warrant requirement in Ohio

2026The State asks us to follow Moore, which held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d at 48 .

2026Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). {¶106} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement). {¶107} Upon this law, we address Appellant’s argument about the court’s January 21, 2015 denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered

2025However, the warrant exception is subject to a handful of “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); State v. Nickelson, 2017-Ohio-7503, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), quoting Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988).

2025However, the warrant exception is subject to a handful of “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); State v. Nickelson, 2017-Ohio-7503, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), quoting Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988).

2025Thus, we must determine whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard. {¶9} Regarding warrantless searches and seizures, the state generally bears the burden of establishing that the search or seizure in question falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Kessler (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 , and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.

2023State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978). 6 Plain View Exception {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception.

2023Given our holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, we need not consider these alternate bases for justifying the search. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

2023Given our holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, we need not consider these alternate bases for justifying the search. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

2026Compare Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (defendant must allege the lack of a warrant in motion to suppress); Curry, 2025-Ohio-2083, at ¶ 41 (1st Dist.) (motion sufficient where it put the State on notice of the need to show an exception to the warrant requirement). {¶22} Instead, the supplemental motion focused on the legality of the traffic stop, the officers’ use of “stop sticks,” and the duration of Henderson’s detention.

2025However, the warrant exception is subject to a handful of “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); State v. Nickelson, 2017-Ohio-7503, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), quoting Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218 (1988).

2025The marijuana cigarette was in plain view. {¶51} Under a similar set of facts, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-2010, ¶ 8, citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982); State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (1992). {¶52} As previously stated, Trooper Guinther had probable cause to believe th

2024Therefore, the court held that officers did not act unreasonably when they pried open the ADAMS, 23CA1178 36 glovebox. {¶58} In State v. Reis, 2014 ND 30 , the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that when police officers have probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband and the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, officers may search the vehicle and any containers within the vehicle that may contain the object of the search, citing Ross, supra, at 800 .

2023“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the 12 Case No. 2023-L-029 state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Banks-Harvey at ¶ 18, citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 , 313 N.E.2d 405 (1974). {¶44} The plain view doctrine is one such exception.

2023“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the 12 Case No. 2023-L-029 state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Banks-Harvey at ¶ 18, citing Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 , 313 N.E.2d 405 (1974). {¶44} The plain view doctrine is one such exception.

2026“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18 . {¶29} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181 , citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to viol

2025“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18 . {¶26} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181 , citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to viol

2025Id. at p. 10. {¶ 24} “One exception to the warrant requirement is the ‘plain view’ doctrine, first expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .

2025Id. at p. 10. {¶ 24} “One exception to the warrant requirement is the ‘plain view’ doctrine, first expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .

2025Accord Ohio Const., article I, §14. “[A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). {¶17} One exception to the warrant requirement is when an officer has a concern for the safety of the officer.

2025I write separately to emphasize that this is a close case and there is also competent, credible evidence that would support a finding that Arce did voluntarily consent to the search. {¶ 34} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); State v. Casi, 2020-Ohio-3063, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.). “‘[W]hether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress

2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S

2014Ashland County, Case No. 13 COA 023 6 {¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized seven exceptions to the warrant requirement: “(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; or (f) the plain-view doctrine,” State v. Akron Airport Post No. 8975, 19 Ohio St.3d 49, 51 , 482 N.E.2d 606 (1985), certiorari denied 474 U.S. 1058 , 106 S.Ct. 800 , 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986); or (g) an “administrative search,” Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio S

2026“And still more fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.” Id. (noting the subject’s regular touching of meth would transfer the odor to his vehicle, upon which a trained drug dog is expected to alert, regardless of whether the type of drugs for which the dog was certified were then recovered from the vehicle). {¶45} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the

2026Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). {¶106} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement). {¶107} Upon this law, we address Appellant’s argument about the court’s January 21, 2015 denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered

2023“Inventory searches are a ‘well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 108 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999), quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987).

2023“Inventory searches are a ‘well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’ ” State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 108 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999), quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987).

2025“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000); see also State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 (1985), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156 (1925) (“a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe PAGE 15 OF 19 Case No. 2025-L-009 the vehicle contained contraband was not unreason

2024As such, the exception recognized in Michigan v. Long, supra, was not applicable. {¶ 28} The state argues that even if the exception in Long did not support the search, the search was nonetheless valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as "the officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle." Relying on the information provided by appellant's wife indicating that appellant had a loaded firearm in the vehicle, the state argues the deputies had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence (i.e., a loaded gun) that appel

2022Ross No. 02CA2693, 2003-Ohio-6942, ¶ 19 , citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). -10- Case No. 11-22-01 {¶23} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist.

2022Ross No. 02CA2693, 2003-Ohio-6942, ¶ 19 , citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980). -10- Case No. 11-22-01 {¶23} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist.

