warrant requirement in Oregon

2026An officer merely articulated a con- cern that, if released, defendant “may come back and * * * take the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) Although it was “very likely” that the jail would not detain defendant, the state did not demonstrate that defendant posed an imminent threat 3 In McCarthy, the Supreme Court eliminated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, created in State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 278 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986). 369 Or at 132 .

2026An officer merely articulated a con- cern that, if released, defendant “may come back and * * * take the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) Although it was “very likely” that the jail would not detain defendant, the state did not demonstrate that defendant posed an imminent threat 3 In McCarthy, the Supreme Court eliminated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, created in State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 278 , 721 P2d 1357 (1986). 369 Or at 132 .

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024As that body of law further reflects, warrantless entries and searches of areas in which a defendant has a privacy interest are per se unreasonable unless they fall “within one of the few specifically established and well- delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237-38 , 666 P2d 802 (1983) (citing Katz Cite as 336 Or App 830 (2024) 839 v. United States, 389 US 347, 357 , 88 S Ct 507 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2014First, the state has abandoned its unsuccessful efforts below to justify Quinones’s opening of the sock as a search incident to defendant’s arrest. 2 See, e.g., State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 200-04 , 729 P2d 524 (1986) (describing that exception to the warrant requirement).

2014First, the state has abandoned its unsuccessful efforts below to justify Quinones’s opening of the sock as a search incident to defendant’s arrest. 2 See, e.g., State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 200-04 , 729 P2d 524 (1986) (describing that exception to the warrant requirement).

2023See State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987) (explaining the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 773-74 , 305 P3d 94 (2013) (explaining the reasonable suspicion exception).

2023See State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 524 , 747 P2d 991 (1987) (explaining the officer-safety exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Watson, 353 Or 768, 773-74 , 305 P3d 94 (2013) (explaining the reasonable suspicion exception).

2016“A warrantless search by the police is ‘reasonable’ under Article I, section 9, when the search falls into one or another of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Id.

2016A. Voluntariness of Consent Generally, voluntary consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement and, therefore, police may conduct a warrantless search if “someone having the authority to do so voluntarily gave the police consentí.]” State v. Paulson, 313 Or 346, 352 , 833 P2d 1278 (1992).

2020This explains, perhaps, why we can find no cases applying the third-party consent doctrine in the context of warrantless searches of a criminal suspect’s body, juvenile or otherwise.3 3 The dissenting opinion quotes State v. Banks, 364 Or 332, 338 , 434 P3d 361 (2019), which, in turn, quotes State v. Weaver, 319 Or 212, 219 , 874 P2d 1322 (1994), for the proposition that the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies when “ ‘someone having the authority to do so voluntarily gave the police Cite as 305 Or App 86 (2020) 97 But, even if we are wrong, and even if the agency thread of the

2020This explains, perhaps, why we can find no cases applying the third-party consent doctrine in the context of warrantless searches of a criminal suspect’s body, juvenile or otherwise.3 3 The dissenting opinion quotes State v. Banks, 364 Or 332, 338 , 434 P3d 361 (2019), which, in turn, quotes State v. Weaver, 319 Or 212, 219 , 874 P2d 1322 (1994), for the proposition that the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies when “ ‘someone having the authority to do so voluntarily gave the police Cite as 305 Or App 86 (2020) 97 But, even if we are wrong, and even if the agency thread of the

2026Under Article I, section 9, “[w]arrantless entries and searches of premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988).

2026Under Article I, section 9, “[w]arrantless entries and searches of premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235 , 759 P2d 1054 (1988).

2026Because the state has not demonstrated that an applicable warrant exception applies, see, e.g., State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 647 , 260 P3d 476 (2011), defendant is entitled to suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the search of her van, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

2026Because the state has not demonstrated that an applicable warrant exception applies, see, e.g., State v. Baker, 350 Or 641, 647 , 260 P3d 476 (2011), defendant is entitled to suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the search of her van, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

2017See State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (explaining that warrantless search or seizure is reasonable—and therefore constitutional—under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, if it is “supported by probable cause and conducted under exigent circumstances,” e.g., circumstances in which “immediate action is necessary to prevent the disappearance, dissipation, or destruction of evidence”).

