warrant requirement in Michigan

2026Moreover, the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement, which allows an officer to seize an item felt during an “authorized patdown” “if the officer develops probable cause to believe that the item felt is contraband,” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 105-106 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), applies.

2026Moreover, the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement, which allows an officer to seize an item felt during an “authorized patdown” “if the officer develops probable cause to believe that the item felt is contraband,” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 105-106 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), applies.

2025The exceptions to the warrant requirement include: “(1) searches incident to a lawful arrest, (2) automobile searches, (3) plain view seizure, (4) consent, (5) stop and frisk, and (6) exigent circumstances.” Johnson v VanderKooi, 509 Mich 524 , 538; 983 NW2d 779 (2022), quoting In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 266 ; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).

2025The exceptions to the warrant requirement include: “(1) searches incident to a lawful arrest, (2) automobile searches, (3) plain view seizure, (4) consent, (5) stop and frisk, and (6) exigent circumstances.” Johnson v VanderKooi, 509 Mich 524 , 538; 983 NW2d 779 (2022), quoting In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 266 ; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).

2026Thus, the police must conduct a search with a warrant or show that the search “fell within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2026Because the officers in this case lacked probable cause, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.[24] Relevant to this case, this Court explained in Armstrong that “[p]robable cause means that there is a ‘substantial basis for inferring a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” 25 But Michigan’s appellate courts have not directly applied this principle to the issue presented in this case, which is whether the automobile exception applies to cases like this one where an officer has probable cause to believe the ve

2024“Examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement are: (1) searches incident to arrest, (2) automobile searches and seizures, (3) plain view seizure, (4) consent, (5) stop and frisk, and (6) exigent circumstances.” People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 10 ; 497 NW2d 910 (1993).

2024“Examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement are: (1) searches incident to arrest, (2) automobile searches and seizures, (3) plain view seizure, (4) consent, (5) stop and frisk, and (6) exigent circumstances.” People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 10 ; 497 NW2d 910 (1993).

2026An established exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), which is colloquially known as a Terry stop.

2026An established exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 ; 88 S Ct 1868 ; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), which is colloquially known as a Terry stop.

2023One such exception to the warrant requirement is “[t]he performance of an inventory search by the police in accordance with departmental regulations.” People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 271 ; 475 NW2d 16 (1991).

2023One such exception to the warrant requirement is “[t]he performance of an inventory search by the police in accordance with departmental regulations.” People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 271 ; 475 NW2d 16 (1991).

2026“Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest.” Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 338 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009), citing Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 ; 34 S Ct 341 ; 58 L Ed 652 (1914).

2026“Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest.” Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 338 ; 129 S Ct 1710 ; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009), citing Weeks v United States, 232 US 383 ; 34 S Ct 341 ; 58 L Ed 652 (1914).

2026“Generally, a 2 Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI. -3- search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there exist both probable cause and a circumstance establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 407 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“Generally, a 2 Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI. -3- search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there exist both probable cause and a circumstance establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 407 ; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” Mahdi, 317 Mich App at 460 .

2025People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446, 458 ; 894 NW2d 732 (2016). -8- One of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement is a Terry4 stop.

2019See, e.g., People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 293-294 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). 3 We note that the district court failed to recognize that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and did not make any factual determination as to the voluntariness of defendant’s consent.

2019See, e.g., People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 293-294 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). 3 We note that the district court failed to recognize that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and did not make any factual determination as to the voluntariness of defendant’s consent.

2026In Armstrong, 20 this Court addressed whether the decriminalization by the MRTMA of possession of 2.5 ounces or less of marijuana supersedes the rule of People v Kazmierczak, 21 which held that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” On the basis of the passage of the MRTMA, the Court of Appeals in Armstrong held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances 18 Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1, 2, 3 ; 101 S Ct 42

2026A search or seizure conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless the search or seizure falls “within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 418 ; 605 NW2d 667 (2000).

1992The United States Supreme Court held that the inadvertence requirement that had been derived from Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 469 ; 91 S Ct 2022 ; 29 L *537 Ed 2d 564 (1971), was the result of dicta and that inadvertence is not required in order to establish the applicability of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.

1992The United States Supreme Court held that the inadvertence requirement that had been derived from Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 469 ; 91 S Ct 2022 ; 29 L *537 Ed 2d 564 (1971), was the result of dicta and that inadvertence is not required in order to establish the applicability of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.

2026In Armstrong, 20 this Court addressed whether the decriminalization by the MRTMA of possession of 2.5 ounces or less of marijuana supersedes the rule of People v Kazmierczak, 21 which held that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” On the basis of the passage of the MRTMA, the Court of Appeals in Armstrong held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances 18 Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1, 2, 3 ; 101 S Ct 42

2026In Armstrong, 20 this Court addressed whether the decriminalization by the MRTMA of possession of 2.5 ounces or less of marijuana supersedes the rule of People v Kazmierczak, 21 which held that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” On the basis of the passage of the MRTMA, the Court of Appeals in Armstrong held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances 18 Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1, 2, 3 ; 101 S Ct 42

