warrant requirement in Texas

2021The goal of police work is not the invasion but the protection of liberty.”) (emphasis added). 9 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50 (“[P]olice bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”); see also Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685 (“[T]he warrant requirement is not lightly set aside, and the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.”) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 243 (1973); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim.

2016Exceptions to the warrant requirement include “voluntary consent to search, search under exigent circumstances, and search incident to arrest.” McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim.

2025It is well-known that 7 exigent circumstances are an exception to the warrant requirement, and “hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect” is an exigent circumstance that allows “[p]olice officers [to] enter [a] premises without a warrant.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013).

2024“A warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013)).

2025“In general, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, a search of a person pursuant to a criminal investigation (1) requires a search warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 , 795–810 (Tex Crim App 2014). 4 It is undisputed that this was a warrantless search.

2020“In general, to comply with the Fourth Amendment,[7] a search of a person pursuant to a criminal investigation (1) requires a search warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim.

2021The goal of police work is not the invasion but the protection of liberty.”) (emphasis added). 9 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50 (“[P]olice bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”); see also Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685 (“[T]he warrant requirement is not lightly set aside, and the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.”) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 243 (1973); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim.

2018App. 2011). “[T]he warrant requirement is not lightly set aside, and the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim.

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2015“In general, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, a search of a person pursuant to a criminal investigation (1) requires a search warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Villarreal , — *5 S.W.3d at —, —, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (holding that warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls under recognized exception to warrant requirement).

2015“In general, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, a search of a person pursuant to a criminal investigation (1) requires a search warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Villarreal , — *5 S.W.3d at —, —, 2014 WL 6734178, at *8 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (holding that warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls under recognized exception to warrant requirement).

2015In so holding, the Weems court stated, “We conclude that McNeely’s prohibition on per se, categorical exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement did not solely apply to the exigency exception, but also applies to the facts presented in Aviles[,]” and that “the implied consent and mandatory blood draw statutes are not exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Id. at 664, 665 .

2015Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 665 (concluding that the remand of Aviles indicated that the implied consent statute was not in itself an exception to the warrant requirement); Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) (“[I]n the 15 absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances, taking Reeder’s blood pursuant to Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2014, pet. filed) (“[I]t would seem that the position advanced in Aviles that the Texas Transportation

2023In that case, we regarded the plain view doctrine not as an exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a recognition that a defendant lacks any expectation of privacy in an object in plain view of the public.11 As such it would provide an independent justification for the seizure in this case rather than an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.12 As we explained in Walter, “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that the “plain view” doctrine is not really an “exception” to the warrant requirement because the seizure of the property in plain view involves no invasion of pri

2023In that case, we regarded the plain view doctrine not as an exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a recognition that a defendant lacks any expectation of privacy in an object in plain view of the public.11 As such it would provide an independent justification for the seizure in this case rather than an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule.12 As we explained in Walter, “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that the “plain view” doctrine is not really an “exception” to the warrant requirement because the seizure of the property in plain view involves no invasion of pri

2020App. 2003) (emphasis added); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 10 Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63. 11 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 12 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ). 13 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 5 Accordingly, the exigency requirement is a necessary element of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and should not be confused with the exigent circumstances exception.

2019The Court in Gant also recognized other exceptions to the warrant requirement, including the situation in which “there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.” Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 820–21 (1982)).

2015See id.; see also Perez v. 8 State, No. 01-12-01001-CR, 2015 WL 1245469, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2015, pet. filed) (“the warrantless taking of appellant's blood sample pursuant to the implied consent/mandatory blood draw statutory scheme did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment without a showing that some established exception to the warrant requirement applied”); State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d 895, 912 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, no pet.) (holding that nothing in section 724.011 nor section 724.012 require police to take blood without a warrant); Gentry v. S

2015CODE ANN. § not meet the requirements for voluntary consent under the 724.012(b)(3)(B); Villarreal, ––– S.W.3d at ––––, 2014 Fourth Amendment”); State v. Anderson, 445 S.W.3d WL 6734178, at *7. 895, 908 (Tex.App.–Beaumont 2014, no pet.) (concluding that section 724.012(b) “does not constitute an exception In our original opinion, we applied the Court of Criminal to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement”); Aviles Appeals’ precedents and held that the implied consent v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex.App.–San Antonio statute implied appellant’s consent to the blood sample, 2014, pet. filed

2014The Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the protective-sweep exception to the warrant requirement in Reasor. 12 S.W.3d at 816-17 .

2004Voluntariness of Horn’s Consent To show that the search was made with the property owner’s consent and thus trigger the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant gave consent freely and voluntarily. 6 Reasor v. State , 12 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. Crim.

2015Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 665 (concluding that the remand of Aviles indicated that the implied consent statute was not in itself an exception to the warrant requirement); Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) (“[I]n the 15 absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances, taking Reeder’s blood pursuant to Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2014, pet. filed) (“[I]t would seem that the position advanced in Aviles that the Texas Transportation

2015See Villarreal, 2014 WL 1257150, at * 11 (explaining that the mandatory blood draw statute "does not address or purport to dispense with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for blood draws").

2024These searches are “unqualified” and “are always justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, upon no more justification than the arrest itself.” Id.

2022App. Sept. 23, 2020) (explaining that searches of the person of the arrestee, or “of property within the immediate control” of the arrestee, “are always justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, upon no more justification than the arrest itself”) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 235 -7- 04-18-00022-CR (1973)).

