warrant requirement in Colorado

2021The prosecution carries “the burden of establishing that [a] warrantless search is . . . justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v. Fuerst, 2013 CO 28, ¶ 11 , 302 P.3d 253, 256 (quoting People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo. 1999)). ¶ 36 One exception to the warrant requirement is “[a] search conducted pursuant to consent freely and voluntarily given by a 13 person with ‘common authority’ over the [searched] premises.” People v. Strimple, 2012 CO 1, ¶ 20 , 267 P.3d 1219, 1223 .

2018When police officers conduct a warrantless search, the People bear the burden of establishing that the search "is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." People v. Winpigler , 8 P.3d 439 , 443 (Colo. 1999). ¶9 Pappan concedes that the People made "a clear showing of probable cause," and the record shows that the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence of that crime, namely a laser-sight rifle, would be located in his residence.

2018Accordingly, "[i]t is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); accord O'Hearn , 931 P.2d at 1173 . ¶46 Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the People bear the burden of establishing one of these exceptions.

2018Accordingly, "[i]t is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); accord O'Hearn , 931 P.2d at 1173 . ¶46 Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts have recognized several exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the People bear the burden of establishing one of these exceptions.

2025See Stock, ¶¶ 16, 23 (Voluntary consent to enter is an exception to the warrant requirement; “[t]he police may assume, without further inquiry, that a person who answers the door in response to their knock has the authority to let them enter.” (quoting People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657, 705 (Cal. 2006))); People v. Stone, 2021 COA 104, ¶¶ 47-49 (absent a revocation of consent or an objection to reentry, consent for police to initially enter a home can extend to subsequent entries); see also People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006) (Exigent circumstances is an exception to the warrant

2009The warrant requirement may give way if "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see generally People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277-80 (Colo.2006).

2018“As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may 6 combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure.” People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529, 535 (Colo. 1999).

2018"As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure." People v. Kluhsman , 980 P.2d 529 , 535 (Colo. 1999).

2024A person’s consent may justify a warrantless search so long as the consent is “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). ¶ 27 Tarr’s argument implicates two closely related issues: (1) whether a state expressed consent statute can satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for a BAC test, including a blood test; and (2) if so, whether a driver possesses the constitutional right to revoke that consent.

2015Id. ; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).

2024See People v. Alameno , 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (citing People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000)) ("[E]vidence that is not supported by a valid search warrant may still be admissible if it falls under one of several exceptions to the warrant requirement, 11 such as the plain view exception.").

2018Id. at ¶ 39, 307 P.3d at 1082 . ¶11 Another well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, which provides that police officers "are not required to close their eyes to any evidence that they plainly see *277 while conducting otherwise legitimate searches." People v. Gothard , 185 P.3d 180 , 183 (Colo. 2008) (quoting People v. Pitts , 13 P.3d 1218 , 1222 (Colo. 2000) ).

1999See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 869 (Colo.1991); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Colo.1984).

1987Search of a juvenile that is not a consent search is governed by the general rule that “[warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they satisfy an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200 (Colo.1984).

2016“To overcome this presumption, the prosecution has the burden of establishing that the warrantless search is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo. 1999) (citing People v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 570, 581 (Colo. 1988)); see also People v. Villiard, 679 P.2d 593, 597 (Colo. 1984). 1 As the majority notes, Colorado voters passed Amendment 64 and added to their constitution a section titled, “Personal use and regulation of marijuana.” Colo. Const. art.

2016"To overcome this presumption, the prosecution has the burden of establishing that the warrantless search is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo, 1999) (citing People v. Garcia, 752 P.2d 570, 581 (Colo, 1988)); see also People v.. Villiard, 679 P.2d 598, 597 (Colo. 1984). 184 As the majority explains, one exception to the warrant requirement concerns automobiles.

1995People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Colo.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); see also People v. Berow, 688 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Colo.1984); People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 59 , 562 P.2d 422, 423 (1977) (upholding a warrantless seizure based on a combination of the plain-view and emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement).

1995People v. Milton, 826 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Colo.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); see also People v. Berow, 688 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Colo.1984); People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 59 , 562 P.2d 422, 423 (1977) (upholding a warrantless seizure based on a combination of the plain-view and emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2015People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo.2004); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo.2002). € 29 In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent cireumstances exception.

2005Under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, a police officer may intervene without a warrant in situations where "both an immediate crisis existed" and there is some "probability that assistance will be helpful." People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo.2004).

2019As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated” in such seizures and searches, “nor is the related concept of probable cause.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (citation omitted).

2016People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo. 1999). 4 ¶ 10 This case concerns the exception that “permits officers to conduct an inventory search of a vehicle without a warrant based on probable cause when that vehicle is lawfully impounded by law enforcement officials.” Vaughn, ¶ 14; see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987) (Because inventory searches further police caretaking procedures, “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable cause.”) (citation omitted).

2024“Nevertheless, the warrant requirement is subject to certain well-delineated exceptions because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Id. ¶ 20 Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence that has been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment [must] be suppressed from presentation in the government’s case-in-chief.” People v. Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988).

2019Id. at 716-17, 719 . ¶13 While the second search with which the Supreme Court was concerned in Murray was authorized by warrant, the Court's reasoning applies equally to searches executed pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement.

