warrant requirement in Nevada

2018One exception to the warrant requirement "is the valid consent of a third party who possesses actual authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 1079 , 968 P.2d 315, 321 (1998) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

2018One exception to the warrant requirement "is the valid consent of a third party who possesses actual authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071 , 1079, 968 P.2d 315 , 321 (1998) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 171, 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) ).

2018One exception to the warrant requirement "is the valid consent of a third party who possesses actual authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 1079 , 968 P.2d 315, 321 (1998) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

2018One exception to the warrant requirement "is the valid consent of a third party who possesses actual authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Taylor, 114 Nev. 1071, 1079 , 968 P.2d 315, 321 (1998) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).

2024See Lloyd, 129 Nev. at 743 , 312 P.3d at 469 (a search is reasonable if performed subject to a valid exception to the warrant requirement).

2024See Lloyd, 129 Nev. at 743 , 312 P.3d at 469 (a search is reasonable if performed subject to a valid exception to the warrant requirement).

2015See Hannon v. State, 125 Nev. 142, 147 , 207 P.3d 344, 347 (2009) (the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is applicable where an SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e officer "had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others").

2015See Hannon v. State, 125 Nev. 142, 147 , 207 P.3d 344, 347 (2009) (the emergency exception to the warrant requirement is applicable where an SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A e officer "had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others").

2018"The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where 'the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148-49 (2013)).

2014The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)).

2024Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288 , 871 P.2d 339, 340 (1994).

2024Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288 , 871 P.2d 339, 340 (1994).

2019United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying the doctrine to excuse warrantless searches merely because officers had probable cause "would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2019United States v. Lundin, 817 F.3d 1151, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying the doctrine to excuse warrantless searches merely because officers had probable cause "would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37 ; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 , an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 , 130

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653, an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330, 130 P.3

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37 ; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 , an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 , 130

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37 ; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 , an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 , 130

2024Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73 .

2021Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288 , 871 P.2d 339, 340 (1994) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)); see also SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 )1 1947A MIDED Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).

2021Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288 , 871 P.2d 339, 340 (1994) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)); see also SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 )1 1947A MIDED Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).

2013See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas, 597 F.3d at 498-500 ; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this point unmistakably clear: [T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraban

2017To be valid, actual consent must be "voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." McMorran v. State, 118 Nev. 379, 383 , 46 P.3d 81, 83 (2002) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973)).

1979Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37 ; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 , an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 , 130

2015Both Vernonia and Earls ultimately rest on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 836-37; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653, an exception that the State, in its briefing, confessed has no applicability here— "[A] dministrators were not relying on a special need exception to search [L.W.] in the instant case; they were relying on [his] consent." But even setting aside the State's waiver of the special needs exception, and Vernonia and Earls' poor fit to its remaining argument, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330, 130 P.3

1995On appeal, the state asserts that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), it was entitled to withdraw blood from each respondent without a warrant and test it for the presence of cocaine and its metabolites.

1995On appeal, the state asserts that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), it was entitled to withdraw blood from each respondent without a warrant and test it for the presence of cocaine and its metabolites.

1998See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 .

1979Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

2025"A search is per se unreasonable unless performed pursuant to a valid warrant or subject to an exception to the warrant requirement." Srnith v. State, 140 Nev., Adv.

2025Op. 19 , 545 P.3d 716, 719 (2024).

2024Jim, 137 Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 44reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search where law enfor

2024Jim, 137 Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 44reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search where law enfor

2024Jim, 137 Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 44reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search where law enfor

2024Jim, 137 Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 44reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search where law enfor

2021Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990); State v. Conners, 116 Nev. 184 , 187 n.3, 994 P.2d 44 , 46 n.3 (2000).

2021Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990); State v. Conners, 116 Nev. 184, 187 n.3, 994 P.2d 44, 46 n.3 (2000).

2021See Beckman, 129 Nev. at 485-86 , 305 P.3d at 916 (holding that this court reviews a district coures denial of a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and that the reasonableness of a search is a legal inquiry); Scott v. State, 110 Nev. 622, 628 , 877 P.2d 503, 507 (1994) (noting that a non-owner driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he or she lawfully possesses).

2021See Beckman, 129 Nev. at 485-86 , 305 P.3d at 916 (holding that this court reviews a district coures denial of a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and that the reasonableness of a search is a legal inquiry); Scott v. State, 110 Nev. 622, 628 , 877 P.2d 503, 507 (1994) (noting that a non-owner driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he or she lawfully possesses).

2021See Beckman, 129 Nev. at 485-86 , 305 P.3d at 916 (holding that this court reviews a district coures denial of a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and that the reasonableness of a search is a legal inquiry); Scott v. State, 110 Nev. 622, 628 , 877 P.2d 503, 507 (1994) (noting that a non-owner driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he or she lawfully possesses).

2021See Beckman, 129 Nev. at 485-86 , 305 P.3d at 916 (holding that this court reviews a district coures denial of a motion to suppress de novo as to legal conclusions and that the reasonableness of a search is a legal inquiry); Scott v. State, 110 Nev. 622, 628 , 877 P.2d 503, 507 (1994) (noting that a non-owner driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle that he or she lawfully possesses).

2020See Bejarano, 122 Nev. at 1074 - 75, 146 P.3d at 271 .

2020See Bejarano, 122 Nev. at 1074 - 75, 146 P.3d at 271 .

2017To be valid, actual consent must be "voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." McMorran v. State, 118 Nev. 379, 383 , 46 P.3d 81, 83 (2002) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973)).

2017To be valid, actual consent must be "voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied." McMorran v. State, 118 Nev. 379, 383 , 46 P.3d 81, 83 (2002) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973)).

2014The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)).

2014The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. „ 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)).

2014Jones, 111 Nev. at 776, 895 P.2d at 644. 2 Accordingly, we conclude that the warrantless blood draw in question was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

2014Jones, 111 Nev. at 776, 895 P.2d at 644. 2 Accordingly, we conclude that the warrantless blood draw in question was not justified by the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.