warrant requirement in Minnesota

2016Odette’s argument fails to recognize that the automobile exception is an independent exception to the warrant requirement that permits police to search a vehicle without a warrant “[w]hen probable cause exists to believe that a vehicle contains contraband,” Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 248 , which is not limited by the Supreme Court’s holding in McNeely.

2016State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). 3 An inventory search is a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.

2024“The state bears the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001).

2018Generally, warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable" and unconstitutional "unless one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies." State v. Ture , 632 N.W.2d 621 , 627 (Minn. 2001) (quotations omitted).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2015As a general rule, a search requires either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, such as the person’s consent, Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 ; the existence of exigent circumstances, 4 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 ; or a valid arrest, State v. Bernard, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 543160, at *4 (Minn. Feb. 11, 2015).

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2024Nor is an administrative delay “one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682 , 685 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). 5 Here, we note that the district court had no record from which it could have made any determination about the status or nature of Fohrenkam’s 5 See, e.g., Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 628, 631 (Minn. 2018) (pat-frisk, community- caretaker, and exigent-circumstances exceptions); State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (automobile exception); State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015) (search incident to l

2024A long-standing exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment, however, is a search incident to lawful arrest, which allows the police “to conduct a ‘full search of the person’ who has been lawfully arrested.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 , 766–67 (Minn. 2015) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).

2026See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 21-22 (1968); Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842 .

2016“Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, war-rantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions *516 applies.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn.2011) (quotations omitted); see also Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct 2473, 2482 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.”).

2024Nor is an administrative delay “one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682 , 685 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). 5 Here, we note that the district court had no record from which it could have made any determination about the status or nature of Fohrenkam’s 5 See, e.g., Ries v. State, 920 N.W.2d 620, 628, 631 (Minn. 2018) (pat-frisk, community- caretaker, and exigent-circumstances exceptions); State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (automobile exception); State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015) (search incident to l

2024A warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions applies.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). 5 The district court determined that the search of Johnson’s vehicle was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2007Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law enforcement officers, in pursuing a community-caretak-ing function, “may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency , assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occu pant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006);- see also State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.1992).

2007Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain limited exceptions, and law enforcement officers, in pursuing a community-caretaking function, "may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant *788 from imminent injury." Brigham City v. Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); see also State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.1992).

2007But the warrant requirement is “ ‘subject ... to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.’ ” State v. Hanley, 363 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn.1985) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).

2007But the warrant requirement is "`subject . . . to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" State v. Hanley, 363 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Minn.1985) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).

2024In response, the Minnesota Legislature amended the test-refusal statute to include clause (2), which incorporates the warrant requirement outlined in Birchfield.” Id. at *3 n.1 (first citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 , 474-75 (2016); and then 2017 Minn. Laws ch. 83, art. 2, § 2, at 351, 355 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (Supp. 2017))).

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2023Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable “because of their administrative and caretaking functions” which “serve to protect an owner[’]s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 (quotation omitted).

2016However, inventory searches are a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement” that “serve to protect an owner[’]s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Id. (quotations omitted).

2025See, e.g., Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 149 n.2 (“[A]lthough ‘probable cause to arrest’ satisfies the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when an arrest is made, ‘probable cause to search’ does not necessarily trigger an exception to the warrant requirement or lead to the conclusion that the search was otherwise reasonable.”); In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 1997) (“[P]robable cause to search and probable cause to arrest are distinct. . . .

2015The officer testified that, knowing the robbery had involved a gun, he wanted to be “a little more thorough [in his pat search] before [he] put [appellant] in the squad [car].” But, regardless of what the search produced, the officer would have asked appellant his name and run the name through the police computer, thus revealing the warrant; appellant would have been arrested, see State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96 , 101 n.2 (Minn. 2000) (once a warrant is 5 discovered, officers must make an arrest); a search would have been performed incident to the arrest, see State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149-

2026See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that, under the emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “[t]he officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant”); Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 n.6 (acknowledging Lemieux’s reference to “the prior application of an additional prong” requiring that the officer “must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence,” but recognizing that Brigham City rejected that prong for Fourth Amendment purposes); Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788 (stating that, under Brigham City, an officer’s subjective inten

2018As part of this argument, the State's brief emphasized that the legal issue the State was presenting to the court (whether the police conduct was justified under the community-caretaking doctrine) is " distinct from the emergency or exigent-circumstances exception in that it does not depend on an ongoing or imminent danger. " (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the State's brief did not cite Brigham City , 547 U.S. 398 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , which established the emergency-aid exception, and the brief's single citation to Lemieux , 726 N.W.2d 783 , was used to support a contention that the search of Ries

2016As stated above, Milton articulated only three criteria for the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. 821 N.W.2d at 799 .

