warrant requirement in Virginia

2023In Robinson, the Court recognized that “the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop.” 414 U.S. at 234-35 . - 12 - Deputy Tharp had probable cause to arrest Parady, he did not do so, so no exception to the warrant requirement applies.12 Before concluding, we briefly address the trial court’s reliance on Bunch v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 491, 494-96 (2008), and the statement t

2014See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973) (explaining that one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest based on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody and the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial).

2007Although recognizing that “there is an exception to the warrant requirement allowing police officers to enter a building in response to a dangerous situation or an emergency,” we reasoned that the protective sweep doctrine did not apply because “there was no evidence[] that there were dangerous persons in the [residence].” Id. at 649 , 347 S.E.2d at 181 .

2007Although recognizing that “there is an exception to the warrant requirement allowing police officers to enter a building in response to a dangerous situation or an emergency,” we reasoned that the protective sweep doctrine did not apply because “there was no evidence[] that there were dangerous persons in the [residence].” Id. at 649 , 347 S.E.2d at 181 .

2025“Since the 1920s, our law has recognized an exception to the warrant requirement for automobile searches.” Durham, ___ Va. at ___ (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).

2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder

2019Reittinger v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 232 , 235-36, 532 S.E.2d 25 , (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Simmons v. Commonwealth , 238 Va. 200 , 204, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U.S. 30 , 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) ); see also United States v. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48 , 51, 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption [to the warrant requirement] to show the need for it."); McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 456, 69 S.

2019Reittinger v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 232 , 235-36, 532 S.E.2d 25 , (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Simmons v. Commonwealth , 238 Va. 200 , 204, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U.S. 30 , 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) ); see also United States v. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48 , 51, 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption [to the warrant requirement] to show the need for it."); McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 456, 69 S.

2024As the Supreme Court explained in King, a “well-recognized exception [to the warrant requirement] applies when ‘“the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” 563 U.S. at 460 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).

2019Upon reversing this Court's earlier opinion holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case, the United States Supreme Court specifically stated that "[w]e leave for resolution on remand whether Officer Rhodes' warrantless intrusion on the curtilage of Collins' house may have been reasonable on a different basis, such as the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement ." Collins v. Virginia , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. at 1670, 1675 (2018) (emphasis added). "[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless the

2014The trial court also found that there were no facts to support reasonable articulable suspicion that Vick was planning to evade the Metro fare.4 Regarding whether the encounter between the police officers and Vick was consensual – and whether Vick voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack, the trial court ruled as follows: The testimony was that the defendant was then removed from the train, not physically, but was removed from the train; and the train 3 The Commonwealth has never argued (at trial or on appeal) that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement would j

2014The trial court also found that there were no facts to support reasonable articulable suspicion that Vick was planning to evade the Metro fare.4 Regarding whether the encounter between the police officers and Vick was consensual – and whether Vick voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack, the trial court ruled as follows: The testimony was that the defendant was then removed from the train, not physically, but was removed from the train; and the train 3 The Commonwealth has never argued (at trial or on appeal) that the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement would j

2026Indeed, “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, and the Commonwealth has the heavy burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 704, 712 (2003) (quoting Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534 (2001)).

2016The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” “Therefore, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, Thompson v. Louisiana, -3- 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984), and the Commonwealth has the heavy burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534 , 551 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001); Cauls, 55 Va. App. at 98 , 6

2024“Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999)).

2024“A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13 (citing Katz -5- v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

2024“Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009).

2024“Under the Fourth Amendment, officers cannot search a place without a warrant unless one of several delineated exceptions to this warrant requirement apply.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 175, 179 (2009) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999)).

2019Reittinger v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 232 , 235-36, 532 S.E.2d 25 , (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Simmons v. Commonwealth , 238 Va. 200 , 204, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U.S. 30 , 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) ); see also United States v. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48 , 51, 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption [to the warrant requirement] to show the need for it."); McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 456, 69 S.

2019Reittinger v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 232 , 235-36, 532 S.E.2d 25 , (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Simmons v. Commonwealth , 238 Va. 200 , 204, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443 , 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and Vale v. Louisiana , 399 U.S. 30 , 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969 , 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) ); see also United States v. Jeffers , 342 U.S. 48 , 51, 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) ("[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption [to the warrant requirement] to show the need for it."); McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451 , 456, 69 S.

2024The exception to the warrant requirement exists because “the inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).

2022Instead, the exception hinges on the principle that the inherent capacity of a vehicle to be quickly moved “creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)). 7 The appellant also claims that the police should have obtained an anticipatory warrant before going to the Dairy Queen and that they manufactured their own exigent circumstances by failing to do so.

2024“A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13 (citing Katz -5- v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

2023“A warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).

2005“Prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court . . . have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully delineated.’” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 (citations omitted).8 8 Because individuals possess the highest expectation of privacy in their homes, the Supreme Court “ordinarily afford[s] the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection” to the sanctity of private dwellings.

1990It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized as "a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." *667 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 , 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (citations and footnote omitted). "[E]xceptions to the warrant requirement are `few in number and carefully delineated,' and... the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches...." Id. at 749-50 , 104 S.Ct. at 2097 (citation omitted

2025Under this exception to the warrant requirement, police officers “may search an automobile without having obtained a warrant so long as they have probable cause to do so.” Id. at 592 .

