warrant requirement in Tennessee

2026Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 , 629 -6- (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454–55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

2026Generally, “under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

2026Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 , 629 -6- (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454–55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

2025Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

2026Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 , 629 -6- (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 454–55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

2025Warrantless seizures are “presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the . . . seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000).

2025Generally, “under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. - 18 - 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tenn. 1996)).

2024However, “one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).

2025Also included among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop, which may be conducted “when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” Bridges, 963 S.W.2d at 492; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 .

2020“One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997)).

2024However, “one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)).

2021However, “one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 , and State v. Jackson, 889 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim.

2016Because stopping an automobile without a warrant and detaining its occupants unquestionably constitutes a seizure, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), the State in the present situation had the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) (temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes seizure that implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions); Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 .

2016Because stopping an automobile without a warrant and detaining its occupants unquestionably constitutes a seizure, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), the State in the present situation had the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) (temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes seizure that implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions); Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 .

2024The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly guarantees “[t]hat the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Under both constitutions, “a search without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable, and any evidence obtained pursuant to

2020“Well settled among the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and the one with which we are engaged here, is consent to search.” Id. (citations omitted).

2019Any “warrantless search or seizure is presumed [to be] unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. 1998). -8- A. Search Incident to an Arrest After making a lawful custodial arrest, a police officer is permitted to search an arrestee and the immediate surrounding area, including “the passenger area of any vehicle in which the a

2016A warrantless search is presumed unreasonable under both the federal and state constitutions, and evidence seized from the warrantless search is subject to suppression unless the state demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was “conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. 1998); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

2020“One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997)).

2019“One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997)).

2024The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly guarantees “[t]hat the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Under both constitutions, “a search without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable, and any evidence obtained pursuant to

2014Under both constitutions, “a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)); see also State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2003).

2022Our supreme court has recognized, as one exception to the warrant requirement, that “it is constitutionally permissible for police officers to inventory the contents of a -11- lawfully impounded automobile without a search warrant as long as it is in accordance with routine administrative procedures.” State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (Tenn. 1976)).

2014A well- established exception to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop based upon “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ; Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)).

2026“The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009); see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

2025“The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009); see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

2025See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) (listing some of the commonly recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2023See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 722 (Tenn. 2008) (listing some of the commonly recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2018A warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and evidence obtained as a result will be suppressed “unless the prosecution demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)); see also State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2007).

2017“The consent exception to the warrant requirement applies when a person voluntarily consents to a search.” State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 306 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 -9- U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 109 (Tenn. 2007)).

2016Because stopping an automobile without a warrant and detaining its occupants unquestionably constitutes a seizure, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), the State in the present situation had the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) (temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes seizure that implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions); Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 .

2016Because stopping an automobile without a warrant and detaining its occupants unquestionably constitutes a seizure, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), the State in the present situation had the burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tenn. 2005) (temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes seizure that implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions); Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865 .

2026“The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009); see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

2025“The ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009); see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

2017Indeed, although an arrest based on probable cause is an exception to the warrant requirement, Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 277 (citing State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Tenn. 2009)), the State has not argued that the police had probable cause to support the warrantless seizure of the defendant.

2017“A full-scale arrest supported by probable cause is, of course, an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 278 (Tenn. 2012) (citing State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Tenn. 2009)).

2024Under these exceptions, “the stop of an automobile is constitutionally reasonable, under both the state and federal constitutions, if the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 ).

2020Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993).

2010State v. Shaw, 603 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tenn. Crim.

2009App. 1983) (citing State v. Shaw, 603 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tenn. Crim.

2020After noting that the Court had already determined that the exigent circumstances exception could apply in drunk driving cases, subject to a “careful case- by-case assessment of exigency,” id. at 2174 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ), the Court considered whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement might also be applied in drunk driving cases by examining the facts presented in the three cases before it, in each of which “the drivers were searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving.” Birchfie

2019In McNeely, however, the Supreme Court, considering the question “whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases,” concluded “that it does not” and held “consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles, that exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145 .

2024The Tennessee Supreme Court has described the exceptions to the warrant requirement as “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[,] jealously and carefully drawn.” McElrath, 569 S.W.3d at 570 (quoting State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 , (Tenn. 2009)).

2023See State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155, 165 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000). “[A] warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression” unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly-defined -5- exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2026Exigent circumstances dispense with the warrant requirement when “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).

2022Despite the warrant requirement, police may enter a person’s home if “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)).

2017State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900-901 (Tenn. 2008); see State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tenn. 2002) (recognizing that Tennessee’s constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures is “identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment”) (quoting Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tenn. 1968)). “[A] warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence -7- discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant

2017State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900-01 (Tenn. 2008). “[A] warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

2019“One of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement is met when a police officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense.” State v. Davis, 484 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277-78 (Tenn. 2012)); see also T.C.A. § 40-7-103(a)(1).

2018A warrantless search or seizure “is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). -5- Our federal and state courts have recognized three categories of police-citizen interactions: “(1) a full-scale arrest, which requires probable cause; (2) a brief investigatory detention, requiring reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing; and (3) a brief police-citizen

2018In addition, "evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search or seizure 'is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.' " Talley , 307 S.W.3d at 729 -30 (quoting Yeargan , 958 S.W.2d at 629 ).

2016Such exceptions to the warrant requirement include, “searches incident to arrest, plain view, exigent circumstances, and others, such as the consent to search.” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 729 .

2022“Therefore, when a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the State bears the burden of proving that its warrantless actions were justified, i.e., as a lawful investigatory stop or under some other exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656-57 (Tenn. 2006).

2020“One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997)).

2021However, “one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 , and State v. Jackson, 889 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim.

2021However, “one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, and State v. Jackson, 889 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim.