warrant requirement in Delaware

2023Ct. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006); cf. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 2002) (State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement); Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001) (“Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear.

2023Ct. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006); cf. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 2002) (State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement); Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001) (“Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear.

2024As a general matter, absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.123 Here, the Superior Court held that the warrant obtained by police to search Matthews’s cellphone was an unconstitutional general warrant.124 The State does not dispute this holding or argue otherwise.125 And we agree—the warrant permitted police to conduct an “exploratory rummaging” through Matthews’s phone.126 And trial counsel should have been aware of the issues with the warrant, as Wheeler and Buckham had already 123 See Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 10

2023Article I, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution “protect the right of persons to be secure from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”19 “Generally, searches and seizures are per se unreasonable . . . unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”20 There is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, however, for searches that are conducted with a person’s valid consent.21 Consent may be express or implied.22 This waiver of constitutional rights need not be knowing and intelligent, but it must be voluntaril

2023See id. (“[T]here is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless search.” (quoting Tatman, 494 A.2d at 1253 )); State v. DuBose, 2016 WL 1590583 , at *8 (Del.

2021For the same reasons, the police also had probable cause to search Torres’ vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.13 11 Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 572 (Del. 2019) (quoting LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Del 2008)). 12 Id. at 573 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)). 13 See, e.g., Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del. 1985). 7 Under the totality of the circumstances, the State has met its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to arrest Torres at the time of the seizure and to search hi

2019Sep. 29, 2016) (TABLE)). 22 See Coley v. State, 886 A.2d 1277 , 2005 WL 2679329, at *2 (Del.

2016A search incident to an arrest must either follow a valid arrest or be “nearly contemporaneous” to the arrest. 9 The police may not use the results of the search to establish probable cause for the arrest.10 Here, the proffered reason for the arrest was the marijuana seized from Hopkins’ pocket as a result of the illegal search.11 Consequently, since the arrest was the product of an illegal search and therefore invalid, this warrant exception does not justify the backpack 9 Coley v. State, 886 A.2d 1277 , 2005 WL 2679329, at *1 (Del.

2023Thus, we will not consider Thomas’s state constitutional claims.”) (internal citation omitted). 54 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 298 (“The warrant requirement addresses the Framer’s concerns in two ways.”). 55 Id. (citation omitted). 56 Id. at 298–99. 57 Id.

2023Thus, we will not consider Thomas’s state constitutional claims.”) (internal citation omitted). 54 Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 298 (“The warrant requirement addresses the Framer’s concerns in two ways.”). 55 Id. (citation omitted). 56 Id. at 298–99. 57 Id.

2023Ct. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006); cf. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 2002) (State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement); Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001) (“Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear.

2023Ct. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006); cf. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 2002) (State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement); Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001) (“Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule in Delaware should now be clear.

2023As we stated in Jones v. State, these features reflect “that distinctive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws and its people justify recourse to the state constitutions as an independent source for recognizing and protecting individual rights.” 745 A.2d 856, 865 (Del. 1999). 53 Womack v. State, 296 A.3d 882 , 899 n.37 (Del. 2023).

2015“A law enforcement officer may seize, without a warrant, contraband that the officer observes in plain view, but only if (1) the officer is lawfully in a position to observe the 5 Holden v. State, 23 A.3d 843, 846 (Del. 2011). 6 1d. 7 1d. 8 Jones v. Stale, 745 A.2d 856, 860 (Del. 1999). 4 contraband, (2) the item’s evidentiary value is immediately apparent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the item.”9 (8) McDougal’s claim is unavailing.

2023Under that doctrine, ‘the mere observation of an item in plain view does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.’”). 38 922 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 2007). 16 some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.39 The Superior Court determined that the emergency doctrine was inapplicable, not because the facts could not support an inference that the children’s guardian was in danger, but because the testimony of the officers themselves undermined that inference.

2021July 27, 2009) (TABLE) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances must indicate that the detaining officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d 825, 828 (Del. 2008))); Guererri v. State, 922 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 2007) (applying the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof to the showing required to establish the legality of a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine); see also State v. DuBose, 2016 WL 1590583 , at *3 (Del.

