warrant requirement in Ohio

2026The State asks us to follow Moore, which held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d at 48 .

2026Quoting State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (2000), the court in Richmond stated: “[T]he smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2026“Warrantless searches and seizures are considered per se unreasonable, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id., citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

2025Accord Ohio Const., article I, §14. “[A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is when an officer has a concern for the safety of the officer.

2025Thus, we must determine whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard. {¶9} Regarding warrantless searches and seizures, the state generally bears the burden of establishing that the search or seizure in question falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Kessler (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.

2023State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978). 6 Plain View Exception {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception.

2023Montgomery No. 28406, 2020-Ohio-1142, ¶ 22 ; Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 at 376 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ; Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d at 108-109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 . “ ‘Under this -16- exception, when a vehicle is impounded, police are permitted to follow a routine practice of administrative procedures for securing and inventorying the vehicle’s contents.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Foster, 2017-Ohio-2858 , 91 N.E.3d 98, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) “An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement or a probable- cause review, because it is a search that is made for administr

2023Montgomery No. 28406, 2020-Ohio-1142, ¶ 22 ; Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 at 376 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ; Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d at 108-109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 . “ ‘Under this -16- exception, when a vehicle is impounded, police are permitted to follow a routine practice of administrative procedures for securing and inventorying the vehicle’s contents.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Foster, 2017-Ohio-2858 , 91 N.E.3d 98, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) “An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement or a probable- cause review, because it is a search that is made for administr

2026Compare Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (defendant must allege the lack of a warrant in motion to suppress); Curry, 2025-Ohio-2083, at ¶ 41 (1st Dist.) (motion sufficient where it put the State on notice of the need to show an exception to the warrant requirement). {¶22} Instead, the supplemental motion focused on the legality of the traffic stop, the officers’ use of “stop sticks,” and the duration of Henderson’s detention.

2025Thus, we must determine whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard. {¶9} Regarding warrantless searches and seizures, the state generally bears the burden of establishing that the search or seizure in question falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Kessler (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.

2023“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2018-Ohio-201 , 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 18 , citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 , 313 N.E.2d 405 (1974).

2023“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2018-Ohio-201 , 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 18 , citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 , 313 N.E.2d 405 (1974).

2025The marijuana cigarette was in plain view. {¶51} Under a similar set of facts, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-2010, ¶ 8, citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982); State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (1992). {¶52} As previously stated, Trooper Guinther had probable cause to believe th

2024Therefore, the court held that officers did not act unreasonably when they pried open the ADAMS, 23CA1178 36 glovebox. {¶58} In State v. Reis, 2014 ND 30 , the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that when police officers have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, officers may search the vehicle and any containers within the vehicle that may contain the object of the search, citing Ross, supra, at 800 .

2026See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991). {¶ 20} Consent to search is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.

2026See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991). {¶ 20} Consent to search is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement.

2025I write separately to emphasize that this is a close case and there is also competent, credible evidence that would support a finding that Arce did voluntarily consent to the search. {¶ 34} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); State v. Casi, 2020-Ohio-3063, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.). “‘[W]hether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress

2025Accord Ohio Const., article I, §14. “[A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is when an officer has a concern for the safety of the officer.

2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S

2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S

2025Id. at p. 10. {¶ 24} “One exception to the warrant requirement is the ‘plain view’ doctrine, first expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .

2025Id. at p. 10. {¶ 24} “One exception to the warrant requirement is the ‘plain view’ doctrine, first expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .

2025“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000); see also State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 (1985), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156 (1925) (“a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe PAGE 15 OF 19 the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the mean

2024As such, the exception recognized in Michigan v. Long, supra, was not applicable. {¶ 28} The state argues that even if the exception in Long did not support the search, the search was nonetheless valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as "the officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle." Relying on the information provided by appellant's wife indicating that appellant had a loaded firearm in the vehicle, the state argues the deputies had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence (i.e., a loaded gun) that appel

2026While “[s]earches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies[,]” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-2375, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), consent is a well- established exception to the warrant requirement.

2022“It is well settled law that, absent consent, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest unless there is both probable cause for the arrest and the existence of exigent circumstances.” State v. Letsche, 4th Dist. Ross No. 02CA2693, 2003-Ohio-6942, ¶ 19 , citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). -10- {¶23} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27340, 2017-Ohio-6903, ¶ 13 .

