warrant requirement in Virgin Islands

2016Appx. 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2005) (“At the same time that the Court has permitted officers to seize items whose ‘incriminating character’ is ‘immediately apparent’ under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, it has permitted officers to seize ‘objects dangerous in themselves.’ ” (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.

2016Appx. 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2005) (“At the same time that the Court has permitted officers to seize items whose ‘incriminating character’ is ‘immediately apparent’ under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, it has permitted officers to seize ‘objects dangerous in themselves.’ ” (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.

2016Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (plurality))); United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court also has indicated that the plain view exception permits the warrantless seizure of ‘objects dangerous in themselves.’ ”).

2015Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (plurality))); United States v. Bishop, 338 F.3d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court also has indicated that the plain view exception permits the warrantless seizure of ‘objects dangerous in themselves.’ ”).

2016Id.; see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-41 .

2014Id.; see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-41 .

2015It requires that consent be given freely and voluntarily. “[T]he State concedes that ‘when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.’ ” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L.

2015It requires that consent be given freely and voluntarily. “[T]he State concedes that ‘when a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.’ ” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 , 93 S. Ct. 2041 , 36 L.

2026In Carpenter, the Court rejected applying the third-party doctrine to permit the government to obtain cell phone location records without a warrant because such evidence constituted “near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” 585 U.S. at 312.

2016Browne v. People, 56 V.I. 207, 217 (V.I. 2012).

2016See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 , 72 L.

2016See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 , 72 L.

2015Id. at 394-95 ; see also Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 , 120 S. Ct. 7 , 145 L.

2015Id. at 394-95 ; see also Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 , 120 S. Ct. 7 , 145 L.

2015Simmonds, 53 V.I. at 559-60 ; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 , 98 S. Ct. 2408 , 57 L.

2015When the Arizona Supreme Court attempted to create a “crime scene exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the United States Supreme Court explicitly ruled that there is no murder scene exception to the Fourth Amendment and that a warrantless search of a person’s home “was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 .

2012Although the burden of proving that a search or seizure was unlawful normally rests with the defendant, United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010), when the police conduct a search or seizure without a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to prove exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement.

2012United States v. Headen, 264 Fed.

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2010Karo, 468 U.S. at 717 , 104 S. Ct. at 3304 (listing certain automobile searches, consensual searches and exigent circumstances as examples of the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement recognized by the Supreme Court); accord United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Warrantless searches and seizures inside someone’s home ... are presumptively unreasonable unless the occupants consent or probable cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify the intrusion.” (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 , 101 S. Ct. at 1647 ; Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S. Ct. at 1380 ); Uni

2008In also affirming the appellate court’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court first discussed the limits of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, indicating, “If... the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object — i.e., if its incriminating character is not immediately apparent — the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.” Id., at 375.