295 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2026 91 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2026One exception, relevant to the facts of this case, is exigent circumstances, i.e., “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. at 148-49 (citation omitted); see also State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶23 , 373 Wis. 2d 468 , 893 N.W.2d 812 (“One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances doctrine, which holds that a warrantless search complies with the Fourth Amendment if the need for a search is urgent and insufficient time to obtain a warrant exists.” (citation omitted)). ¶8 “Alcoho 2024The McNeely Court acknowledged that technology-based developments may streamline the warrant process, and it reasoned that where “the warrant process will not significantly increase the delay before the blood test[,] … there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 153-54 . ¶18 Citing this passage, Ragen argues that because Deputy Scray made no effort to obtain a warrant, he was not acting “reasonably” on any “settled precedent.” To the extent Ragen suggests that the McNeely Court held there is never a plausible justification for an exception to | 14 | 25 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2020To avoid potential ambiguity, we do not use the term “actual consent” in this opinion except when quoting the parties or other courts, which generally use this term in the first sense described above: consent that satisfies the traditional warrant exception. 18 No. 2016AP308-CR coercion”—and voluntariness is “determined from the totality of the circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 ; Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33 . 2020STAT. § 343.305 satisfy the traditional warrant exception for consent, this argument fails to take the totality of circumstances into account, and it is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Birchfield and Mitchell. ¶53 As discussed above, the traditional warrant exception requires that consent be “voluntary” based upon an evaluation of the “totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 . | 13 | 16 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2026IV, that the taking of a blood sample is a search, Birchfield, 579 U.S. at 456 , and that “warrantless searches are ‘per se unreasonable,’ unless some exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies,” Forrett, 401 Wis. 2d 678 , ¶6 (citation omitted). ¶17 WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(2) provides, Any person who … drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state, or in those areas enumerated in [WIS. 2024The provision’s ‘deemed’ consent authorizes warrantless searches that do not fulfill any recognized exception to the warrant requirement and thus the provision violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches.”); and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 , 477 (2016) (“[W]e conclude that motorists cannot be deemed to have [impliedly] consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.”). | 10 | 15 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences2021Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system of law enforcement” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (plurality opinion))). 9 No. 2020AP1004-CR By the Court.—Judgment affirmed. 2020Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system of 6 No. 2016AP308-CR law enforcement”) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (plurality opinion)). ¶11 When a defendant challenges evidence that has been obtained through a warrantless search, the State bears the burden to establish that the search was justified by a recognized exception to the war | 10 | 15 |
Welsh v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2008The Welsh court further noted that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 (citation omitted). 2008The Welsh court further noted that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 (citation omitted). | 10 | 12 |
Kentucky v. Kinggreen2 sentences2022State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30 , 290 Wis. 2d 380 , 714 N.W.2d 548 ; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382 (2014). “‘In the absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’” Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). 2018The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to protect the security of person and property when exceptions to the warrant requirement are sought."). 27 Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 , 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 18 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 28 Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) ; Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 22 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 29 Schneckloth , 412 U. | 10 | 11 |
State v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17 , 233 Wis. 2d 280 , 607 N.W.2d 621 (recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement where the government can show both probable cause and exigent circumstances). 2025See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17 , 233 Wis. 2d 280 , 607 N.W.2d 621 (recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement where the government can show both probable cause and exigent circumstances). | 9 | 18 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021As with any 4 No. 2019AP1404-CR.rfd exception to the warrant requirement, consent is "jealously and carefully drawn," and must be "confined in scope" and "strictly circumscribed." See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 29 (1968). 2021As with any 4 No. 2019AP1404-CR.rfd exception to the warrant requirement, consent is "jealously and carefully drawn," and must be "confined in scope" and "strictly circumscribed." See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 29 (1968). | 9 | 9 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013). ¶7 A warrantless search is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the “‘specifically established and well-delineated’ exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18 , 255 Wis. 2d 1 , 646 N.W.2d 834 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 2021Therefore, I do not further address the judgment of conviction related to the open intoxicant. 5 No. 2021AP564 Labor Execs.’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989); County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 624 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980). ¶13 A warrantless search is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the “‘specifically established and well-delineated’ exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18 , 255 Wis. 2d 1 , 646 N.W.2d 834 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). | 8 | 14 |