2024The Court recognized that the facts of that case arose “at the intersection of two components of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to the curtilage of a home.” Id. at 591 .

2024In articulating the contours of the exception, many of these cases relied (at least in part) on the “ready mobility” of the vehicle—or, in other words, the “exigency” of the situation4 that would preclude obtaining a warrant—as a justification for the search. 4 The Court in Carroll stated that the automobile exception rested, at least in part, on the fact that “it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” 267 U.S. at 153 . -7- The Supreme Court of Virginia stated, in 1984, “[u]nder

2004“Under the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an automobile may be searched without a warrant where there are both probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of crime and exigent circumstances.” McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 227 , 321 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1984) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)).5 We addressed an analogous issue in Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 1 , 421 S.E.2d 877 (1992).

2023See Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410-11 (1985).8 These same rationales justify the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.

2015One such exception to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures exists when the officers “had probable cause at the time of their warrantless entry to believe that cognizable exigent circumstances were present.” Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134, 141, 278 S.E.2d 841, 846 (1981); see also Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410 , 337 S.E.2d 749, 752-53 (1985) (“Warrantless entries into dwellings, followed by searches, seizures, and arrests therein ... are presumed to be unreasonable, in Fourth Amendment terms, casting upon the police a heavy burden of proving justification by exigent

1998One of the established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is for a “search incident to a lawful arrest.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 226 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 472 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (also holding that searches incident to arrest “meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness”); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

1998One of the established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is for a “search incident to a lawful arrest.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 226 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 472 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (also holding that searches incident to arrest “meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness”); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-2040 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).

2016The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” “Therefore, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, Thompson v. Louisiana, -3- 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984), and the Commonwealth has the heavy burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Megel v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534 , 551 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001); Cauls, 55 Va. App. at 98 , 6

2007Moreover, the trial court was in error by concluding that police “have a right to go into a crime scene.” As this Court explained in Hunter v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 81, 84 , 378 S.E.2d 634, 635 (1989), “The landmark case of Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), established that no ‘crime scene exception’ to the warrant requirement exists.” See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-21 , 105 S.Ct. 409, 410-11 , 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (reaffirming the holding in Mincey that a crime scene exception for a warrantless search “is inconsistent with the Fourth

1997Ross dissenters rejected the holding as inconsistent with the Chadwick-Sanders line, and opined that they could not see why a container which police had probable cause to search, and which was found in a car, was “more private, [or] less difficult for police to seize and store, or in any other relevant respect [was] more properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable cause search of an entire' automobile.” 456 U.S. at 839-40 , 102 S.Ct. at 2180-81 .

1997Ross dissenters rejected the holding as inconsistent with the Chadwick-Sanders line, and opined that they could not see why a container which police had probable cause to search, and which was found in a car, was “more private, [or] less difficult for police to seize and store, or in any other relevant respect [was] more properly subject to the warrant requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable cause search of an entire' automobile.” 456 U.S. at 839-40 , 102 S.Ct. at 2180-81 .

2013In Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035 , 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980), the Supreme Court of Virginia explained: This exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is based upon the need to protect the owner’s property, to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property, to protect the police from physical danger, and to protect the public from dangerous instrumentalities or substances that may be pilfered from an impounded vehicle.

2013In Reese v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035 , 265 S.E.2d 746 (1980), the Supreme Court of Virginia explained: This exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is based upon the need to protect the owner’s property, to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property, to protect the police from physical danger, and to protect the public from dangerous instrumentalities or substances that may be pilfered from an impounded vehicle.

2025A “well-recognized exception [to the warrant requirement] applies when ‘“the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 61 , 70 (2024) (alternations in original) (quoting King, 563 U.S. at 460 ).

2024This “presumption may be overcome” when “the warrant requirement is subject to certain reasonable exceptions.” Id.

2018See also, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009) (citing with approval Michigan v. Long and stating, “Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand.

2015Relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the defendant asserted that the warrantless search of his vehicle was conducted without probable cause, argued that the search did not fall within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant rule, and requested therefore that the trial court suppress the evidence discovered during the search.

2022Instead, the exception hinges on the principle that the inherent capacity of a vehicle to be quickly moved “creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)). 7 The appellant also claims that the police should have obtained an anticipatory warrant before going to the Dairy Queen and that they manufactured their own exigent circumstances by failing to do so.

2012Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, “[only] the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 .

2024“One concession to reasonableness” is the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, which “recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 .

2020Consequently, “[a] lower court’s judgment, if legally correct, will be affirmed even if we were to disagree with the lower court’s legal reasoning.” Id. -5- “One concession to reasonableness” is the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, which “recognizes the ‘right of the police to enter and investigate’ when someone’s health or physical safety is genuinely threatened.” Kyer, 45 Va. App. at 480 (citation omitted).

2013Relying on South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the trial court found that the sole justification identified by the Supreme Court in allowing warrantless searches pursuant to the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement is “to protect the community’s safety.” The trial court found that there was no safety concern prompting the police to remove the truck in this case, and, accordingly, granted the motion to suppress.

2004“The general rule is ... that warrantless searches without consent are per se unreasonable and thus invalid under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few well-defined exceptions.” Girardi v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 459, 463 , 270 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1980) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski 413 U.S. 433, 439 , 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)). “[O]ne of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the inventory search, as approved in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).” Id. at 463 , 270 S.E.2d at 746 .