2022The court was not persuaded that the data emitted from the device was protected by the Fourth Amendment, stating that “[i]t would seem, therefore, that the constitutional ‘harm,’ sought to be prevented by the warrant requirement is the placement of the tracker, not the data emitted as a result thereof from wherever it is generated.”8 The court concluded that: Because the Court will not find trial counsel ineffective for failing to “effectively” raise an issue of first impression, and because the Court believes that even if he had done so effectively, the issue would not have been decided in hi

2022The court was not persuaded that the data emitted from the device was protected by the Fourth Amendment, stating that “[i]t would seem, therefore, that the constitutional ‘harm,’ sought to be prevented by the warrant requirement is the placement of the tracker, not the data emitted as a result thereof from wherever it is generated.”8 The court concluded that: Because the Court will not find trial counsel ineffective for failing to “effectively” raise an issue of first impression, and because the Court believes that even if he had done so effectively, the issue would not have been decided in hi

2022Sept. 2, 2021) (citations omitted). 13 Id. at *2, quoting Jose Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Del. 2008), Uriel Harris v. State, 806 A.2d 119, 127 (Del. 2002), Josiah Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Del. 2001). 6 Further, while warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in certain circumstances “the police may search a car without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.”14 Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police must have probable cause to believe that an

2015Id. at 1563 . 9 McVaugh v. State, 2014 WL 1117722 , at *1 (Del. 2014) (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del. 2008)). 10 Id. (citing McCallister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119 , 1122–23 (Del. 2002)). 11 Id. (quoting Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1284 ). 5 The United States and Delaware Constitutions protect the right of persons to be secure from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”12 Generally, “[s]earches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in the absence of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”13 In addition to exigent circumstances, a

2021For the same reasons, the police also had probable cause to search Torres’ vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.13 11 Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 572 (Del. 2019) (quoting LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1108 (Del 2008)). 12 Id. at 573 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983)). 13 See, e.g., Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del. 1985). 7 Under the totality of the circumstances, the State has met its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was probable cause to arrest Torres at the time of the seizure and to search hi

2016Search of Vehicle’s Trunk” Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment, when police have probable cause to believe that an automobile is carrying contraband or evidence, they may search the vehicle without obtaining a search warrant.30 Probable cause exists where, under the totality of the circumstances, the facts known to the off`1cers, as those versed in the field of law enforcement, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.3l The standard is of only a "fair probability"

2019See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 14 State v. John L.

1999See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ("It is well settled that a. search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”); Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983) (citing Robinson). .

2016Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.6 3 Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 216 (Del. 2008). 4 Id. 5 Id. at 216-17 . 6 Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 4 8.

2016Third, once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, the caretaking function is over and any further detention constitutes an unreasonable seizure unless the officer has a warrant, or some exception to the warrant requirement applies, such as reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.6 3 Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 216 (Del. 2008). 4 Id. 5 Id. at 216-17 . 6 Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 4 8.

2016See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 5 papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”7 Searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, unless they are authorized by warrants or fall under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.8 In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory detention of an individual based on the officer‟s reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.9 In similar fashion, Delaware‟s Detention Statute allows a police officer to detain an in

1999C. § 1257. [80] See Ellison v. State, Del.Super., 410 A.2d 519, 523 (1979), aff'd, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 1127 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 , 102 S.Ct. 1730 , 72 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). [81] See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."); Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983) (citing Robinson ). [82] See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wong Sun v. Unit

2003See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2003See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2003See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2003See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2002See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 , 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 248 (Del.1987) (both holding the State bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement).

1993Mason v. State, Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 242, 248 (1987).

2023The State bears the burden of proof.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 21 Sisson, 883 A.2d at 875 ; see State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4056130 , at *3 (Del.

2023The State bears the burden of proof.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). 20 Sisson, 883 A.2d at 875 ; see State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4056130 , at *3 (Del.

2019Sep. 29, 2016) (TABLE)). 22 See Coley v. State, 886 A.2d 1277 , 2005 WL 2679329, at *2 (Del.

2016A search incident to an arrest must either follow a valid arrest or be “nearly contemporaneous” to the arrest. 9 The police may not use the results of the search to establish probable cause for the arrest.10 Here, the proffered reason for the arrest was the marijuana seized from Hopkins’ pocket as a result of the illegal search.11 Consequently, since the arrest was the product of an illegal search and therefore invalid, this warrant exception does not justify the backpack 9 Coley v. State, 886 A.2d 1277 , 2005 WL 2679329, at *1 (Del.