2007United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 37 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 (2008) (holding that whether police had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances is "revealed by the circumstances known to the officers" at the time of entry); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 , 71 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 992 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (holding that the lawfulness of entry and existence of probable cause concerns only what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry); People v. Pate, 71 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Colo.2008) (holding that courts must examine the totality of cireum-stances as th

2006United States v. Banks , 540 U.S. 31 , 37 , 124 S.Ct. 521 , 157 L.Ed.2d 343 ( 2003 ) ( holding that whether police had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances is "revealed by the circumstances known to the officers" at the time of entry ) ; United States v. Ramirez , 523 U.S. 65 , 71 n. 2 , 118 S.Ct. 992 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191 ( 1998 ) ( holding that the lawfulness of entry and existence of probable cause concerns only what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry ) ; People v. Pate , 71 P.3d 1005, 1010 ( Colo. 2003 ) ( holding that courts must examine the totality of c

2025Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 ( 1967 ) ; see also Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275, 279 ( Colo. 1999 ) ( stating that a warrantless search is unconstitutional "unless it is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement" ) .

2025Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1999) (stating that a warrantless search is unconstitutional "unless it is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement").

2016This exception exists because an inventory search does not seek to obtain evidence but is “designed to protect the owner’s property while it is in police custody, to insure against claims concerning lost or damaged property, and to protect the police from any danger posed by the contents of the vehicle.” Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181, 1185 (Colo. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by Vaughn, ¶ 11 n.7. ¶ 11 Still, the decision to impound a vehicle and the ensuing inventory search are separate processes, both of which “must meet the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Dug

2015Id. at 1184 . ¶24 At the outset of its analysis of the inventory search, the Colorado Supreme Court indicated that it was considering both the Federal and State Constitutions: Pursuant to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls under a specifically established and delineated exception to the warrant requirement. . . . [One such] exception permits officers to conduct an administrative inventory search of a vehicle after that vehicle has lawfully been taken into custody. [ Bertine II

2015People v. Allison , 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Hebert , 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo. 2002). ¶29       In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception.

2015People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo.2004); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo.2002). € 29 In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent cireumstances exception.

2012"The burden of proof ... always remains with the prosecution to establish that a warrantless search falls within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." Syrie, 101 P.3d at 222 ; see People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo.1999). 112 One specifically established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is "a search incident to lawful arrest." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Syrie, 101 P.3d at 222 .

2012"The burden of proof ... always remains with the prosecution to establish that a warrantless search falls within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." Syrie, 101 P.3d at 222 ; see People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo.1999). 112 One specifically established exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is "a search incident to lawful arrest." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Syrie, 101 P.3d at 222 .

1990“A warrantless search and seizure is presumptively illegal, and the prosecution has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 59 , 562 P.2d 422, 423 (1977); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Garcia, 752 P.2d at 581 ; People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 331 (Colo.1982); McCall, 623 P.2d at 402 .

1983The emergency doctrine is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and will be invoked where facts exist which support a “colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo.1983) (quoting McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981)); see also People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977).

2009Rather, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is `reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).

2009Rather, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is `reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).

2016Even so, an impoundment by the police without a warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment if it occurs in furtherance of “public safety” or “community caretaking functions,” such as removing “disabled or damaged vehicles” and “automobiles which violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976) (citation omitted).5 Like the exception for inventory searches, this exception to the warrant requirement recognizes that the purpose of the impoundment is not to obtain evide

1998In the context of jail house searches, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the inventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983); see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Edwards, 415 U.S. at 802-805 , 94 S.Ct. at 1236-1238 .

1994Finally, we have held that “doubts must be resolved in favor of magistrates’ determinations of probable cause in order to avoid giving police an incentive to resort to war-rantless searches in the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant requirement that might develop at the time of search.” Abeyta, 795 P.2d at 1327-28 ; People v. Varrieur, 771 P.2d 895, 897 (Colo.1989); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 .

1994Finally, we have held that “doubts must be resolved in favor of magistrates’ determinations of probable cause in order to avoid giving police an incentive to resort to war-rantless searches in the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant requirement that might develop at the time of search.” Abeyta, 795 P.2d at 1327-28 ; People v. Varrieur, 771 P.2d 895, 897 (Colo.1989); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. at 2331 .

1980The court stated: “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in a case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” *512 And in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court said, “[W]hen an arrest is made, it is . . . entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its c

1980The court stated: “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in a case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” *512 And in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court said, “[W]hen an arrest is made, it is . . . entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its c

2025Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 ( 1967 ) ; see also Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275, 279 ( Colo. 1999 ) ( stating that a warrantless search is unconstitutional "unless it is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement" ) .

2025Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Mendez v. People , 986 P.2d 275, 279 (Colo. 1999) (stating that a warrantless search is unconstitutional "unless it is supported by probable cause and is justified under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement").

1990“A warrantless search and seizure is presumptively illegal, and the prosecution has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 59 , 562 P.2d 422, 423 (1977); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Garcia, 752 P.2d at 581 ; People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 331 (Colo.1982); McCall, 623 P.2d at 402 .

1990“A warrantless search and seizure is presumptively illegal, and the prosecution has the burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 59 , 562 P.2d 422, 423 (1977); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Garcia, 752 P.2d at 581 ; People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 331 (Colo.1982); McCall, 623 P.2d at 402 .

2024Dep’t, 363 P.3d 861, 866-67 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015) (“[The defendant] impliedly consented to be tested for alcohol by driving a motor vehicle in Idaho. . . . [Her] statutorily implied consent was effective at the time of the warrantless blood draw as it was justified by Idaho’s implied consent statute.”). ¶ 40 Others courts, however, like the Texas court that decided Aviles II, have interpreted McNeely’s language that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable 17 must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances,” 569 U.S. at 156 , to me

2016However, Schaufele declined to follow Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. __ , __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), because the analysis proposed a new rule in addition to existing exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.