediacy, and compelling need.” Id. at 212 , 468 A.2d 333 .

2012In Wengert, the Court of Appeals observed that [t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless search and seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances such that there is a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (burning building).

2012In Wengert, the Court of Appeals observed that [t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless search and seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances such that there is a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (burning building).

2005That doctrine “recognizes an exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, to search the vehicle for the contraband or evidence of a crime and seize it, without a warrant.” Berry v. State, 155 Md.App. 144, 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004) (citing, inter alia, Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)).

2005That doctrine “recognizes an exception to the warrant requirement that allows the police, when they have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, to search the vehicle for the contraband or evidence of a crime and seize it, without a warrant.” Berry v. State, 155 Md.App. 144, 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004) (citing, inter alia, Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)).

2016Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , supra. Likewise, “odor is a valid consideration” in establishing probable cause *28 and may constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under the plain view doctrine. 6 Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 376 , 987 A.2d 72, 88 (2010).

2016Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , supra. Likewise, “odor is a valid consideration” in establishing probable cause *28 and may constitute an exception to the warrant requirement under the plain view doctrine. 6 Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 376 , 987 A.2d 72, 88 (2010).

2016Notable exceptions to the warrant requirement include: 1) search incident to an arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)); 2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); 3) the plain view doctrine *17 (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)); 4) the Carroll doctrine (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)); 5) stop and frisk (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); 6) consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

2016Notable exceptions to the warrant requirement include: 1) search incident to an arrest (Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009)); 2) hot pursuit (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)); 3) the plain view doctrine *17 (Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)); 4) the Carroll doctrine (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)); 5) stop and frisk (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); 6) consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

2022As such, the case dealt with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also known as the “Carroll doctrine,” which allows an officer to “search an automobile, without a warrant, if he or she has 5 The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this enforcement regime for those who have obtained marijuana “directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice.” CR § 5-601(a)(1). 12 probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or contraband goods.” Id. at 468 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); W

2022As such, the case dealt with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also known as the “Carroll doctrine,” which allows an officer to “search an automobile, without a warrant, if he or she has 5 The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this enforcement regime for those who have obtained marijuana “directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice.” CR § 5-601(a)(1). 12 probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or contraband goods.” Id. at 468 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); W

2009The Court concluded that the pat-down had exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry search because the incriminating nature of the object was not immediately apparent to the officer and “the officer determined that the item was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 379, 113 S.Ct. 2130 .

2008“Although warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” In re Calvin S., 175 Md.App. 516, 528 , 930 A.2d 1099 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); Madison-Sheppard v. State, 177 Md.App. 165, 173 , 934 A.2d 1046 (2007) (“This constitutional guarantee is subject only to a few limited *679 exceptions when the search or seizure is ‘conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate.’ ” (internal quotation omitted)) (quoting Minnesot

2019There are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement.12 Id. at 16-17 , 141 A.3d at 147-48 .

2019There are “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement.12 Id. at 16-17 , 141 A.3d at 147-48 .

2017The ensuing confusion between the Carroll and Chadwick principles provoked the Court, in 1999, to overrule Sanders , reasoning that "it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.” Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. at 579 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 . 14 .

2017The ensuing confusion between the Carroll and Chadwick principles provoked the Court, in 1999, to overrule Sanders , reasoning that "it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.” Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. at 579 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 . 14 .

2010See Conboy, 155 Md.App. at 364 , 843 A.2d 216 (“[A]s long as police have probable cause to arrest before they search the arrestee, it is not ‘particularly important that the search precede the arrest rather than vice versa.’ ” (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980))); See also Nieves, 383 Md. at 579 , 861 A.2d 62 (“A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (The United States Supreme Court articulated

2010See Conboy, 155 Md.App. at 364 , 843 A.2d 216 (“[A]s long as police have probable cause to arrest before they search the arrestee, it is not ‘particularly important that the search precede the arrest rather than vice versa.’ ” (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 , 100 S.Ct. 2556 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980))); See also Nieves, 383 Md. at 579 , 861 A.2d 62 (“A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (The United States Supreme Court articulated

2007See Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 114 , 857 A.2d 65, 86 (2004) (“[t]he ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be suppressed falls on the State” (quoting State v. Green, 375 Md. 595 , 826 A.2d 486 (2003))); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191 , 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994)(noting that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and that “the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement rests on the State”); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 217 , 468 A.2d 333, 341 (1983) (emphasizing “that the burden of establishing exigent

2007See Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 114 , 857 A.2d 65, 86 (2004) (“[t]he ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be suppressed falls on the State” (quoting State v. Green, 375 Md. 595 , 826 A.2d 486 (2003))); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 191 , 638 A.2d 107, 114 (1994)(noting that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and that “the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement rests on the State”); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 217 , 468 A.2d 333, 341 (1983) (emphasizing “that the burden of establishing exigent

2026We hold, therefore, that the use of a cell site simulator, such as Hailstorm, by the government, requires a search warrant based on probable cause and 9 describing with particularity the object and manner of the search, unless an established exception to the warrant requirement applies.[4] Id. at 394–95.

2020Accordingly, we held in State v. Andrews that 25 unless a valid exception to the warrant requirement applies, the government may not use a cell phone simulator without a warrant or, alternatively, a specialized order that requires a particularized showing of probable cause, based on sufficient information about the technology involved to allow a court to contour reasonable limitations on the scope and manner of the search, and that provides adequate protections in case any third-party cell phone information might be unintentionally intercepted. 227 Md.

2021This Court has stated that “[a] search conducted pursuant to valid consent, i.e., - 40 - voluntary and with actual or apparent authority to do so, is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 51 , 962 A.2d at 403 (cleaned up).

2021This Court has stated that “[a] search conducted pursuant to valid consent, i.e., - 40 - voluntary and with actual or apparent authority to do so, is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 51 , 962 A.2d at 403 (cleaned up).