warrant requirement in New Hampshire

1988We also conclude that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 580 , 409 A.2d at 1137 , applies in this case, justifying a warrantless entry.

1988We also conclude that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 580 , 409 A.2d at 1137 , applies in this case, justifying a warrantless entry.

2020We first recognized the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in State v. Psomiades, 139 N.H. 480, 482 (1995).

2010We first recognized the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in State v. Psomiades, 139 N.H. 480, 482 (1995), where we held that it applies to the seizure of property “when [the seizure] constitutes no more than a routine and good faith attempt, in the exercise of reasonable caution, to safeguard the defendant’s own property.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1982Absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable.” State v. Beede, 119 N.H. at 625, 406 A.2d at 129 ; State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 578, 409 A.2d at 1137 .

1982Absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable.” State v. Beede, 119 N.H. at 625, 406 A.2d at 129 ; State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. at 578, 409 A.2d at 1137 .

2014As it was conducted without a warrant, and under no recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the search “was not constitutionally permissible” under the Federal Constitution, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 395 (1978), and evidence obtained as a result of the search was, “by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court,” Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

1987State v. Jones, 127 N.H. 515, 522 , 503 A.2d 802, 807 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).

1999Just as the police cannot create an exigency for purposes of avoiding the warrant requirement, see Santana, 133 N.H. at 805 , 586 A.2d at 81 , defendants cannot trigger the need for a warrant by racing the police to the sanctity of the home, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1134 .

1999Just as the police cannot create an exigency for purposes of avoiding the warrant requirement, see Santana, 133 N.H. at 805 , 586 A.2d at 81 , defendants cannot trigger the need for a warrant by racing the police to the sanctity of the home, see United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1134 .

2017We found the exigent circumstances rationale unpersuasive because we disagreed with the theory that "every automobile, due to its mobility, serves to justify **194 governmental intrusion into the vehicle." Id. ; see State v. Camargo , 126 N.H. 766 , 770-71, 498 A.2d 292 (1985) (agreeing "that the exigency exception [to the warrant requirement] typically applies to searches of automobiles stopped while in transit, because of their mobility and the likelihood that the occupants will be alerted to the police suspicion and will remove or destroy the contents of the automobile," but holding that ex

2011While Part I, Article 19 does offer greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in some circumstances, see Goss, 150 N.H. at 49 ; State v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 449 (1995) (refusing to adopt an automobile exception to the warrant requirement), our law regarding information voluntarily exposed to third parties is in line with the protection afforded under the Fourth Amendment and diverges significantly from New Jersey law, see Valenzuela, 130 N.H. at 182-84 (relying upon the “well-settled” and “inescapable” United States Supreme Court precedent that individuals have no reasonable expectatio

2006See State v. Ricci, 144 N.H. 241,243 (1999).

2001State v. Thompson, 132 N.H. 730, 733-34 , 571 A.2d 266, 268-69 (1990); Ricci, 144 N.H. at 243 , 739 A.2d at 406 .

2017We found the exigent circumstances rationale unpersuasive because we disagreed with the theory that "every automobile, due to its mobility, serves to justify **194 governmental intrusion into the vehicle." Id. ; see State v. Camargo , 126 N.H. 766 , 770-71, 498 A.2d 292 (1985) (agreeing "that the exigency exception [to the warrant requirement] typically applies to searches of automobiles stopped while in transit, because of their mobility and the likelihood that the occupants will be alerted to the police suspicion and will remove or destroy the contents of the automobile," but holding that ex

2017We found the exigent circumstances rationale unpersuasive because we disagreed with the theory that "every automobile, due to its mobility, serves to justify **194 governmental intrusion into the vehicle." Id. ; see State v. Camargo , 126 N.H. 766 , 770-71, 498 A.2d 292 (1985) (agreeing "that the exigency exception [to the warrant requirement] typically applies to searches of automobiles stopped while in transit, because of their mobility and the likelihood that the occupants will be alerted to the police suspicion and will remove or destroy the contents of the automobile," but holding that ex

2017One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception, see State v. Nieves , 160 N.H. 245 , 247, 999 A.2d 389 (2010), which authorizes the police to seize an item, see Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128 , 133-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).

