warrant requirement in District of Columbia

2024See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012) (concluding that there was an unconstitutional search when “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (explaining that “[b]oth sides to the controversy” over the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “appear to recognize a distinction between searches and seizures that take place on a man’s property . . . and those carried out elsewhere.

2023See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is “subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions”).

2018This exception to the warrant requirement, known as the "emergency aid exception," does not depend on "the seriousness of any crime [the officers] are investigating when the emergency arises," and instead "requires only 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that 'a person within [the dwelling] is in need of *25 immediate aid.' " Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45 , 48, 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (quoting Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 404 -05 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 ; Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (internal citations omitted) ); see also

2018This exception to the warrant requirement, known as the "emergency aid exception," does not depend on "the seriousness of any crime [the officers] are investigating when the emergency arises," and instead "requires only 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that 'a person within [the dwelling] is in need of *25 immediate aid.' " Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45 , 48, 130 S.Ct. 546 , 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (quoting Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 404 -05 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 ; Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (internal citations omitted) ); see also

2016The Court also held that separate and apart from Chimel’s two traditional justifications for the warrant exception, “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ” Id. at 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring)).

2012Indeed, the court noted in Gant “[o]ther established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand.” Id. at 346 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 .

2014This expectation, moreover, was not defeated merely because Mr. Biles stood in a public market; rather, it remained “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring), particularly where Mr. Biles kept his belongings protected from view and “in [his] line of sight.” Because Mr. Biles had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings and because the warrantless search of those items did not fall within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the DVDs hidden under his backpack and the identificati

2014This expectation, moreover, was not defeated merely because Mr. Biles stood in a public market; rather, it remained “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring), particularly where Mr. Biles kept his belongings protected from view and “in [his] line of sight.” Because Mr. Biles had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings and because the warrantless search of those items did not fall within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the DVDs hidden under his backpack and the identificati

1995A. I agree with my colleagues that the “probable cause” requirement under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, as elaborated in United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351, 1355-56 (D.C.1983), and succeeding cases, “reflects the need for solid facts,” ante at 1166, showing “reasonable grounds to believe some kind of emergency existed.” Ante at 1166 (quoting W.R.

1995A. I agree with my colleagues that the "probable cause" requirement under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement, as elaborated in United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351, 1355-56 (D.C.1983), and succeeding cases, "reflects the need for solid facts," ante at 1166, showing "reasonable grounds to believe some kind of emergency existed." Ante at 1166 (quoting W.R.

2021In response to the trial court’s indication that it would not rule on probable cause, the prosecutor stated that he “had further argument” that he would forgo “as long as you’re not making that ruling.” The court also did not make definitive findings as to whether Officer Branson’s search was justified by other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as plain feel if it was “immediately apparent” that the item was “obvious contraband” and gave the officer probable cause to seize it, see Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971 , 974–75 (D.C. 2002), or probable cause to arrest, which would have

2021In response to the trial court’s indication that it would not rule on probable cause, the prosecutor stated that he “had further argument” that he would forgo “as long as you’re not making that ruling.” The court also did not make definitive findings as to whether Officer Branson’s search was justified by other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as plain feel if it was “immediately apparent” that the item was “obvious contraband” and gave the officer probable cause to seize it, see Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971 , 974–75 (D.C. 2002), or probable cause to arrest, which would have

2025One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is that “the police may briefly detain a person for an investigatory or Terry stop, even if they lack probable cause, if the officers have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person has just committed a crime.” Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2023Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (recognizing that “[i]t is the State’s burden to demonstrate” that a search or seizure falls under an exception to the warrant requirement); see also Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (“Where a defendant shows that a warrantless search or seizure produced evidence that the government seeks to introduce at trial . . . the burden is on the government to . . . justify[] the search based on facts that could bring it within certain recognized, limited exceptions to the warrant requirement” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2020Third, “[i]t is well established that ‘exigent circumstances,’ including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise impermissible search without first obtaining a warrant.”19 But the Marshals had no such justification after they removed all persons from appellant’s (…continued) justification for a protective sweep, once the officers discovered that nobody else was in the house, the sweep should have ended.”); United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Once police eliminate the dangers that justify a security sweep . . . they