2025The marijuana cigarette was in plain view. {¶51} Under a similar set of facts, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-2010, ¶ 8, citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982); State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (1992). {¶52} As previously stated, Trooper Guinther had probable cause to believe th

2022Generally, "[f]or a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant." State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 49 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). {¶ 43} An exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which "allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure." State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 , 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

2025I write separately to emphasize that this is a close case and there is also competent, credible evidence that would support a finding that Arce did voluntarily consent to the search. {¶ 34} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); State v. Casi, 2020-Ohio-3063, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.). “‘[W]hether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress

2024Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement that requires the state to “show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). “ ‘[T]he State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 , 103 S.Ct. 1319

2026Id. at 52 ; see also State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 , ¶ 18, 22-23 (7th Dist.), citing Moore, Dyson, and California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-392 (1985) (the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles, the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile, and also the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of travel on public roads).

2026Young was permitted to order both passengers out of the vehicle while the stop was pending. {¶28} During a valid traffic stop, “any questioning which occurs during the detention, even if unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the questioning does not improperly extend the duration of the detention.” Id., citing State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556-557 (9th Dist.1995). {¶29} Moving to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it “was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile.” State

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of -8- Case No. 9-19-91 establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶16} In this case, the trial court concluded that law enforcement’s search and seizure of the bookbag were lawfully conducted under the

2020“At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.” Steinbrunner at ¶ 12, citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus, State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999). {¶12} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Byrd, 2d Dist.

2019Typically, “[i]n cases involving closed containers, * * * the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a container believed to contain contraband but any subsequent search of the concealed contents of the container must be accompanied by a warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.” (Emphasis sic.) United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir.1992), citing -30- Case No. 1-18-52 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 749-751 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) and Horton, 496 U.S. at 141, fn. 11 .

2018"If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more." Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128 , 140, 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). {¶ 22} The Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement assures that the police cannot indiscriminately rummage through citizens' personal effects.

2018Brown, 2017-Ohio-1006 , 86 N.E.3d 591 , ¶ 33. {¶ 42} Exigent circumstances may also serve as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement where " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

2018Brown, 2017-Ohio-1006 , 86 N.E.3d 591 , ¶ 33. {¶ 42} Exigent circumstances may also serve as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement where " 'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385 , 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

2017However, the United States Supreme Court has upheld many searches that have been conducted without the prior procurement of a warrant. {¶ 17} The narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to this case include searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , and searches where consent has been given.

2017However, the United States Supreme Court has upheld many searches that have been conducted without the prior procurement of a warrant. {¶ 17} The narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement relevant to this case include searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , and searches where consent has been given.

2024“An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search that is made for administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id., citing State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999).

2024“An inventory search is not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement or a probable-cause review, because it is a search that is made for administrative reasons and is unrelated to a criminal investigation.” Id., citing State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109 , 717 N.E.2d 329 (1999).

2025United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2016) (approving the seizure of contraband where a police officer, during a pat-down search, “[c]ombin[ed] his sight and his touch with his training and experience” to conclude within seconds that an item he felt was probably brick cocaine); State v. Jones, 2002-Ohio-1109 (9th Dist.), quoting Dickerson at 375 (“The plain feel exception to the warrant requirement allows the state to use evidence seized during a Terry search if the police officer, due to his experience arresting drug offenders, feels contraband whose contour or mass makes its

2014Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). {¶27} Additionally, independent from a pat-down search for weapons, a search of a defendant’s person for drugs may be justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

2025This voluntary production of contraband provided Officer Beel with probable cause to search the vehicle. {¶ 28} "Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement." (Citations omitted.) State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 2000-Ohio-10 .

2021See State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St.3d 569 , 2018-Ohio-4002 , 116 N.E.3d 1262 (2018) (“ ‘the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement’ ” quoting Moore, infra); State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 2000-Ohio-10 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000) (“we hold that the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search”); State v. Maughmer, 4th Dist.

2022“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). “[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

2022“In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-460 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). “[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

2025I write separately to emphasize that this is a close case and there is also competent, credible evidence that would support a finding that Arce did voluntarily consent to the search. {¶ 34} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); State v. Casi, 2020-Ohio-3063, ¶ 42 (6th Dist.). “‘[W]hether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress

2020“It is well settled that consent to a warrantless search will not be held invalid nor the resulting search unreasonable when one with authority over the premises voluntarily permits the search.” Id. {¶ 39} “To rely on the consent exception of the warrant requirement, the state must show by ‘clear and positive’ evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily’ given.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988), quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968).

2022The court explained that it “generally determine[s] whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Id., quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 . 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 36} In Riley, the court discussed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), which held that an officer’s search of a suspect in

2022The court explained that it “generally determine[s] whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ” Id., quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 . 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 36} In Riley, the court discussed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), which held that an officer’s search of a suspect in