warrant requirement in Montana

2019An exception to the warrant requirement is the "investigatory or 'Terry stop,' which allows 'a brief seizure of the individual that must be supported by a reasonable [or particularized] suspicion of criminal activity.' " State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 (quoting State v. Lovegren , 2002 MT 153 , ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 358 , 51 P.3d 471 ***451 (citing *405 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )). ¶13 Police did not initiate a stop of Questo's vehicle, and thus, as Questo correctly notes, we must first determine whether a seizure occurr

2019An exception to the warrant requirement is the "investigatory or 'Terry stop,' which allows 'a brief seizure of the individual that must be supported by a reasonable [or particularized] suspicion of criminal activity.' " State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 (quoting State v. Lovegren , 2002 MT 153 , ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 358 , 51 P.3d 471 ***451 (citing *405 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )). ¶13 Police did not initiate a stop of Questo's vehicle, and thus, as Questo correctly notes, we must first determine whether a seizure occurr

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2017State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 36 , 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 55 , 852 P.2d 111, 113 (1993); Ante v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 , 88 S. Ct. 507, 515 (1967).

2017State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 36 , 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 55 , 852 P.2d 111, 113 (1993); Ante v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 , 88 S. Ct. 507, 515 (1967).

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2011We stated in that case that this after-the-fact consent was ineffective because "`to be valid and qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, a consent must precede a search.'" Ellis , ¶ 45 (quoting State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 216 , 951 P.2d 971, 980 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223 , 317 Mont. 177 , 75 P.3d 1268 ).

2011We stated in that case that this after-the-fact consent was ineffective because “ ‘to be valid and qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, a consent must precede a search.’ ” Ellis , ¶ 45 (quoting State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 216 , 951 P.2d 971, 980 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223 , 317 Mont. 177 , 75 P.3d 1268 ).

1998See Solis, 214 Mont. at 319 , 693 P.2d at 522 . ¶35 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution; however, both federal and state law recognize certain specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.

1998See Solis, 214 Mont. at 319 , 693 P.2d at 522 . ¶35 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution; however, both federal and state law recognize certain specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2018State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 ; State v. Hardaway , 2001 MT 252 , ¶ 36, 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 358, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 515, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). ¶11 A recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the temporary investigative stop, or Terry stop, as first recognized *1216 by the United States Supreme Court in Terry , 392 at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877 , and subsequently codified in Montana at §§ 46-5-401 and -403, MCA. 5 Under this exception, a law enforcement officer may briefly stop and detain a person for invest

2018State v. Ballinger , 2016 MT 30 , ¶ 16, 382 Mont. 193 , 366 P.3d 668 ; State v. Hardaway , 2001 MT 252 , ¶ 36, 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 , 358, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 515, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). ¶11 A recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the temporary investigative stop, or Terry stop, as first recognized *1216 by the United States Supreme Court in Terry , 392 at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877 , and subsequently codified in Montana at §§ 46-5-401 and -403, MCA. 5 Under this exception, a law enforcement officer may briefly stop and detain a person for invest

2001See, e.g., State v. Bassett, 1999 MT 109 , 294 Mont. 327 , 982 P.2d 410 (warrantless entry into burned house by police was an unlawful search, a violation of owner's right to privacy, and was not justified by the exigent circumstances or plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement); State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361 , 901 P.2d 61 (warrantless entry by police onto fenced, posted private property constituted an unlawful search and evidence of a crime derived from such entry was inadmissible); Elison, ¶ 54 (warrantless search of an automobile requires the existence of probable cause as

2001See, e.g., State v. Bassett, 1999 MT 109 , 294 Mont. 327 , 982 P.2d 410 (warrantless entry into burned house by police was an unlawful search, a violation of owner's right to privacy, and was not justified by the exigent circumstances or plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement); State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361 , 901 P.2d 61 (warrantless entry by police onto fenced, posted private property constituted an unlawful search and evidence of a crime derived from such entry was inadmissible); Elison, ¶ 54 (warrantless search of an automobile requires the existence of probable cause as

2003State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 31 , 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 31 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 31 (right to privacy disallows swabbing blood sample from hands of an arrestee as a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest); Elison , ¶ 46 (right to privacy disallows federal “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement in Montana); State v. Nelson (1997) 283 Mont. 231, 241-42 , 941 P.2d 441, 448 (right to privacy disallows unauthorized access to personal medical records without subpoena); State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 383 , 901 P.2d 61, 75 (right to privacy disallows federal “open fields” search a