2017One exception to the warrant requirement is the plain view exception, see State v. Nieves , 160 N.H. 245 , 247, 999 A.2d 389 (2010), which authorizes the police to seize an item, see Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128 , 133-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990).

2017“A warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Licks, 154 N.H. 491, 492-93 (2006).

2013“A warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Licks, 154 N.H. 491, 492-93 (2006).

2010“Separate and apart from conducting criminal investigations,” police engage in community caretaking functions such as “helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and protecting citizens in need.” State v. Seavey, 147 N.H. 304, 311 (2001) (Duggan, J. dissenting) (quotation omitted).

2006State v. Seavey, 147 N.H. 304, 306 (2001).

1985Hence the defendant concludes that the officer was not justified in seizing them under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement of part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, as articulated in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 , 471 A.2d 347 (1983).

1985Hence the defendant concludes that the officer was not justified in seizing them under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement of part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, as articulated in State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226 , 471 A.2d 347 (1983).

2017In order for an item's warrantless seizure to be justified under the plain view exception: (1) the item must be in plain view; (2) the officer must not have violated the constitution "in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed"; and (3) the officer "must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself." Id. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 ; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (explaining that "plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence"), overruled on other grounds by Hor

2017In order for an item's warrantless seizure to be justified under the plain view exception: (1) the item must be in plain view; (2) the officer must not have violated the constitution "in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed"; and (3) the officer "must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself." Id. at 136-37 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 ; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (explaining that "plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence"), overruled on other grounds by Hor

2009See State v. Davis, 149 N.H. 698, 700 (2003); State v. Turmelle, 132 N.H. 148, 152 (1989); State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 625 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980).

2006See State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 625-26 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980).

2024The court found that “to the extent [the officer’s] efforts to obtain the defendant’s license from his wallet are 2 appropriately characterized as a search, such a search would fall within the ‘search-incident exception’ to the warrant requirement.” Relying mainly on State v. Farnsworth, 126 N.H. 656 (1985), and State v. Cimino, 126 N.H. 570 (1985), the court concluded that “[i]n these circumstances, the passing of time from the seizure of the wallet to its searching, does not undermine the constitutionality of the later search.” [¶6] The defendant subsequently stipulated to sufficient facts f

1995See, e.g., State v. Cimino, 126 N.H. 570, 573 , 493 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1985) (officer acted properly in securing vehicle pursuant to defendant’s request); State v. Gilson, 116 N.H. 230, 234 , 356 A.2d 689, 692 (1976) (officer acted properly in removing keys in order to secure vehicle).

2017We further believe that it "correctly balances the need to search against the invasion which the search entails, and, thus heeds our constitution's proscription against unreasonable searches." State v. Smith , 141 N.H. 271 , 276, 681 A.2d 1215 (1996) (quotation, brackets, and citation omitted) (adopting, under Part I, Article 19, the federal "protective sweep" exception to the warrant requirement).

2017We further believe that it "correctly balances the need to search against the invasion which the search entails, and, thus heeds our constitution's proscription against unreasonable searches." State v. Smith , 141 N.H. 271 , 276, 681 A.2d 1215 (1996) (quotation, brackets, and citation omitted) (adopting, under Part I, Article 19, the federal "protective sweep" exception to the warrant requirement).

2003Psomiades, 139 N.H. at 481 ; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).

1995In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the United States Supreme Court first recognized the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.

2020See State v. Schulz, 164 6 N.H. 217, 225 (2012) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is a distinct constitutional inquiry from the question of whether a warrant is required in the first place.”); see also, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 267 (2010) (reasoning that “[b]ecause the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his deck, a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement was needed for the officer to lawfully enter the defendant’s deck”).