1999C. § 1257. [80] See Ellison v. State, Del.Super., 410 A.2d 519, 523 (1979), aff'd, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 1127 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 , 102 S.Ct. 1730 , 72 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). [81] See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."); Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983) (citing Robinson ). [82] See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wong Sun v. Unit

1999C. § 1257. [80] See Ellison v. State, Del.Super., 410 A.2d 519, 523 (1979), aff'd, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 1127 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 , 102 S.Ct. 1730 , 72 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). [81] See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."); Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983) (citing Robinson ). [82] See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wong Sun v. Unit

2022MOTION TO SUPPRESS – WARRANT CHALLENGES On a motion to suppress contesting the validity of a search warrant, the defendant shoulders the burden of establishing that the challenged search or seizure was unlawful.54 The Delaware Constitution provides that a search warrant may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.55 “It is well-settled that the Court must employ a ‘four-corners’ test to determine whether an application for a warrant demonstrates probable cause.”56 Under the test, to be no more than what she was, a temporary house sitter.” Thus, her apparent authority to consent was tru

2015Our implied consent statute simply attaches a 64 Cooke, 977 A.2d at 855 .

2021The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained in the course of illegal police conduct “will not be suppressed if the prosecution can prove that the incriminating evidence would have been discovered through legitimate means in the absence of official misconduct.”33 The inevitable discovery exception typically 32 The State conceded in its post-hearing submission that the “investigators’ primary purpose in entering the residence was to find a guardian for the children.” State’s Post-Hr’g Submission (Dec. 8, 2021) at 1 (D.I. 34). 33 Cook, 374 A.2d at 2

1999C. § 1257. [80] See Ellison v. State, Del.Super., 410 A.2d 519, 523 (1979), aff'd, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 1127 (1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026 , 102 S.Ct. 1730 , 72 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). [81] See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ("It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."); Traylor v. State, Del.Supr., 458 A.2d 1170 (1983) (citing Robinson ). [82] See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wong Sun v. Unit

2018Feb. 4, 2010) (finding a search and seizure was lawful based on the “strong odor of marijuana” and the fact the defendant was clutching his jacket). 22 See Jenkins v. State, 970 A.2d 154, 158 (Del. 2009) (finding “sufficient justification to conduct a separate search and seizure beyond the purpose of the initial traffic stop” when a police officer “smelled a strong odor of marijuana,” which established probable cause to arrest the defendant and search the car). 23 Opening Br. at 32 (quoting Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1051 ); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (“If a protectiv

1993Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2139 .

2017See State v. Flonnory, 109 A.3d 1060, 1062-64 (Del. 2015); see also Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (confronting the question of whether “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations”). 34 In State v. Cardona, defendant argued that a blood draw at a police station_instead of a hospital_was a per se unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, despite not objecting when his blood was dr

2015Id. at 1563 . 9 McVaugh v. State, 2014 WL 1117722 , at *1 (Del. 2014) (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del. 2008)). 10 Id. (citing McCallister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119 , 1122–23 (Del. 2002)). 11 Id. (quoting Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1284 ). 5 The United States and Delaware Constitutions protect the right of persons to be secure from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”12 Generally, “[s]earches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in the absence of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause.”13 In addition to exigent circumstances, a

2002Scott v. State, 672 A.2d 550, 552 (Del.1996) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

2002Scott v. State, 672 A.2d 550, 552 (Del.1996) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).

2026“This Court has also eschewed a hyper technical approach to the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit in favor of a common-sense interpretation.” Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811 (quoting Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409 (Del. 1989)). 70 Opening Br. 9. 71 Id. at 9–11. 11 what he believed would satisfy the warrant requirement – “if there was a surveillance photo or surveillance video around the time of the crime or at the time of the crime that showed [the defendant] in possession . . . of the phone . . . .”72 (18) Heck asserts that Dorsey v. State supports his position and controls here.73 We d

2026“This Court has also eschewed a hyper technical approach to the evaluation of the search warrant affidavit in favor of a common-sense interpretation.” Dorsey, 761 A.2d at 811 (quoting Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409 (Del. 1989)). 70 Opening Br. 9. 71 Id. at 9–11. 11 what he believed would satisfy the warrant requirement – “if there was a surveillance photo or surveillance video around the time of the crime or at the time of the crime that showed [the defendant] in possession . . . of the phone . . . .”72 (18) Heck asserts that Dorsey v. State supports his position and controls here.73 We d