2003State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 31 , 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 31 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 31 (right to privacy disallows swabbing blood sample from hands of an arrestee as a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest); Elison , ¶ 46 (right to privacy disallows federal “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement in Montana); State v. Nelson (1997) 283 Mont. 231, 241-42 , 941 P.2d 441, 448 (right to privacy disallows unauthorized access to personal medical records without subpoena); State v. Bullock (1995), 272 Mont. 361, 383 , 901 P.2d 61, 75 (right to privacy disallows federal “open fields” search a

2025In State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 , “this Court largely abandoned the automobile exception to search warrants under the Montana Constitution,” however, “the Elison Court specifically reserved a limited number of instances in which 12 warrantless searches of vehicles would remain permissible, one of which was plain view.” Tenold, ¶ 11; see also State v. Logan, 2002 MT 206, ¶ 14 , 311 Mont. 239 , 53 P.3d 1285 (“there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution . . . a warrantless search of an automobile requires

2025In State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 , “this Court largely abandoned the automobile exception to search warrants under the Montana Constitution,” however, “the Elison Court specifically reserved a limited number of instances in which 12 warrantless searches of vehicles would remain permissible, one of which was plain view.” Tenold, ¶ 11; see also State v. Logan, 2002 MT 206, ¶ 14 , 311 Mont. 239 , 53 P.3d 1285 (“there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution . . . a warrantless search of an automobile requires

2020Goetz, ¶ 14 (citing State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 35 , 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ). ¶14 Warrantless searches inside a home are per se unreasonable unless the State establishes an exception to the warrant requirement justified the search.

2020Goetz, ¶ 14 (citing State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 35 , 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ). ¶14 Warrantless searches inside a home are per se unreasonable unless the State establishes an exception to the warrant requirement justified the search.

2006See State v. Olson, 2002 MT 211, ¶ 20 , 311 Mont. 270, ¶ 20 , 55 P.3d 935, ¶ 20 (“The knowing and voluntary consent by a citizen to a search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

2006See State v. Olson, 2002 MT 211, ¶ 20 , 311 Mont. 270, ¶ 20 , 55 P.3d 935, ¶ 20 (“The knowing and voluntary consent by a citizen to a search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2021Citing, Stewart, ¶¶ 6-11 and 40-44; Allen, ¶ 61; Goetz, ¶¶ 30, 37, and 54, he characterizes his illicit text message communications with the cloaked law enforcement officer as a form or analog of the illegal surreptitious electronic monitoring and recording by the government at issue in those cases, and thus similarly invasive and unreasonable police-suggested “pretext phone calls” fell within recognized exception to the warrant requirement); Allen, ¶¶ 62-64 (in re state failure to meet burden of showing that warrantless electronic recording of telephone calls by police agent-informant fell wi

2025Whether Detective Monaco’s continued questioning was constitutional because Summers consented. ¶24 “Voluntary consent to a government search or seizure is an independent exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution.” State v. Laster, 2021 MT 269 , ¶ 40, 406 Mont. 60 , 497 P.3d 224 . “[T]he standard of consent applicable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, [Section] 11, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures is merely that a consent to a government search or seizure be voluntary in fact under the tota

2025Whether Detective Monaco’s continued questioning was constitutional because Summers consented. ¶24 “Voluntary consent to a government search or seizure is an independent exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution.” State v. Laster, 2021 MT 269 , ¶ 40, 406 Mont. 60 , 497 P.3d 224 . “[T]he standard of consent applicable under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, [Section] 11, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures is merely that a consent to a government search or seizure be voluntary in fact under the tota

2024A third category of exceptions includes welfare checks arising under the community caretaker doctrine, when a peace officer acts on a duty to promptly investigate situations “in which a citizen may be in peril or need some type of assistance from an officer.” Estate of Frazier v. Miller, 2021 MT 85, ¶ 16 , 404 Mont. 1 , 484 P.3d 912 (citations omitted).1 1 The Dissent, ¶ 58, argues that the community caretaker doctrine “is not an exception to the warrant requirement.” The premise stems from our statement in State v. Lovegren that “this category of interaction with police ‘does not involve any

2024A third category of exceptions includes welfare checks arising under the community caretaker doctrine, when a peace officer acts on a duty to promptly investigate situations “in which a citizen may be in peril or need some type of assistance from an officer.” Estate of Frazier v. Miller, 2021 MT 85, ¶ 16 , 404 Mont. 1 , 484 P.3d 912 (citations omitted).1 1 The Dissent, ¶ 58, argues that the community caretaker doctrine “is not an exception to the warrant requirement.” The premise stems from our statement in State v. Lovegren that “this category of interaction with police ‘does not involve any

1999State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 287 Mont. 220, ¶ 21 , 953 P.2d 1065, ¶ 21 . ¶13 In order to justify a warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement argued before the District Court, both exigent circumstances and probable cause must be established.

