warrant requirement in Maine

2020Nevertheless, “the general importance of the government’s interest in this area does not justify departing from the warrant requirement . . . .” Id.

2020Nor does “the fact that people are accorded less privacy in automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation . . . diminish a motorist’s privacy interest in preventing an agent of the government from piercing his skin.” Id. at 159 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 14 [¶21] Section 2522 does not advance a “‘special need’ . . . divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement” that justifies a departure from the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of a warrant and individualized suspicion.

2018State v. Dunlap , 395 A.2d 821 , 824 (Me. 1978).

1985The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is available if two circumstances are met: (1) the collective information available to the police provides them with adequate probable cause for the search or seizure, see State v. Smith, 379 A.2d 722, 724 (Me.1977), and (2) exigent circumstances prevent the police from going before a magistrate to obtain a warrant, see State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821, 824 (Me.1978). 2 .

2010Detective Brent Beaulieu arrived at the Second Street apartment shortly after being called by Detective Nadeau to conduct a search of the computer's "hard drive." Detective Beaulieu conducted the search without incident and the defendant makes no argument concerning the constitutionality of the Beaulieu computer search. 4 probable cause and exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search, without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant; or (2) the search is pursuant to another recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 133 , ~ 11, 930 A.2d at 274 (qu

2008Nevertheless, a warrantless search is permitted when (1) “it is supported by probable cause” as well as “exigent circumstances ... requiring a prompt search, without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant,” or (2) “the search is pursuant to another recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Rabon, 2007 ME 113, ¶ 11 , 930 A.2d 268, 274 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 21] Based on competent evidence presented during two testimonial hearings, the court concluded that the police decision to seize Drewry’s bags prior to obtaining a warrant to do so was justified by exigent cir

2017See Cress, 576 A.2d at 1367 (holding that, to demonstrate voluntary consent, the State must show “more than a mere ‘acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority’” (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968))).

2017"A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is an exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Cress.\', 576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990), state v. Sargent, 2009 ME 125 .

2022"To demonstrate that the consent exception to a warrant requirement applies, however, the State must prove, 'by a preponderance of the evidence, that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture."' Id. (quoting State v Bailey, 2012 ME 55 , ~ 16, 41 A.3d 535 .).

2018See Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 2184 (2016) (stating that "[o]ne advantage of blood tests is their ability to detect not just alcohol but also other substances that can impair a driver's ability to operate a car safely," and indicating that police may rely on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if there is insufficient time to seek a warrant in such circumstances).

2009However, this discovery was not made until after the Fire Marshal had extended the search up the third floor stairs without a legitimate basis for doing so, and thus cannot support the State’s “mixed use” justification for the administrative inspection. [¶ 44] Administrative inspections of closely regulated businesses conducted pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority represent an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 , and the State necessarily has the burden of proof on the applicability of the exception, see State v. Mich

2009However, this discovery was not made until after the Fire Marshal had extended the search up the third floor stairs without a legitimate basis for doing so, and thus cannot support the State’s “mixed use” justification for the administrative inspection. [¶ 44] Administrative inspections of closely regulated businesses conducted pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority represent an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, see Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 , and the State necessarily has the burden of proof on the applicability of the exception, see State v. Mich

2001“As a matter of federal constitutional law, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant or unless the search falls into one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Tomah, 586 A.2d 1267, 1268-69 (Me.1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). 4 *1182 “[P]robable cause to search exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be fo

2001“As a matter of federal constitutional law, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant or unless the search falls into one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Tomah, 586 A.2d 1267, 1268-69 (Me.1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). 4 *1182 “[P]robable cause to search exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be fo

2024See id. at 16-17 ; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).

2022One such exception is where "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).

2018Labor Executives' Ass'n , 489 U.S. 602 , 619, 622, 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). [¶ 12] As is also clear, however, there are "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.

2018Labor Executives' Ass'n , 489 U.S. 602 , 619, 622, 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). [¶ 12] As is also clear, however, there are "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.

2017See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 18 , 1 A.3d 445 . [¶12] The court was not compelled, based on the evidence presented, to find that Boyd’s acquiescence to the blood draw demonstrated his voluntary consent and overcame the warrant requirement.

2017See State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 18 , 1 A.3d 445 . [¶12] The court was not compelled, based on the evidence presented, to find that Boyd’s acquiescence to the blood draw demonstrated his voluntary consent and overcame the warrant requirement.

1985In a similar situation, we said in State v. McLain, 367 A.2d 213, 216 (Me. 1976) that the entry into a person's home without a warrant was unreasonable in itself unless justified under one of a few exceptions to the requirement of a warrant issued by a disinterested magistrate on a showing of probable cause; an established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent.

1985In a similar situation, we said in State v. McLain, 367 A.2d 213, 216 (Me.1976) that the entry into a person’s home without a warrant was unreasonable in itself unless justified under one of a few exceptions to the requirement of a warrant issued by a disinterested magistrate on a showing of probable cause; an established exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent.

2021See State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931,933 (Me. 1980).

1981As stated previously, it was the State’s burden to establish at the suppression hearing, by a preponderance of the evidence, its claimed exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth-Fourteenth Amendments, here, that Philbrick had abandoned his knapsack in the constitutional sense, i. e. that he had relinquished “any reasonable expectation of privacy in it.” State v. Johnson, Me., 413 A.2d 931, 933 (1980); State v. Blais, Me., 416 A.2d 1253, 1256 (1980).

