warrant requirement in California

2024(U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, “subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 .) When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search, “the prosecution bears the burden to prove police conducted the search under a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756 ; see People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152 [“The prosecution always bears the burden of justifying, by

2021(U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 ], fns. omitted; People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1196 .) One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which allows for warrantless searches of automobiles where an officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.

2018But Gant recognized "[o]ther established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorizing a vehicle search," including a search based on probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity other than the offense of the arrest. ( Id . at pp. 346-347, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , citing United States v. Ross , supra , 456 U.S. 798 , 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157 .) The Supreme Court has also held that "[a] vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to jus

2018But Gant recognized "[o]ther established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorizing a vehicle search," including a search based on probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity other than the offense of the arrest. ( Id . at pp. 346-347, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , citing United States v. Ross , supra , 456 U.S. 798 , 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157 .) The Supreme Court has also held that "[a] vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to jus

2026The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” ( Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 368–369, fn. omitted, citing Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441 .) Relatedly, “[i]nventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. [Citation.] When a vehicle is impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853

2026The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” ( Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 368–369, fn. omitted, citing Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441 .) Relatedly, “[i]nventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. [Citation.] When a vehicle is impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853

2021Exigency Exception to the Warrant Requirement There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. ( Kentucky, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 459-460.) One such exception is the existence of exigent circumstances, 14 which justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure when “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 394 .) “ ‘ “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is” ’ one such ‘ “justification for what would b

2019"A warrantless search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the constitutional requirement of a warrant." ( People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909 , 916, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 , 288 P.3d 1259 .) Entry into a residence is a search under *248 the Fourth Amendment. ( Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740 , 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 [" 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed' "].) Here, officers entered defendant's residence and bedroom

2025Consent Our finding that Officer Hanlin did not possess reasonable suspicion to justify the patdown search does not end our inquiry, as the patdown must be deemed lawful if it was conducted pursuant to Ruiz’s voluntary consent. “[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.” (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 222 ; (People v. Cantor (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 (Cantor) [“Consent to a search is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”].) “Where . . . the prosecution relies on consent to justify a warrantless sear

2025In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 , 382 [ 134 S.Ct. 2473 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 ].) “It is ‘well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.’ ” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674 , quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219 [ 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 ].) “[T]he prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal j

2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 182 .) “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 .) One such exception—explicated in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry)—exists when an officer “harbors a reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.’ ” (People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1091 (Esparza).) In such situations, “an investigato

2022A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search. [Citation.]” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120 .) “Nevertheless, . . . the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. [Citations.]” (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 .) The United States Supreme Court has “long recognized an exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment context. [Citations.] [It has] found the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment inapplicable in cases where t

2021Exigency Exception to the Warrant Requirement There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. ( Kentucky, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 459-460.) One such exception is the existence of exigent circumstances, 14 which justify a warrantless entry, search, or seizure when “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 394 .) “ ‘ “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is” ’ one such ‘ “justification for what would b

2018In claiming that the federal and state constitutions have always precluded warrantless searches of his electronic devices, Guzman cites authority discussing the privacy rights of individuals who were not on probation and not subject to a warrantless search condition when their property was searched. ( Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385 , 393-395, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 [holding that a "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement is unconstitutional]; People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640 , 652, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818 , 602 P.2d 738 [finding that a "credit card holder would reasonab

2025(People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125 .) A warrantless search or seizure is presumed unconstitutional, and the government bears the burden of establishing that its action fell within an exception to the warrant requirement.

2024(Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-444 ; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 62 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 800-801 .) “As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine ‘is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source 13 doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’ [Citation.]” (Robles, at p. 800, italics omitted.) Inventory searches of police-impounded cars are “a well-defined exception to the warrant

2025(Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 , 338–339.) Unless another exception to the warrant requirement applies, the officers may search the arrestee’s vehicle without a warrant “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” (Id. at p. 351.) 5 These principles were applied in People v. Molina (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038 .