2020Third, “[i]t is well established that ‘exigent circumstances,’ including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise impermissible search without first obtaining a warrant.” 19 But the Marshals had no such justification after they removed all persons from appellant’s (…continued) justification for a protective sweep, once the officers discovered that nobody else was in the house, the sweep should have ended.”); United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Once police eliminate the dangers that justify a security sweep . . . they

2002See Horton, 496 U.S. at 141 & n. 11, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (explaining that reliance on privacy concerns is misplaced when an exception to the search warrant requirement authorizes an officer with a lawful right of access to seize an item without a warrant, even if the item is a container); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (the “search incident to lawful arrest” exception to the warrant requirement justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have in a container found within the scope of the search authorized by the exception, ev

2002See Horton, 496 U.S. at 141 & n. 11, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (explaining that reliance on privacy concerns is misplaced when an exception to the search warrant requirement authorizes an officer with a lawful right of access to seize an item without a warrant, even if the item is a container); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (the “search incident to lawful arrest” exception to the warrant requirement justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have in a container found within the scope of the search authorized by the exception, ev

1996Compare Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 , 96 S.Ct. at 3096 (“the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible”) with Johns, 469 U.S. at 484 , 105 S.Ct. at 885 ("A vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless search.") and Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261 , 102 S.Ct. at 3080 (noting that finding of exigent circumstances is not requir

1981Because we hold that the contraband in the cab would not “inevitably” have been discovered even pursuant to a lawful search, we need not reach the question of whether a lawful search would have been authorized in the first place, either by a hypothetical judicial determination of probable cause, or by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2844-45 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 , 101 S.Ct. 42 , 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Chamb

1981Because we hold that the contraband in the cab would not “inevitably” have been discovered even pursuant to a lawful search, we need not reach the question of whether a lawful search would have been authorized in the first place, either by a hypothetical judicial determination of probable cause, or by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2844-45 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 , 101 S.Ct. 42 , 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Chamb

1981Because we hold that the contraband in the cab would not “inevitably” have been discovered even pursuant to a lawful search, we need not reach the question of whether a lawful search would have been authorized in the first place, either by a hypothetical judicial determination of probable cause, or by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Robbins v. California, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2844-45 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 , 101 S.Ct. 42 , 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Chamb

2020Effectively, the government asks this court to significantly expand the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 5 and hold that—regardless of the nature of a person’s 5 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (explaining that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits a search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (holding that an automobile may be searched and seized without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe it contains contraband); see also W

1996Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, search of the person and surrounding area incident to arrest, search at the national border or “functional equivalent,” plain view, and — the exception at issue here — the “automobile exception.” See Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36 , 103 S.Ct. at 1540 (citing, among others, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 95-96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (hot pursuit);

2018Washington v. United States , 585 A.2d 167 , 168 (D.C. 1991) (quoting McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 455-56, 69 S.Ct. 191 , 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) ); see also Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 602 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (explaining that the warrant requirement "interpose[s] the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen" and "minimizes the danger of needless intrusions.").

2018Washington v. United States , 585 A.2d 167 , 168 (D.C. 1991) (quoting McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 455-56, 69 S.Ct. 191 , 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) ); see also Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 602 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (explaining that the warrant requirement "interpose[s] the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen" and "minimizes the danger of needless intrusions.").

1995See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (individual can waive the warrant requirement by consenting to a search and seizure); Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 66 , 190 F.2d 649, 651 (1951) (same).

1995See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (individual can waive the warrant requirement by consenting to a search and seizure); Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 66 , 190 F.2d 649, 651 (1951) (same).

2020See footnote 14, supra. Appellant did not directly dispute these matters, however. 21 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 17 The police themselves did not enter the home except briefly to accompany the suspect (who was not yet under arrest) for the sole purpose of ensuring that he did not take the opportunity to destroy drugs concealed there.

2020See footnote 14, supra. Appellant did not directly dispute these matters, however. 21 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 17 The police themselves did not enter the home except briefly to accompany the suspect (who was not yet under arrest) for the sole purpose of ensuring that he did not take the opportunity to destroy drugs concealed there.