2026Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). {¶106} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement). {¶107} Upon this law, we address Appellant’s argument about the court’s January 21, 2015 denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered

2026“And still more fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.” Id. (noting the subject’s regular touching of meth would transfer the odor to his vehicle, upon which a trained drug dog is expected to alert, regardless of whether the type of drugs for which the dog was certified were then recovered from the vehicle). {¶45} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the

2025The marijuana cigarette was in plain view. {¶51} Under a similar set of facts, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-2010, ¶ 8, citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982); State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (1992). {¶52} As previously stated, Trooper Guinther had probable cause to believe th

2022Generally, "[f]or a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant." State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 49 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). {¶ 43} An exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which "allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure." State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 , 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

2026“An inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Goodin, 2000 WL 134733 , *3 (4th Dist. Jan. 28, 2000), citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).

2023“Inventory searches are a ‘well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 108 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999), quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987).

2026Id. at 52 ; see also State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 , ¶ 18, 22-23 (7th Dist.), citing Moore, Dyson, and California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-392 (1985) (the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles, the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile, and also the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of travel on public roads).

2026Young was permitted to order both passengers out of the vehicle while the stop was pending. {¶28} During a valid traffic stop, “any questioning which occurs during the detention, even if unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the questioning does not improperly extend the duration of the detention.” Id., citing State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556-557 (9th Dist.1995). {¶29} Moving to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it “was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile.” State

2025I write separately to emphasize that this is a close case and there is also competent, credible evidence that would support a finding that Arce did voluntarily consent to the search. {¶ 34} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); State v. Casi, 2020-Ohio-3063, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.). “‘[W]hether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress

2024Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement that requires the state to “show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). “ ‘[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶12} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27340, 2

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the plain-view excep

2026Search Incident to Arrest {¶ 22} In his third assignment of error, Daniels argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person incident to his arrest. 8. {¶ 23} The “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement allows officers “to conduct a search that includes an arrestee’s person and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.” State v. Smith, 2009-Ohio-6426, ¶ 11 , citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969).

2017However, the United States Supreme Court has upheld many searches that have been conducted without the prior procurement of a warrant. {¶ 17} The narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to this case include searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , and searches where consent has been given.

2024“An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search that is made for administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id., citing State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999).

2024“An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search that is made for administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id., citing State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999).

2019Nevertheless, we conclude that the seizure and search of the pill bottle were valid under the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. {¶46} “It is well established that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to seize incriminating evidence discovered in a place where they have a right to be under the plain-view exception to the search-warrant requirement.” Parsons, 2017-Ohio-1315, at ¶ 29 , citing State v. Bazrawi, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1043, 2013-Ohio-3015 , ¶ 32, citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990) and State

2019Nevertheless, we conclude that the seizure and search of the pill bottle were valid under the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. {¶46} “It is well established that law enforcement officers do not need a search warrant to seize incriminating evidence discovered in a place where they have a right to be under the plain-view exception to the search-warrant requirement.” Parsons, 2017-Ohio-1315, at ¶ 29 , citing State v. Bazrawi, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1043, 2013-Ohio-3015 , ¶ 32, citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 (1990) and State

2026Id. {¶21} In 2000, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 6.

2026Id. {¶21} In 2000, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 6 .

2018Brown, 2017-Ohio-1006 , 86 N.E.3d 591 , ¶ 33. {¶ 42} Exigent circumstances may also serve as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement where " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

2018Brown, 2017-Ohio-1006 , 86 N.E.3d 591 , ¶ 33. {¶ 42} Exigent circumstances may also serve as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement where " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

2022“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). “[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

2022“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). “[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

2025United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2016) (approving the seizure of contraband where a police officer, during a pat-down search, “[c]ombin[ed] his sight and his touch with his training and experience” to conclude within seconds that an item he felt was probably brick cocaine); State v. Jones, 2002-Ohio-1109 (9th Dist.), quoting Dickerson at 375 (“The plain feel exception to the warrant requirement allows the state to use evidence seized during a Terry search if the police officer, due to his experience arresting drug offenders, feels contraband whose contour or mass makes its

2014Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). {¶27} Additionally, independent from a pat-down search for weapons, a search of a defendant’s person for drugs may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

2026Id. {¶21} In 2000, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 6.

2026Id. {¶21} In 2000, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 6 .

2022The court explained that it “generally determine[s] whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Id., quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 . 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 36} In Riley, the court discussed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), which held that an officer’s search of a suspect in

2022The court explained that it “generally determine[s] whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Id., quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 . 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 36} In Riley, the court discussed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), which held that an officer’s search of a suspect in