2026This includes searches conducted in reasonable reliance on statutes subsequently declared unconstitutional, Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340 ; 107 S Ct 1160 ; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987); searches conducted in reasonable reliance on erroneous information contained in a database maintained by judicial employees, Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1 ; 115 S Ct 1185 ; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995); searches conducted in reasonable reliance on the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, People v Lemons, 299 Mich App 541, 550 ; 830 NW2d 794 (2013); and searches conducted in reasonable reliance on the community-care

2026This includes searches conducted in reasonable reliance on statutes subsequently declared unconstitutional, Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340 ; 107 S Ct 1160 ; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987); searches conducted in reasonable reliance on erroneous information contained in a database maintained by judicial employees, Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1 ; 115 S Ct 1185 ; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995); searches conducted in reasonable reliance on the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement, People v Lemons, 299 Mich App 541, 550 ; 830 NW2d 794 (2013); and searches conducted in reasonable reliance on the community-care

2023People v Slaughter, 489 Mich 302, 312 ; 803 NW2d 171 (2011); Lemons, 299 Mich App at 545 . “[T]he emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement allows police officers to enter a dwelling without a warrant under circumstances in which they reasonably believe, based on 5 We acknowledge that the standard criminal jury instructions are not binding authority.

2023“While many warrantless searches are unreasonable pursuant to the warrant requirement, the United States Supreme Court has articulated several instances in which warrantless searches are reasonable.” Slaughter, 489 Mich at 311 (citation omitted).

2016One exception to the warrant requirement is for an “inventory search.” In South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 370-371 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they follow standard procedures to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded automobile, as long as the impoundment and inventory search were not a pretext and as long as the scope of the search was reasonable.

2016One exception to the warrant requirement is for an “inventory search.” In South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 370-371 ; 96 S Ct 3092 ; 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they follow standard procedures to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded automobile, as long as the impoundment and inventory search were not a pretext and as long as the scope of the search was reasonable.

2026“As a general rule, searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the police conduct falls under one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Beuschlein, 245 Mich App at 749 .

2026Generally, “searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the police conduct falls under one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Beuschlein, 245 Mich App at 749 .

2017“Generally, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.” Barbarich, 291 Mich App at 472 .3 “Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446 , ___; 894 NW2d 732 (2016).

2017“Generally, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.” Barbarich, 291 Mich App at 472 .3 “Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Mahdi, 317 Mich App 446 , ___; 894 NW2d 732 (2016).

2025In those instances, “[i]t is the prosecutor’s burden to show that a search and seizure challenged by a defendant were justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 638 ; 675 NW2d 883 (2003).

2025In those instances, “[i]t is the prosecutor’s burden to show that a search and seizure challenged by a defendant were justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 638 ; 675 NW2d 883 (2003).

2020The Court reasoned that the justifications provided in Chimel v California, 395 US 752, 762-763 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), for this exception to the warrant requirement-- potential harm to officers and the destruction of evidence-- are less compelling in the context of digital data.

2020The Court reasoned that the justifications provided in Chimel v California, 395 US 752, 762-763 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), for this exception to the warrant requirement-- potential harm to officers and the destruction of evidence-- are less compelling in the context of digital data.

2026In Armstrong, 20 this Court addressed whether the decriminalization by the MRTMA of possession of 2.5 ounces or less of marijuana supersedes the rule of People v Kazmierczak, 21 which held that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” On the basis of the passage of the MRTMA, the Court of Appeals in Armstrong held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances 18 Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1, 2, 3 ; 101 S Ct 42

2026In Armstrong, 20 this Court addressed whether the decriminalization by the MRTMA of possession of 2.5 ounces or less of marijuana supersedes the rule of People v Kazmierczak, 21 which held that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” On the basis of the passage of the MRTMA, the Court of Appeals in Armstrong held that “the odor of marijuana is relevant to the totality of the circumstances 18 Colorado v Bannister, 449 US 1, 2, 3 ; 101 S Ct 42

1982Furthermore, it is uncontested that no search warrant was obtained. *696 In People v White, 392 Mich 404, 410 ; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), the Court stated: "To sustain the validity of a warrantless search the burden rests on the. people to demonstrate the police acted in a reasonable manner, based on probable cause and in response to an exigent circumstance bringing the search under one of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” In People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497, 503 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980), we set forth the proper standards to be used in applying the exigent circumstan

1982Furthermore, it is uncontested that no search warrant was obtained. *696 In People v White, 392 Mich 404, 410 ; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), the Court stated: "To sustain the validity of a warrantless search the burden rests on the. people to demonstrate the police acted in a reasonable manner, based on probable cause and in response to an exigent circumstance bringing the search under one of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” In People v Dugan, 102 Mich App 497, 503 ; 302 NW2d 209 (1980), we set forth the proper standards to be used in applying the exigent circumstan

2024“One of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement is searches incident to arrest.” People v Eaton, 241 Mich App 459, 461-462 ; 617 NW2d 363 (2000).

2024“One of the narrow, specific exceptions to the warrant requirement is searches incident to arrest.” People v Eaton, 241 Mich App 459, 461-462 ; 617 NW2d 363 (2000).

2025“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence as having been illegally obtained, it is the prosecutor’s burden to show that the search and seizure were justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 589 ; 468 NW2d 294 (1991).

2025“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence as having been illegally obtained, it is the prosecutor’s burden to show that the search and seizure were justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” People v Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 589 ; 468 NW2d 294 (1991).