2024(Id. at pp. 750–751.) “[A] reasonable belief to search for evidence of the offense of arrest exists when the nature of the offense, considered in conjunction with the particular facts of the case, gives rise to a degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions such as investigatory stops.” (Id. at p. 751.) “In either of these situations, Gant provides the generalized authority to search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein incident to arrest.” (People v. Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 555 .) When neither justification is pre

2021Society’s interest in protecting police officers must, however, be balanced against the constitutionally protected interest of citizens to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 680 .) Because no exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was justified here, the deputies’ search of the second floor without a warrant was “presumptively unreasonable.” (Ibid.; Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 586 .) 13 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed.

2021(U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) “ ‘It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 817 , quoting Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586 .) When police conduct a search or seizure without a warrant, the prosecution has the burden of showing the officers’ actions were justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.

2020The court found Silva’s consent was free and voluntary and concluded the People met their burden of establishing the lawfulness of the searches and seizures and, therefore, denied the motion to suppress. 2 Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, but the People bear an additional “burden of proving that the defendant’s manifestation of 8 consent was the product of his free will and not a mere submission to an express or implied assertion of authority. [Citation.] The voluntariness of the consent is in every case ‘a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the circumstan

2019The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure *147 in their persons, houses, papers and effects; against unreasonable searches and seizures." (U.S. Cont., 4th Amend.) A blood draw is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. ( Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 , 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 .) In a criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the constitutionality of a search conducted without a warrant. ( Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443 , 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 .) An exception to the warrant requireme

2022(Id. at p. 458 [“even granting that the police had probable cause to search the car, the application of the [automobile exception] to these facts would extend it far beyond its original rationale”]; id. at p. 464 [“Here there was probable cause, but no exigent circumstances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant.”].) The court explained that the “underlying rationale” of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement -- that it is “ ‘not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which th

2022Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1225-1226 , italics added.) 11 The next year, in Coolidge, the court ruled the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement did not apply to seizure and subsequent search at a police station of a car that was parked in plain view in the defendant’s driveway, when defendant already had been arrested inside his home. ( Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 456, 458-464.) This was so despite probable cause to search the car.

2025A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review Under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution, “ ‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 602 ; see also ibid. [“ ‘the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed” ’ ”].) “When a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell within

2025A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review Under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution, “ ‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 602 ; see also ibid. [“ ‘the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed” ’ ”].) “When a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell within

2013(Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 [ 69 L.Ed. 543 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ] contraband may be seized from an automobile without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe the contraband was being transported in the automobile].) This automobile exception to the warrant requirement has been extended to encompass searches backed by reasonable belief in other offenses and warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles.

2013(Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 [ 69 L.Ed. 543 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ] contraband may be seized from an automobile without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe the contraband was being transported in the automobile].) This automobile exception to the warrant requirement has been extended to encompass searches backed by reasonable belief in other offenses and warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles.

2026Because Nelson preceded the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in McNeely and Birchfield, the controlling authority was Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 , in which the high court established an exigency exception to the warrant requirement for blood alcohol testing in DUI cases.

2026(See, e.g., Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 770 [“the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system”].) In McNeely, the Court again acknowledged this physiological reality (McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 152 ), but nonetheless rejected the government’s argument that it justified a per se exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement: “In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, … it does not do so 6 categ

2020(United States v. Dunn (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 301 [curtilage is the area “intimately tied to the home” such as a detached garage or a fenced area immediately surrounding the home]; People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676 .) “This presumption can be overcome by a showing of one of the few ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” (Celis, at p. 676.) One such exception is an exigent circumstance, defined as “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent esc

2015(Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 738-739 [“‘Plain view’ is perhaps better understood… not as an independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.”]; Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 13 . pp. 793, 801 [plain view doctrine not applicable to officer’s warrantless entry into a private garage even though he could see that a stolen vehicle was parked inside].) Turning to respondent’s contention on appeal, “the exigent circumstances doctrine constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement wh

2026The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” ( Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 368–369, fn. omitted, citing Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441 .) Relatedly, “[i]nventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. [Citation.] When a vehicle is impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853

2026The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” ( Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 368–369, fn. omitted, citing Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441 .) Relatedly, “[i]nventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. [Citation.] When a vehicle is impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents.” (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853

2026“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside.” (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 372 ; see Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1225 .) The exception has been justified by “the ease with which an automobile might be moved out of the jurisdiction before a warrant can be obtained.” (Ibid.) Although the high court has said the privacy interest in a vehicle is “ ‘less substantial’ ” than in a home, it is “ ‘nevertheless important and deserving of constit

2022Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1225-1226 , italics added.) 11 The next year, in Coolidge, the court ruled the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement did not apply to seizure and subsequent search at a police station of a car that was parked in plain view in the defendant’s driveway, when defendant already had been arrested inside his home. ( Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 456, 458-464.) This was so despite probable cause to search the car.