2016And citing 5 to the three Milton factors, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in State v. Holland that “[u]nder the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, police may seize an object without a warrant if three criteria are met,” citing to the three Milton factors. 865 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Minn. 2015) (citing Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 799 ) (emphasis added).

2024One exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception,” under which a police officer may search a vehicle without a warrant, including closed containers in that vehicle, if there is “probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted).

2024Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “the police may search a car without a warrant, including closed containers in that car, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn. 2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n.10 (Minn. 2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n.1 (Minn. 1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement . . . .”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn. 1

2015See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Minn.2013) (Stras, J., concurring) (noting that we had yet to adopt the good-faith exception and had again declined the opportunity to do so); State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163 , 180 n. 10 (Minn.2007) (“We note, however, that we have consistently declined to adopt, much less even address, the Leon ‘good faith’ exception.”); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782 , 791 n. 1 (Minn.1999) (“[W]e need not address the state’s request for us to adopt the ‘good faith’ exception to the warrant requirement-”); State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 634 (Minn.1995) (“[W

2018The court of appeals affirmed on both issues, but the court of appeals concluded the pat-frisk of Ries was reasonable under the exception to the warrant requirement recognized in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), as opposed to the postconviction court's "community caretaking function" rationale.

2018The court of appeals affirmed on both issues, but the court of appeals concluded the pat-frisk of Ries was reasonable under the exception to the warrant requirement recognized in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), as opposed to the postconviction court's "community caretaking function" rationale.

2016Ayers argues that McDonnell stands for the principle that “[i]t is fundamentally unfair to mislead an individual by threatening a criminal charge when an officer knows, or should know, that criminal liability is impossible.” As support for his argument under McDonnell, Ayers cites State v. Trahan, in which this court held that because a warrantless blood test of a driver would not have been constitutional under either the search-incident-to-arrest or exigent-circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the test-refusal statute as applied to that driver violated

2016In Trahan, this court concluded that “[w]hen a warrantless search of a driver’s blood would not have been constitutional under an exception to the warrant requirement, charging the driver with violating [the test-refusal statute], for refusing to submit to a blood test, implicates a fundamental right.” 870 N.W.2d. at 398 .

2015“Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of . . . an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.” State v. Campbell, 581 N.W.2d 870 , 5 871 (Minn. App. 1998) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1971).

2015“Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of . . . an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate.” State v. Campbell, 581 N.W.2d 870 , 5 871 (Minn. App. 1998) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1971).

2026See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (holding that, under the emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “[t]he officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant”); Ries, 920 N.W.2d at 632 n.6 (acknowledging Lemieux’s reference to “the prior application of an additional prong” requiring that the officer “must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence,” but recognizing that Brigham City rejected that prong for Fourth Amendment purposes); Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 788 (stating that, under Brigham City, an officer’s subjective inten

2018As part of this argument, the State's brief emphasized that the legal issue the State was presenting to the court (whether the police conduct was justified under the community-caretaking doctrine) is " distinct from the emergency or exigent-circumstances exception in that it does not depend on an ongoing or imminent danger. " (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the State's brief did not cite Brigham City , 547 U.S. 398 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , which established the emergency-aid exception, and the brief's single citation to Lemieux , 726 N.W.2d 783 , was used to support a contention that the search of Ries

2025Id. at 149-56 ; see also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. 840 , 847- 57 (2019) (drunk-driving suspect was unconscious and, thus, unable to consent to breath test); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (drunk-driving suspect had caused automobile accident, which required officer’s attention); State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Minn. 2015) (DWI suspect caused fatal automobile accident, was hospitalized, and might have been airlifted to different hospital).

2016The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Id. at 675 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

2012Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), searches conducted pursuant to probable cause and exigent circumstances, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), searches conducted after obtaining voluntary consent, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and administrative/regulatory “special needs searches,” Camara v. Municipal Cour

2012Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), searches conducted pursuant to probable cause and exigent circumstances, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), searches conducted after obtaining voluntary consent, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and administrative/regulatory “special needs searches,” Camara v. Municipal Cour

2016Warrantless searches are 4 generally per se unreasonable, unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001), and evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961). “[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement . . . ,” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987), and “are considered reasonable because of their administrative and caretaking functions,” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 .

2016Warrantless searches are 4 generally per se unreasonable, unless they fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001), and evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961). “[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement . . . ,” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S. Ct. 738, 741 (1987), and “are considered reasonable because of their administrative and caretaking functions,” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502 .

2025Id.; Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-90 ; State v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 1998).

2024However, “[c]onsent to entry is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 1998).