2015The deferential review "encourage[s] police officers to use the warrant process rather than making a warrantless search and later attempting to justify their actions by invoking some exception to the warrant requirement." Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55 , 59–60 (Tex. Crim.

2015The deferential review “encourage[s] police officers to use the warrant process rather than making a warrantless search and later attempting to justify their actions by invoking some exception to the warrant requirement.” Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55 , 59–60 (Tex. Crim.

2024Marijuana Odor and Probable Cause The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if it is “readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.” Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim.

2020The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if it is “readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.” Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim.

2024The statutory language makes clear that the scenario envisioned by the legislature is that the warrant requirement applies to a search of a person’s cell phone in the search-incident-to-arrest scenario contemplated in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), discussed below.

2017Cole ran a red light and struck a pickup truck, causing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review—Warrantless Vehicle Search Under the Fourth Amendment, 1 “a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a warrant exception.” Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim.

2025Under the Fourth Amendment, “a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a warrant exception.” Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim.

2025It is well-known that 7 exigent circumstances are an exception to the warrant requirement, and “hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect” is an exigent circumstance that allows “[p]olice officers [to] enter [a] premises without a warrant.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013).

2024“An officer may temporarily seize property without a warrant . . . if []he has ‘probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime’ and ‘the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present.’” Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 701 ); see also Burgard at 1031 (discussing how officer seized defendant’s cell phone after officer received tip from defendant’s friend that phone contained “sexual images of young girls (possibly aged 14 or younger)” and how search warrant was later obt

2020App. 1999), he contends that the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in the circumstances present here because he was not in distress when the police detained him, because he was on his property when the officers detained him, and because he and his stationary car did not present a danger to himself or others, see id. at 859 n.3 (listing factors to be considered when determining if detention is justified by community- caretaking exception).

2015The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement in Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim.

2016He further argues that the State did not satisfy its burden to show any exigent circumstances to bring the nonconsensual search within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. " See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672-73 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (burden is on State to prove exigent circumstances to excuse warrant requirement).

2015The trial court was within its discretion to deny appellant’s motion to suppress based upon the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. ..............................................................................................16 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 19 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 20 iii INDEX OF AUTHORI

2018See Forsyth v. State, 438 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding that implied consent under the Transportation Code is not the equivalent to voluntary consent as a recognized exception to the warrant requirement). 8 In summary, we conclude that the State did not meet its burden to establish the reasonableness of drawing Ruiz’s blood without a warrant pursuant to sections 724.011(a) and 724.014(a) of the transportation code.5 See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492 .

2016Id. at 224 (declining to hold that an officer is not required to obtain a warrant for the blood draw or show that the blood draw was conducted under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement).

2011App.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009). 21 Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. 7 to the State, which is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable.22 Whether a search is reasonable is a question of law that we review de novo.23 Reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances.24 It requires a balancing of the public interest and the individual‘s right to be free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions.25 A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the ―specifical

2010See Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901 (recognizing that, under Texas law, warrantless arrests are proper only when (1) probable cause for the arrest exists with respect to the individual in question and (2) the arrest falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the warrant requirement). a.

2018One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement “holds that the police may lawfully search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” Id. (citing Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim.

2018One exception to the warrant requirement is “that the police may lawfully search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 282 (Tex. Crim.

2021By definition, protective 12 sweeps within the meaning of Buie cannot be based on general policy.”) (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 , 272-73 (2000) (declining to adopt a firearm exception to stop-and-frisk Terry analysis); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1978) (rejecting an exception to the warrant requirement for searches of homicide scenes); and United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Schultz, 818 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D.

2017Established exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the exigency exception, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the automobile exception, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), the search-incident-to-arrest exception, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and the special-needs exception, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 , 107 S.Ct. 1492 , 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987).

2015The automobile exception to the warrant requirement, first set out in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925) and later repeated in numerous cases including California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985), recognized that, although the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected, its ready mobility and capacity to be "quickly moved" justifies a lesser degree of protection, noting also that there had been a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures and vehicles.

2015The automobile exception to the warrant requirement, first set out in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925) and later repeated in numerous cases including California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985), recognized that, although the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected, its ready mobility and capacity to be "quickly moved" justifies a lesser degree of protection, noting also that there had been a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures and vehicles.

2016McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561 , “In such a circumstance, there would be no plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.-, see Sutherland, 436 S.W.3d at 40-41 ; State v. Ruiz, 2015 WL 5626252, at *5 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2015).

2015Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 665 (concluding that the remand of Aviles indicated that the implied consent statute was not in itself an exception to the warrant requirement); Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d 924, 930 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) (“[I]n the 15 absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances, taking Reeder’s blood pursuant to Section 724.012(b)(3)(B) of the Texas Transportation Code violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 38 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2014, pet. filed) (“[I]t would seem that the position advanced in Aviles that the Texas Transportation

2024An inventory search of a vehicle subject to impounding does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment but is a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement” in that 6 “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable cause . . . .” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S. Ct. 738 , 93 L.

2024An inventory search of a vehicle subject to impounding does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment but is a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement” in that 6 “[t]he policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, nor is the related concept of probable cause . . . .” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 , 107 S. Ct. 738 , 93 L.

2020App. 2003) (emphasis added); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 10 Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63. 11 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 12 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ). 13 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 5 Accordingly, the exigency requirement is a necessary element of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and should not be confused with the exigent circumstances exception.

2007There was no danger ... to the officer. *400 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), held that one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches is that an officer may search the area within the immediate control of a person arrested.