Brigham City v. Stuartgreen2 sentences2020State v. Asboth, 2017 WI 76, ¶12 , 376 Wis. 2d 644 , 898 N.W.2d 541 ("A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is presumptively unreasonable." (internal marks omitted)).6 However, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment [and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution] is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 2017State v. Dumstrey, 7 No. 2015AP2052-CR 2016 WI 3, ¶14 , 366 Wis. 2d 64 , 873 N.W.2d 502 (citing State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶20 , 311 Wis. 2d 358 , 752 N.W.2d 748 ). ¶12 "A seizure conducted without a valid warrant is presumptively unreasonable." State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶24 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982)). "[B]ecause the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" however, "the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). | 8 | 8 |
Chimel v. Californiared2 sentences2008The State relies on the "search incident to an arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to justify the second search of the bedroom. ¶ 46 The State's brief seems to assume that if the second warrantless search of the bedroom falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, the search of the canister and seizure of its contents during the second search of the bedroom also fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 47 The circuit court concluded that the search of the bedroom was a valid search pursuant to an arrest. ¶ 48 The scope of what is conventionally 2008The State relies on the "search incident to an arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to justify the second search of the bedroom. ¶ 46 The State's brief seems to assume that if the second warrantless search of the bedroom falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, the search of the canister and seizure of its contents during the second search of the bedroom also fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 47 The circuit court concluded that the search of the bedroom was a valid search pursuant to an arrest. ¶ 48 The scope of what is conventionally | 7 | 10 |
State v. Articgreen2 sentences2026State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . ¶19 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 . 2026State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . ¶19 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 . | 6 | 26 |
Douglas-Hanson Co., Inc. v. BF Goodrich Co.green2 sentences2025See State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17 , 233 Wis. 2d 280 , 607 N.W.2d 621 (recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement where the government can show both probable cause and exigent circumstances). 2024“The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause to search is a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶21 , 233 Wis. 2d 280, 291 , 607 N.W.2d 621 . ¶16 As noted above, although the State argued during the suppression hearing that the search of Timm’s vehicle was supported by probable cause, the circuit court did not address this argument and instead determined that the search was lawful under a different exception to the warrant requirement: consent. | 6 | 16 |
State v. Michael R. Tullberggreen2 sentences2026State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . ¶19 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 . 2026State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30 , 359 Wis. 2d 421 , 857 N.W.2d 120 . ¶19 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶29 , 327 Wis. 2d 392 , 786 N.W.2d 430 . | 6 | 14 |
Payton v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2018The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to protect the security of person and property when exceptions to the warrant requirement are sought."). 27 Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 , 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 18 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 28 Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) ; Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 22 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 29 Schneckloth , 412 U. 2018The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to protect the security of person and property when exceptions to the warrant requirement are sought."). 27 Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 , 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 18 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 28 Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) ; Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 22 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 29 Schneckloth , 412 U. | 6 | 9 |
State v. Pinkardgreen2 sentences2024Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶14 ("[W]e look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement."). 2024Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶14 ("[W]e look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement."). | 5 | 9 |
| Wyoming v. Houghtongreen | 5 | 6 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 5 | 6 |
| State v. Derik J. Wantlandgreen | 5 | 5 |
| United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigangreen | 5 | 5 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019The Schmerber Court considered the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement in the context of a non-consensual blood test conducted subsequent to arrest for intoxicated driving. 384 U.S. at 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 . 2019The Schmerber Court considered the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement in the context of a non-consensual blood test conducted subsequent to arrest for intoxicated driving. 384 U.S. at 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 . | 4 | 9 |
Griffin v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2021When a person is on probation, “the special needs of Wisconsin’s probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by ‘reasonable grounds.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987). 2018State v. Griffin , 131 Wis. 2d 41 , 62, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd , 483 U.S. 868 (1987). ¶11 To determine whether the consent exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied, this court first reviews whether consent was given in fact by words, gestures, or conduct. | 4 | 8 |
| Carroll v. United Statesgreen | 4 | 5 |
State v. Piresgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 648 , 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987) (a circuit court decision on a legal issue may be sustained if it is correct, even if the court did not use the same reasoning as the appellate court). 17 No. 2023AP86-CR One exception to the warrant requirement recognized by our supreme court concerns emergency aid. [State v. Rome, 2000 WI App 243, ¶12 , 239 Wis. 2d 491 , 620 N.W.2d 225 ] (citing State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597 , 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972)). 2023See State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 648 , 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987) (a circuit court decision on a legal issue may be sustained if it is correct, even if the court did not use the same reasoning as the appellate court). 17 No. 2023AP86-CR One exception to the warrant requirement recognized by our supreme court concerns emergency aid. [State v. Rome, 2000 WI App 243, ¶12 , 239 Wis. 2d 491 , 620 N.W.2d 225 ] (citing State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597 , 201 N.W.2d 153 (1972)). | 3 | 8 |