2017See State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (explaining that warrantless search or seizure is reasonable—and therefore constitutional—under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, if it is “supported by probable cause and conducted under exigent circumstances,” e.g., circumstances in which “immediate action is necessary to prevent the disappearance, dissipation, or destruction of evidence”).

2021See State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 278 n 6, 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (“In this modern day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in the near future when the warrant requirement of the state and fed- eral constitutions can be fulfilled virtually without excep- tion.”); State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, 351 Or 179, 188-89 , 263 P3d 336 (2011) (noting that the majority in Brown had sug- gested that its decision was “a temporary accommodation subject to change in the near future when technology would permit neutral magistrates to” issue warrants “more expe- ditiously”).

2021See State v. Brown, 301 Or 268 , 278 n 6, 721 P2d 1357 (1986) (“In this modern day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in the near future when the warrant requirement of the state and fed- eral constitutions can be fulfilled virtually without excep- tion.”); State v. Kurokawa-Lasciak, 351 Or 179, 188-89 , 263 P3d 336 (2011) (noting that the majority in Brown had sug- gested that its decision was “a temporary accommodation subject to change in the near future when technology would permit neutral magistrates to” issue warrants “more expe- ditiously”).

2020Under Article I, section 9, “a search or seizure con- ducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless that search or seizure falls within one of the ‘specifically established and well delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” State v. Fulmer, 366 Or 224, 230 , 460 P3d 486 (2020) (quoting State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994)).

2020Under Article I, section 9, “a search or seizure con- ducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless that search or seizure falls within one of the ‘specifically established and well delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.” State v. Fulmer, 366 Or 224, 230 , 460 P3d 486 (2020) (quoting State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 36 , 880 P2d 451 (1994)).

2026“Under Article I, section 9, searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a warrant or one of the few * * * exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129, 131 , 501 P3d 478 (2021).

2026“Under Article I, section 9, searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a warrant or one of the few * * * exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129, 131 , 501 P3d 478 (2021).

2023See Nelson, 304 Or at 104 (“Compliance with the warrant clause, or its few exceptions 766 State v. Wilcox as this court has interpreted them, itself provides the nec- essary authorization for searches or seizures intended to discover evidence of crime.”).

2023See Nelson, 304 Or at 104 (“Compliance with the warrant clause, or its few exceptions 766 State v. Wilcox as this court has interpreted them, itself provides the nec- essary authorization for searches or seizures intended to discover evidence of crime.”).

2014Another exception to the warrant requirement allows for search or seizure under exigent circumstances, articulated by this court as “a situation that requires the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence.” State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (when officers are “presented with both probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred and an exigent circumstance,” warrantless action may be justified).

2014Another exception to the warrant requirement allows for search or seizure under exigent circumstances, articulated by this court as “a situation that requires the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence.” State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126 , 806 P2d 92 (1991) (when officers are “presented with both probable cause to believe that a crime had occurred and an exigent circumstance,” warrantless action may be justified).

2026Consent to search is one such exception to the warrant requirement “because consent relinquishes a person’s privacy interest in property so that there is no unlawful intrusion.” State v. Bonilla, 358 Or 475, 480 , 366 P3d 331 (2015).

2026Consent to search is one such exception to the warrant requirement “because consent relinquishes a person’s privacy interest in property so that there is no unlawful intrusion.” State v. Bonilla, 358 Or 475, 480 , 366 P3d 331 (2015).

2023Warrantless seizures and searches “ ‘are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and limited excep- tions to the warrant requirement.’ ” State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129, 141 , 501 P3d 478 (2021) (quoting State v. Bliss, 363 Or 426, 430 , 423 P3d 53 (2018)).

2023Warrantless seizures and searches “ ‘are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few specifically established and limited excep- tions to the warrant requirement.’ ” State v. McCarthy, 369 Or 129, 141 , 501 P3d 478 (2021) (quoting State v. Bliss, 363 Or 426, 430 , 423 P3d 53 (2018)).