2020See State v. Schulz, 164 6 N.H. 217, 225 (2012) (“[T]he reasonableness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is a distinct constitutional inquiry from the question of whether a warrant is required in the first place.”); see also, e.g., State v. Orde, 161 N.H. 260, 267 (2010) (reasoning that “[b]ecause the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his deck, a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement was needed for the officer to lawfully enter the defendant’s deck”).

2019See State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 191 (2017); see also Nieves, 160 N.H. at 247, 251 (explaining that the initial intrusion which afforded the view of the item must have been lawful, meaning the intrusion must have been justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement).

2019See State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 191 (2017); see also Nieves, 160 N.H. at 247, 251 (explaining that the initial intrusion which afforded the view of the item must have been lawful, meaning the intrusion must have been justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement).

2018State v. Newcomb, 161 N.H. 666, 670 (2011).

2017See id.

2018See State v. Stern , 150 N.H. 705 , 708, 846 A.2d 64 (2004) (describing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Gilson , 116 N.H. 230 , 233, 356 A.2d 689 (1976) (holding that "[a]n officer with sufficient experience to recognize the odor of burning marijuana has probable cause to suspect its presence when he detects the odor within the confines of an automobile"); cf. State v. Cora , 170 N.H. 186 , 196, 167 A.3d 633 (2017) (holding that the police do not need a warrant to enter a vehicle that has been stopped in transit pursuant to a lawful stop when

2018See State v. Stern , 150 N.H. 705 , 708, 846 A.2d 64 (2004) (describing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); see also State v. Gilson , 116 N.H. 230 , 233, 356 A.2d 689 (1976) (holding that "[a]n officer with sufficient experience to recognize the odor of burning marijuana has probable cause to suspect its presence when he detects the odor within the confines of an automobile"); cf. State v. Cora , 170 N.H. 186 , 196, 167 A.3d 633 (2017) (holding that the police do not need a warrant to enter a vehicle that has been stopped in transit pursuant to a lawful stop when

2014Accordingly, “a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and evidence derived from such a search is inadmissible unless the State proves that the search comes within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Turmelle, 132 N.H. 148, 152 (1989) (quotation omitted).

2014Turmelle, 132 N.H. at 153 .

1989State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 625 , 406 A.2d 125, 129 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 , reh’g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 578 , 409 A.2d 1134, 1137 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).

1984See, e.g., Payton v. New York, supra at 576 (Federal Constitution prohibits warrantless arrest of suspect at his home, absent consent or exigent circumstances); State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580 , 409 A.2d 1134, 1138 (1979) (“The warrant requirement [under the Federal and State Constitu tions] is particularly stringent for a search of a private dwelling, in which the occupant has a strong expectation of privacy and protection from government intrusion.”), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).

2019See State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 191 (2017); see also Nieves, 160 N.H. at 247, 251 (explaining that the initial intrusion which afforded the view of the item must have been lawful, meaning the intrusion must have been justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement).

2019See State v. Cora, 170 N.H. 186, 191 (2017); see also Nieves, 160 N.H. at 247, 251 (explaining that the initial intrusion which afforded the view of the item must have been lawful, meaning the intrusion must have been justified by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement).

2016Id.

2016“Exigent circumstances exist where the police face a compelling need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay caused by obtaining a search warrant would create a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety or likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.” State v. Rodriguez, 157 N.H. 100, 103-04 (2008) (quotations and citation omitted).

1996See, e.g., Sterndale, 139 N.H. at 449-50 , 656 A.2d at 412 (rejecting an automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Canelo, 139 N.H. at 387 , 653 A.2d at 1105 (rejecting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).

1996See, e.g., Sterndale, 139 N.H. at 449-50 , 656 A.2d at 412 (rejecting an automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Canelo, 139 N.H. at 387 , 653 A.2d at 1105 (rejecting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).