2016Const. art I,§ 5."A warrantless search is, as a matter of law, unreasonable unless: (1) it is supported by probable cause; and (2) exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search, without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant; or(3) the search is pursuant to another recognized 2 exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Leonard, 2002 ME 125 , <][12, 802 A.2d 991 .

2016Const. art I,§ 5."A warrantless search is, as a matter of law, unreasonable unless: (1) it is supported by probable cause; and (2) exigent circumstances exist requiring a prompt search, without the delay occasioned by the need for a warrant; or(3) the search is pursuant to another recognized 2 exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Leonard, 2002 ME 125 , <][12, 802 A.2d 991 .

2010We agree. [¶ 26] Consent is a firmly established exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 , 111 S.Ct. 1801 , 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), but the “requirement of a warrant is waived only to the extent granted by the defendant in his consent,” Koucoules, 343 A.2d at 866 ; see also State v. Sargent, 2009 ME 125, ¶ 10 , 984 A.2d 831, 834 (“Exceptions to the warrant requirement, including those based on consent, are construed narrowly .... ”).

2009Exceptions to the warrant requirement, including those based on consent, are construed narrowly, see, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 , 91 S.Ct. 381 , 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971), and “[t]he requirement of a warrant is waived only to the extent granted by the defendant in his consent,” Koucoules, 343 A.2d at 866 ; see also State v. Kremen, 2000 ME 117, ¶ 10 , 754 A.2d 964, 968 (“[A] search made pursuant to consent is limited to the bounds of that consent.”). [¶ 11] “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness.” Fl

2022"Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone ofthe Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Id.

2019Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); State v. Melvin, 2008 ME 118 , ~ 6, 955 A.2d 245 . ·The Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone, however, is "reasonableness;" and the warrant requirement is subject to exceptions.

2013Because the court did not find that what happened inside the bus was connected to what happened in the terminal, the court did not analyze the bus inspection to determine whether it fell within the Fourth Amendment’s exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries, or whether using the drug dog to sweep the bus interior rendered the inspection unlawful.2 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987); State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 6, ¶ 19 , 962 A.2d 973 .

2013Because the court did not find that what happened inside the bus was connected to what happened in the terminal, the court did not analyze the bus inspection to determine whether it fell within the Fourth Amendments exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries, or whether using the drug dog to sweep the bus interior rendered the inspection unlawful. 2 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 , 107 S.Ct. 2636 , 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987); State v. Johnson, 2009 ME 6, ¶ 19 , 962 A.2d 973 .

2020State v. Cormier [¶22] In a 2007 decision, State v. Cormier, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw taken pursuant to section 2522, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause at the time of the search and despite an acknowledgment that none of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. 2007 ME 112, ¶ 18 , 928 A.2d 753 . [¶23] As to the probable cause requirement, we opined that the statute allowed for a determination of previously existing probable cause after the search, rather than before, when “but for the exigencies at the scene of the collision,

2020State v. Cormier [¶22] In a 2007 decision, State v. Cormier, we upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw taken pursuant to section 2522, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause at the time of the search and despite an acknowledgment that none of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. 2007 ME 112, ¶ 18 , 928 A.2d 753 . [¶23] As to the probable cause requirement, we opined that the statute allowed for a determination of previously existing probable cause after the search, rather than before, when “but for the exigencies at the scene of the collision,

2018The State has the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement existed." State v. Arndt , 2016 ME 31 , ¶ 9, 133 A.3d 587 .

2018The State has the burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence that exigent circumstances excusing the warrant requirement existed." State v. Arndt , 2016 ME 31 , ¶ 9, 133 A.3d 587 .

2019IV ; State v. LeMeunier-Fitzgerald , 2018 ME 85 , ¶¶ 11-12, 21, 188 A.3d 183 .

2019IV ; State v. LeMeunier-Fitzgerald , 2018 ME 85 , ¶¶ 11-12, 21, 188 A.3d 183 .

2018Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Michael M., 2001 ME 92, ¶ 6 , 772 A.2d 1179 .

2018Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Michael M. , 2001 ME 92 , ¶ 6, 772 A.2d 1179 .

2018Courts may not “lightly dispense[] with” the “requirement that a search warrant be obtained.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969). [¶28] A search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest is one exception to the warrant requirement.

2018Courts may not "lightly dispense[ ] with" the "requirement that a search warrant be obtained." Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752 , 762, 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). [¶ 28] A search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest is one exception to the warrant requirement.

2018In order for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement to apply, the "incriminating character" of the evidence must be "immediately apparent," State v. McNaughton , 2017 ME 173 , ¶ 42, 168 A.3d 807 , and the officers must have a legitimate reason to be in the place from which they make their observation, Coolidge , 403 U.S. at 465 -66 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 . [¶ 16] Here, the suppression court found that the officers discovered the bags inadvertently and that the incriminating character of the contents of the bags-drugs and paraphernalia-was immediately apparent.

2018In order for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement to apply, the "incriminating character" of the evidence must be "immediately apparent," State v. McNaughton , 2017 ME 173 , ¶ 42, 168 A.3d 807 , and the officers must have a legitimate reason to be in the place from which they make their observation, Coolidge , 403 U.S. at 465 -66 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 . [¶ 16] Here, the suppression court found that the officers discovered the bags inadvertently and that the incriminating character of the contents of the bags-drugs and paraphernalia-was immediately apparent.