2022(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676 (Celis).) “ ‘[T]he “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” ’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ [Citation.] ‘Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.’ ” (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 602 .) A protective sweep is one such exception.

2021Society’s interest in protecting police officers must, however, be balanced against the constitutionally protected interest of citizens to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.” (Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 680 .) Because no exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was justified here, the deputies’ search of the second floor without a warrant was “presumptively unreasonable.” (Ibid.; Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 586 .) 13 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed.

2013(See Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [ 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 ] [search incident to arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement; police may search person arrested and the area “„within his immediate control‟” to 2 remove weapons and secure evidence]; People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 927 .) The court denied Aguiar‟s suppression motion on the ground he had “no standing” to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, that is, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife‟s purse or its contents.

2013(See Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [ 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 ] [search incident to arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement; police may search person arrested and the area “„within his immediate control‟” to 2 remove weapons and secure evidence]; People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 927 .) The court denied Aguiar‟s suppression motion on the ground he had “no standing” to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, that is, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife‟s purse or its contents.

2026(Id. at p. 403.) In Riley, the Court noted that under the Fourth Amendment, searches generally require police to get a warrant, but as an exception to the warrant requirement, the Court had long recognized that police can “‘search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.’” (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. at p. 382.) The justifications for search incident to arrest exception include officer safety, and the need to avoid the destruction of evidence by the person arrested.

2025(United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 701 ; Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 , 382; United States v. Jeffers (1951) 342 U.S. 48, 51 .) A warrantless search conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement is valid only if it stays within the scope of that exception.

2026(See, e.g., Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 770 [“the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system”].) In McNeely, the Court again acknowledged this physiological reality (McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 152 ), but nonetheless rejected the government’s argument that it justified a per se exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement: “In short, while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, … it does not do so 6 categ

2026(People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 725 .) Applied in the context of DUI investigations, it has been clear at least since the United States Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141 (McNeely) that absent an applicable exception, “the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for a blood draw.” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) One recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when exigent circumstances make it impossible or impractical for law enforcement officers to take the time that would be required to obtain a warrant.

2025(Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 [“‘The scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible’”].) Because defendant’s backpack was not searched pursuant to a warrant, the People seek to justify the search as a permissible frisk for weapons under the Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry) exception to the warrant requirement.

2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 182 .) “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 .) One such exception—explicated in Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry)—exists when an officer “harbors a reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.’ ” (People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084 , 1091 (Esparza).) In such situations, “an investigato

2022It was a vital tool of his trade. “[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 .) Thus, the officers could and would have lawfully searched Wilkins’s person and seized his cellphone.

2021(People v. Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 90 , citing Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 .) “One of the specifically established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is ‘a search incident to a lawful arrest.’ ” (Diaz, at p. 90, citing United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 .) Police officers may search a vehicle incident to an occupant’s arrest in two circumstances: (1) when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or (2) when there is reason to believe evidence relevant to the crim

2013(Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 332 ; Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 678 ; U.S. v. Murphy (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 1117, 1121 [police must comply with the warrant requirement for search of the premises beyond that authorized by the exigencies or other justifications].) Buie and its progeny, including Ledesma, do not authorize a routine protective sweep of a residence 11 preceding or accompanying a probation search divorced from a specific and articulated safety rationale.

2013(Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1156 .) “ „[E]ntry into a home based on exigent circumstances requires probable cause to believe that the entry is justified by one of these factors such as the imminent destruction of evidence or the need to prevent a suspect‟s escape.‟ ” (People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 818 , quoting People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676 (Celis).) Additionally, “[a]s relevant here, the exigent circumstances doctrine constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement when an emergency situation requires swift action to prevent imminent danger to life.” ( Rogers