Illinois v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2017As the United States 8 No. 2015AP450-CR.pdr Supreme Court has explained, "what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government——whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, . . . or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement—— is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Id. at 185 . 2. 2017As the United States 8 No. 2015AP450-CR.pdr Supreme Court has explained, "what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government——whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, . . . or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement—— is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Id. at 185 . 2. | 3 | 8 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 3 | 7 |
| Johnson v. United Statesgreen | 3 | 5 |
| South Dakota v. Oppermangreen | 3 | 5 |
| State v. Douglasgreen | 3 | 4 |
| Arizona v. Gantgreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Sandersgreen | 3 | 4 |
| United States v. Santanagreen | 3 | 4 |
| State v. Blalockgreen | 3 | 3 |
| State v. Navdeep S. Brargreen | 3 | 3 |
| United States v. Di Regreen | 3 | 3 |
State v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2026Consent ¶20 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196 , 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 2026Consent ¶20 “One well-established exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a search conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196 , 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). | 2 | 17 |
Bies v. Stategreen2 sentences2016In Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), which constituted "our very first discussion of the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement," Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶ 21 , an officer responded to information provided by an anonymous telephone caller — information "therefore . . . not possessed of even minimal 'indicia of reliability,'"— that "someone" was "making noise shortly after midnight" in an unspecified garage in an alley. 2016In Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457 , 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), which constituted "our very first discussion of the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement," Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶ 21 , an officer responded to information provided by an anonymous telephone caller — information "therefore . . . not possessed of even minimal 'indicia of reliability,'"— that "someone" was "making noise shortly after midnight" in an unspecified garage in an alley. | 2 | 10 |
State v. Boggessgreen2 sentences2009"These exceptions have been 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and the burden rests with those seeking exemption from the warrant requirement to prove that the exigencies made that course imperative." State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 449 , 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983). ¶ 7. 2009"These exceptions have been 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and the burden rests with those seeking exemption from the warrant requirement to prove that the exigencies made that course imperative." State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 449 , 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983). ¶ 7. | 2 | 9 |
State v. Payano-Romangreen2 sentences2022State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30 , 290 Wis. 2d 380 , 714 N.W.2d 548 ; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382 (2014). “‘In the absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’” Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). 2022State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, ¶30 , 290 Wis. 2d 380 , 714 N.W.2d 548 ; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382 (2014). “‘In the absence of a warrant, a search or seizure is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’” Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). | 2 | 8 |
State v. Krajewskigreen2 sentences2021Indeed, this court has previously set forth that "[t]wo of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement are consent searches and searches based on exigent circumstances." State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24 , 255 Wis. 2d 98 , 648 N.W.2d 385 . ¶42 The State's essential argument in this case boils down to an assertion that the incapacitated driver provision is constitutional because exigent circumstances may have been present. 2021Indeed, this court has previously set forth that "[t]wo of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement are consent searches and searches based on exigent circumstances." State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶24 , 255 Wis. 2d 98 , 648 N.W.2d 385 . ¶42 The State's essential argument in this case boils down to an assertion that the incapacitated driver provision is constitutional because exigent circumstances may have been present. | 2 | 8 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Richter
green
2 sentences2018The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to protect the security of person and property when exceptions to the warrant requirement are sought."). 27 Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 , 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 18 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 28 Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) ; Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 22 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 29 Schneckloth , 412 U. 2018The fourth amendment has been liberally construed to protect the security of person and property when exceptions to the warrant requirement are sought."). 27 Payton , 445 U.S. at 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ); Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10 , 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; see also Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 18 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 28 Jones v. United States , 357 U.S. 493 , 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958) ; Douglas , 123 Wis. 2d at 22 , 365 N.W.2d 580 . 29 Schneckloth , 412 U. | 8 | 2001–2018 |
| State v. Adam M. Blackman green | 6 | 2020–2025 |
| Caniglia v. Strom green | 5 | 2021–2025 |
| State v. Dawn M. Prado green | 5 | 2021–2025 |
| State v. Keith M. Abbott green | 4 | 2020–2026 |
| State v. Callaway green | 4 | 1986–2022 |
| State v. Brett W. Dumstrey green | 4 | 2016–2017 |
| Laasch v. State green | 4 | 1982–2008 |
| Edwards v. State green | 4 | 1973–1977 |
| State v. Dearborn green | 3 | 2014–2024 |
| State v. Felix green | 3 | 2016–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.