2015Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). 10 See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing the “importance of requiring authorization by a neutral and detached magistrate before allowing a law enforcement officer to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt” unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1980In Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. at 770 , 86 S.Ct. at 1835 , the Court upheld a warrantless taking of blood to prevent the destruction of evidence of drunkenness, as being incident to arrest, given the special circumstances that the percentage of alcohol in the blood diminishes as the body functions to eliminate it.

2025One exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is that “the police may briefly detain a person for an investigatory or Terry stop, even if they lack probable cause, if the officers have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person has just committed a crime.” Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2010To effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ... [and] in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances.” Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1 , 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (citations omitted); see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.... ”).

1993See United States v. (Willie) Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 476-77 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (“in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effe

1993See United States v. (Willie) Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 476-77 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (“in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effe

2020Effectively, the government asks this court to significantly expand the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 5 and hold that—regardless of the nature of a person’s 5 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (explaining that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits a search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (holding that an automobile may be searched and seized without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe it contains contraband); see also W

1991The Court emphasized that this exception to the warrant requirement “applies only to searches that are supported by probable cause,” and that such a search “is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” Id., 456 U.S. at 809 , 102 S.Ct. at 2164-65 (footnote omitted).

2025Once that was the case, the plurality could (and it seems should) have proceeded straight to the automobile exception. 21 called ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement applies, for that exception justifies a warrantless entry into the automobile to seize contraband in plain view inside the car.” Id.

1996Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, search of the person and surrounding area incident to arrest, search at the national border or “functional equivalent,” plain view, and — the exception at issue here — the “automobile exception.” See Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36 , 103 S.Ct. at 1540 (citing, among others, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 95-96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (hot pursuit);

2025One of the most commonly invoked exceptions to the warrant requirement is that police may conduct a warrantless search of a person “incident to a lawful [custodial] arrest.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 49 A.3d at 821 ).

2025One of the most commonly invoked exceptions to the warrant requirement is that police may conduct a warrantless search of a person “incident to a lawful [custodial] arrest.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 49 A.3d at 821 ).

2018As the Supreme Court has explained, ―[t]hat language unequivocally establishes the proposition that at the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.‖ Id. at 589-90 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also id. at 585 (―[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.‖). 22 The sanctity of the home is protected by strict adherence to the warrant requirement. ―Crime, even in the privacy of one‘s own quarters, is, o

1996The purpose of the warrant requirement is to interpose an independent assessment of probable cause between a citizen and an “officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

1996Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, search of the person and surrounding area incident to arrest, search at the national border or “functional equivalent,” plain view, and — the exception at issue here — the “automobile exception.” See Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36 , 103 S.Ct. at 1540 (citing, among others, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 95-96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (hot pursuit);

1996Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, search of the person and surrounding area incident to arrest, search at the national border or “functional equivalent,” plain view, and — the exception at issue here — the “automobile exception.” See Brown, 460 U.S. at 735-36 , 103 S.Ct. at 1540 (citing, among others, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 , 72 S.Ct. 93, 95-96 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (hot pursuit);

1974In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 297 A.2d 790 (1972), the court sought to make it crystal clear that the police have no right to make an exploratory search of an automobile even as an incident to a traffic arrest, 6 saying at 792: When the search is made without a warrant, it must be with probable cause or bear some reasonable relationship to the crime for which the arrest is made or to the safety of the officer ’f it is to come within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement described in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ....

1974In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 297 A.2d 790 (1972), the court sought to make it crystal clear that the police have no right to make an exploratory search of an *472 automobile even as an incident to a traffic arrest, [6] saying at 792: When the search is made without a warrant, it must be with probable cause or bear some reasonable relationship to the crime for which the arrest is made or to the safety of the officer if it is to come within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement described in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). . . .

2025See id. (“[T]rial courts must be careful to assure that a police officer’s ‘immediately apparent’ recognition of a concealed drug package . . . is not too casually claimed or accepted.’” (quoting Dickerson, 677 A.2d at 512)).

2021In response to the trial court’s indication that it would not rule on probable cause, the prosecutor stated that he “had further argument” that he would forgo “as long as you’re not making that ruling.” The court also did not make definitive findings as to whether Officer Branson’s search was justified by other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as plain feel if it was “immediately apparent” that the item was “obvious contraband” and gave the officer probable cause to seize it, see Ball v. United States, 803 A.2d 971 , 974–75 (D.C. 2002), or probable cause to arrest, which would have