warrant requirement in Utah

2005“Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable” and thus violate the Fourth Amendment “unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).

2004The State responds by arguing that although the trial court correctly relied on the inevitable discovery doctrine, this court could uphold the trial court’s ruling on the alternative ground that Trooper Davis’s warrantless search of Defendant’s backpack was a valid search incident to arrest. 4 A. Whether Trooper Davis’s Examination of Defendant’s Backpack Was a Valid Search Incident to Arrest ¶ 16 “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).

2021See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984) (explaining that in the face of a warrantless search, the district court must determine whether there was “evidence showing an exception to the warrant requirement” when ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of that search). ¶36 We conclude that the automobile exception applies here.

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2018Such a search "constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement," and is justified by concerns about "protecting the police and public from danger, avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property." See State v. Hygh , 711 P.2d 264 , 267 (Utah 1985) ; accord Opperman , 428 U.S. at 369 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 .

1994We held in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), that the inventory exception to the warrant requirement “does not apply when the inventory is merely ‘a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.’ ” Id. at 268 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2013For example, citing State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 464 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), he asserts that article I, seetion 14 "has been applied to require police to stay within the traditional justification for the exceptions to the warrant requirement or otherwise seek a warrant before they search." Hoffmann also cites a Utah case applying Larocco, see State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102, ¶¶ 23-24 , 182 P.3d 405 , and two Utah cases interpreting article I, section 14 in the context of police roadblocks, see Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 13-15 (Utah 1992); State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ¶ 1

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2011Although ""one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile,'" id. (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)), the " 'automobile excep *56 tion' to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy 'due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status,' " id. (quoting James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10 , 13 P.3d 576 ). 18 In order to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we apply a two-step test.

2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti

2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[tlhere are other contexts . where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("Slearches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (" Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized exception

1995Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are “unreasonable per se unless [they] fall[] within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App.1989).

1992A search and seizure conducted without a warrant, like the search of defendant’s vehicle, “is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.” State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App.1989); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

2006Accord Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

2006Accord Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

2017For that reason, “warrantless searches and seizures within an individual’s home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). ¶13 Nevertheless, the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” and “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).

2017For that reason, “warrantless searches and seizures within an individual’s home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). ¶13 Nevertheless, the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” and “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).

2000See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct.App.1995); State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah Ct.App.1988). "[I]t is a cardinal principle that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Pursifull, 751 P.2d at 826 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)) (additional citations omitted); see State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (sta

2000See State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah Ct.App.1995); State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah Ct.App.1988). "[I]t is a cardinal principle that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Pursifull, 751 P.2d at 826 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)) (additional citations omitted); see State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (sta

2018Such a search "constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement," and is justified by concerns about "protecting the police and public from danger, avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property." See State v. Hygh , 711 P.2d 264 , 267 (Utah 1985) ; accord Opperman , 428 U.S. at 369 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 .

2018Such a search "constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement," and is justified by concerns about "protecting the police and public from danger, avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting the owner's property." See State v. Hygh , 711 P.2d 264 , 267 (Utah 1985) ; accord Opperman , 428 U.S. at 369 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 .

2024Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (cleaned up). ¶51 Thus, Tran’s textual and original public meaning arguments do not persuade us that article I, section 14 forecloses reasonable exceptions, including an emergency aid exception, to the provision’s warrant requirement.

2017For that reason, “warrantless searches and seizures within an individual’s home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). ¶13 Nevertheless, the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” and “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).

2016The Automobile Exeeption Under Utah Case Law > ~ {13 Historically, Utah case law has mirrored federal case law with respect to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, Utah cases, like their federal counterparts, have recognized that "[wlarrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State, v, Brown, 858 P.2d 851 , 855 (Utah 1992) {citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 847 , 857, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L,EdA2d 576 (1967))..

2003While a search of a home is generally unreasonable absent a warrant based on probable cause, "[t]here are other contexts... where the public interest is such that neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Id. at 331 , 110 S.Ct. at 1097 ; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ("[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("`Warrantless searches are unreasonable per se unless they fall within a recognized excepti

2019See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99 , ¶ 43, 37 P.3d 1073 (noting that one exception to the warrant requirement "includes searches conducted pursuant to consent").

2019See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99 , ¶ 43, 37 P.3d 1073 (noting that one exception to the warrant requirement "includes searches conducted pursuant to consent").

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); cf. State v. Malloy, 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11–12, or a warrantless search of Smith’s car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; cf. State v. Malloy , 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11-12, or a warrantless search of Smith's car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295 , 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2011Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a war-rantless search is allowed "'if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.'" 5 Despain, *469 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 13 , 173 P.3d 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam)).

2011Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a war-rantless search is allowed "'if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.'" 5 Despain, *469 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 13 , 173 P.3d 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam)).

2003"The burden of establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995).

2003"The burden of establishing the existence of one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is on the prosecution." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); see State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 204 (Utah 1995).

1997Additionally, “[t]he State must demonstrate ‘that the circumstances of the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickling, 844 P.2d at 985 ).

1996The State must demonstrate “that the circumstances of the seizure constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 985 (Utah App.1992); see also State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) (“Since the officers had no warrant, it was the burden of the State to show that the search was lawful.”).

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2011Although ""one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile,'" id. (additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)), the " 'automobile excep *56 tion' to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy 'due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status,' " id. (quoting James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10 , 13 P.3d 576 ). 18 In order to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we apply a two-step test.

2016T9 In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Curroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed., 548 (1925), the seminal case addressing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2017For that reason, “warrantless searches and seizures within an individual’s home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). ¶13 Nevertheless, the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” and “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).

2017For that reason, “warrantless searches and seizures within an individual’s home are ‘presumptively unreasonable[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). ¶13 Nevertheless, the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” and “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)).