2014See State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010) (dissipation of alcohol from bloodstream of perpetrator presented exigent circumstance); State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (court applied, as “a subset of the exigent circumstances exception, an ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement” allowing warrantless search of mobile vehicle driven by perpetrator because evidence could be lost).

2014See State v. Machuca, 347 Or 644, 657 , 227 P3d 729 (2010) (dissipation of alcohol from bloodstream of perpetrator presented exigent circumstance); State v. Meharry, 342 Or 173, 177 , 149 P3d 1155 (2006) (court applied, as “a subset of the exigent circumstances exception, an ‘automobile exception’ to the warrant requirement” allowing warrantless search of mobile vehicle driven by perpetrator because evidence could be lost).

2025First, the Court emphasized “the inherent mobility of automo- biles,” which creates circumstances of per se “exigency,” such that, “as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” Id. at 367 .

2025First, the Court emphasized “the inherent mobility of automo- biles,” which creates circumstances of per se “exigency,” such that, “as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” Id. at 367 .

2018Even under the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, a seizure must be supported by probable cause, id. , and in order to meet that standard, the officer's subjective belief "that a crime has been committed and thus that person or thing is subject to seizure" must be objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.

2015If an intrusion is a seizure, “it requires probable cause and a search warrant or separate justification under one of the few, carefully circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987).

2018Article I, section 9, provides, in part: "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure[.]" Prior to Baker , which was decided by the Supreme Court in 2011, cases involving the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement were analyzed under a standard set out in State v. Follett , 115 Or.

2014Defendant acknowledged the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, but contended, relying on State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680 , 840 P2d 1298 (1992), rev den, 317 Or 163 (1993), that, for the exception to apply, there must be a “true emergency,” which, according to defendant, meant that an immediate need for assistance to protect life must, in fact, exist — an officer’s good faith belief that such assistance is needed is insufficient.

2020In that case, the court reiterated its holding from State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1 , 688 P2d 832 (1984), and its progeny that exceptions to the warrant requirement—including the inventory exception— must be applied “consistently with the purposes animating the exception.” Fulmer, 366 Or at 233-34 .

2020In that case, the court reiterated its holding from State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1 , 688 P2d 832 (1984), and its progeny that exceptions to the warrant requirement—including the inventory exception— must be applied “consistently with the purposes animating the exception.” Fulmer, 366 Or at 233-34 .

2026See State v. Marshall, 254 Or App 419, 427 , 295 P3d 128 (2013) (explaining that, under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, “a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless the search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement,” such as consent, and noting that the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s consent was voluntary); State v. Banks, 364 Or 332, 337 , 434 P3d 361 (2019) (observing that the search of a suspect’s breath is pro- tected under Article I, section 9).

2026See State v. Marshall, 254 Or App 419, 427 , 295 P3d 128 (2013) (explaining that, under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, “a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, unless the search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement,” such as consent, and noting that the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s consent was voluntary); State v. Banks, 364 Or 332, 337 , 434 P3d 361 (2019) (observing that the search of a suspect’s breath is pro- tected under Article I, section 9).

2022The Court took review in McNeely to resolve that split of authority, and to clarify “whether the natu- ral dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to justify an excep- tion to the warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations.” McNeely, 569 US at 147 .

2022Moreover, pinning the warrant requirement on the expe- ditiousness of the procedure in place “would improperly ignore the current and future technological developments in warrant procedures, and might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions to pursue progressive approaches to war- rant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law enforcement.” Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted); Cite as 320 Or App 335 (2022) 353 see also Rodriguez, 156 P3d at 779 .

2017See State v. Martin, 222 Or App 138, 146 , 193 P3d 993 (2008), rev den, 345 Or 690 (2009) (holding that, in order for a warrantless community-caretaking search of a home to be lawful, the search must also fall under one of the constitutional exceptions to the warrant requirement).

2017See State v. Martin, 222 Or App 138, 146 , 193 P3d 993 (2008), rev den, 345 Or 690 (2009) (holding that, in order for a warrantless community-caretaking search of a home to be lawful, the search must also fall under one of the constitutional exceptions to the warrant requirement).