1999State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 287 Mont. 220, ¶ 21 , 953 P.2d 1065, ¶ 21 . ¶13 In order to justify a warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement argued before the District Court, both exigent circumstances and probable cause must be established.

2018State v. Elison , 2000 MT 288 , ¶ 15, 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; Roberts , ¶ 12 ; Reynolds , 272 Mont. at 49 -50 , 899 P.2d at 542 ; State v. Gopher , 193 Mont. 189 , 193-94, 631 P.2d 293 , 295-96 (1981) ; Cortez , 449 U.S. at 417 -18 , 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 ; Terry , 392 U.S. at 16 -19 , 88 S.Ct. at 1877-79 .

2018State v. Elison , 2000 MT 288 , ¶ 15, 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; Roberts , ¶ 12 ; Reynolds , 272 Mont. at 49 -50 , 899 P.2d at 542 ; State v. Gopher , 193 Mont. 189 , 193-94, 631 P.2d 293 , 295-96 (1981) ; Cortez , 449 U.S. at 417 -18 , 101 S.Ct. at 694-95 ; Terry , 392 U.S. at 16 -19 , 88 S.Ct. at 1877-79 .

2014Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868, 878 , 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3171 (1987) (holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement).

2014Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868, 878 , 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3171 (1987) (holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement).

2014Demontiney requests that we overturn State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43 , 887 P.2d 199 (1994), and adopt the standard set forth in State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472 , 692 P.2d 1273 3 (1985), overruled in part, Pastos, 269 Mont. at 57 , 887 P.2d at 208 , and Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979). ¶8 The State counters that the search was permissible under Pastos because inventory searches are an established exception to the warrant requirement, safety is a compelling state interest, and the search satisfied the requirements for an inventory search.

2014I, § 22.2 Both states rejected inventory searches in the 1970s on the grounds that “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (Haw. 1974), and that officers “may not further search the arrestee’s possessions . . . in the absence of a warrant or circumstances which provide the basis for a more intensive search under another recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 736 (Alaska 1979). ¶34 It is evident that Section 10 was drafted with the purpose to require case-by-case evaluation of spec

2011We stated in that case that this after-the-fact consent was ineffective because "`to be valid and qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, a consent must precede a search.'" Ellis , ¶ 45 (quoting State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 216 , 951 P.2d 971, 980 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223 , 317 Mont. 177 , 75 P.3d 1268 ).

2011We stated in that case that this after-the-fact consent was ineffective because “ ‘to be valid and qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, a consent must precede a search.’ ” Ellis , ¶ 45 (quoting State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 216 , 951 P.2d 971, 980 (1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223 , 317 Mont. 177 , 75 P.3d 1268 ).

2009Dorwart v. Caraway, 1998 MT 191, ¶ 21 , 290 Mont. 196 , 966 P.2d 1121 , overruled on other grounds by Trustees of Indiana University v. Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97 , 315 Mont. 210 , 69 P.3d 663 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 , 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967); State v. Gray, 152 Mont. 145, 149 , 447 P.2d 475, 477 (1968)). ‘The home is the most sanctified of all ‘particular places’ referred to in the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Graham, 2004 MT 385, ¶ 22 , 325 Mont. 110 , 103 P.3d 1073 , and it is for that reason that the exceptions to the warrant requirement are, concomitantly, jealous

2009Dorwart v. Caraway, 1998 MT 191, ¶ 21 , 290 Mont. 196 , 966 P.2d 1121 , overruled on other grounds by Trustees of Indiana University v. Buxbaum, 2003 MT 97 , 315 Mont. 210 , 69 P.3d 663 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 , 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (1967); State v. Gray, 152 Mont. 145, 149 , 447 P.2d 475, 477 (1968)). ‘The home is the most sanctified of all ‘particular places’ referred to in the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Graham, 2004 MT 385, ¶ 22 , 325 Mont. 110 , 103 P.3d 1073 , and it is for that reason that the exceptions to the warrant requirement are, concomitantly, jealous