warrant requirement in Arizona

2024“One exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted with consent.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 11 ; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

2019A warrantless search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, however, if "one of a few well-established exceptions [to the warrant requirement] applies." State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299 , 302 ¶ 10, 371 P.3d 627 , 630 (2016) (citing Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ).

1999P. 16.2(b) (“The prosecutor shall have the burden of proving ... the lawfulness in all respects of the acquisition of all evidence.... ”); Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 266 , 921 P.2d at 669 (“Under rule 16.2(b), the burden of persuasion originates and remains with the state.”); see also Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 237 , 686 P.2d at 760 (State must prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies); Search Warrants C-419847 & C-419848 v. State, 136 Ariz. 175, 176 , 665 P.2d 57, 58 (1983) (same). ¶ 11 State v. Hyde supports the conclusion that this sensible method of proceeding is also the required meth

1999P. 16.2(b) (“The prosecutor shall have the burden of proving ... the lawfulness in all respects of the acquisition of all evidence.... ”); Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 266 , 921 P.2d at 669 (“Under rule 16.2(b), the burden of persuasion originates and remains with the state.”); see also Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 237 , 686 P.2d at 760 (State must prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies); Search Warrants C-419847 & C-419848 v. State, 136 Ariz. 175, 176 , 665 P.2d 57, 58 (1983) (same). ¶ 11 State v. Hyde supports the conclusion that this sensible method of proceeding is also the required meth

2024We agree that Sandoval's consent was voluntary. ¶20 Consent to search is a "long recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 11 (2010).

2016See State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 11 , 223 P.3d 658, 661 (2010) (“One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.” (citations omitted)).12 ¶18 The primary case relied upon by Appellant is distinguishable.

2018Supra ¶ 23; see, e.g., Ault, 150 Ariz. at 466 (deciding “on independent state grounds” not to apply the federal inevitable discovery doctrine, because “exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrow and we choose not to expand them”); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 (holding that police entries into a home to secure them pending warrant “are ‘per se unlawful’ under our state constitution,” a holding “based upon . . . its specific wording, and our own cases, independent of federal authority”).

2017Cf. State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 464 , 724 P.2d 545, 550 (1986) (noting that the state bears the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement). ¶ 16 In Estrada , the court stated: [W]hen a person is receiving medical treatment against his or her will, the exception of § 28-1388(E) allowing blood draws without a warrant does not apply.

2018Accordingly, the medical-draw exception is, by virtue of the supreme court's recognition of an exigency requirement, simply an application of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 11 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court made clear in McNeely that the natural evanescence of alcohol in the bloodstream does not establish a per se exigency. 569 U.S. at 148 -54 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (clarifying rule and describing consistency with Schmerber ); see also State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 512, ¶¶ 25-28, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1257 (2017) (discussing McNeely and Schmerber ).

2018Accordingly, the medical-draw exception is, by virtue of the supreme court's recognition of an exigency requirement, simply an application of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. ¶ 11 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court made clear in McNeely that the natural evanescence of alcohol in the bloodstream does not establish a per se exigency. 569 U.S. at 148 -54 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (clarifying rule and describing consistency with Schmerber ); see also State v. Havatone , 241 Ariz. 506 , 512, ¶¶ 25-28, 389 P.3d 1251 , 1257 (2017) (discussing McNeely and Schmerber ).

2019A warrantless search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, however, if "one of a few well-established exceptions [to the warrant requirement] applies." State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299 , 302 ¶ 10, 371 P.3d 627 , 630 (2016) (citing Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ).

2019A warrantless search is deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, however, if "one of a few well-established exceptions [to the warrant requirement] applies." State v. Valenzuela ( Valenzuela II ), 239 Ariz. 299 , 302 ¶ 10, 371 P.3d 627 , 630 (2016) (citing Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332 , 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 , 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) ).

2010Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 , 917 P.2d 200, 209 (1996); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 , 689 P.2d at 524 . ¶ 11 One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.

2010Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 , 917 P.2d 200, 209 (1996); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 , 689 P.2d at 524 . ¶ 11 One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.

2024“One exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted with consent.” Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, ¶ 11 ; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

2015Whether consent is given is a question determined by the totality of the circumstances, State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 612 , 810 P.2d 607, 610 (App.1991) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and State v. King, 140 Ariz. 602, 604 , 684 P.2d 174, 176 (App.1984)), and an exception to the warrant requirement must be proven “ ‘by clear and positive evidence in unequivocal words or conduct expressing consent,’ ” State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133 , 151, ¶ 53, 42 P.3d 564 , 582 (2002) (quoting State v. Kananen, 97 Ariz. 233, 235 , 399 P.2d 426,

1999The State acknowledges that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established, ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions.” Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 237 , 686 P.2d at 760 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)); see also, e.g., State v. Vasquez, 167 Ariz. 352, 354 , 807 P.2d 520, 522 (1991); State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 431, 432 , 784 P.2d 257, 258 (1989); State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 389 , 724 P.2d 1, 8 (1986).

1999The State acknowledges that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “subject only to a few specifically established, ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions.” Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 237 , 686 P.2d at 760 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)); see also, e.g., State v. Vasquez, 167 Ariz. 352, 354 , 807 P.2d 520, 522 (1991); State v. Greene, 162 Ariz. 431, 432 , 784 P.2d 257, 258 (1989); State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 389 , 724 P.2d 1, 8 (1986).

2019These assertions are unpersuasive. ¶35 Butler did address the sufficiency of consent after the admonition-indeed, we expressly rejected the State's arguments that "the 'consent' in § 28-1321(A) either constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement or satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that consent be voluntary." 232 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 17, 302 P.3d at 613 .

2019These assertions are unpersuasive. ¶35 Butler did address the sufficiency of consent after the admonition-indeed, we expressly rejected the State's arguments that "the 'consent' in § 28-1321(A) either constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement or satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement that consent be voluntary." 232 Ariz. at 88 ¶ 17, 302 P.3d at 613 .

2015Another exception to the warrant requirement is a "search incident to a lawful arrest." See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).

2007Such a distinction would be wholly unnecessary under the State’s interpretation of Belton. ¶ 16 Relying on language in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973), the State next maintains that the Chimel justifications are presumed to exist in all arrest situations simply by “the fact of the lawful arrest,” id. at 235, 89 S.Ct. 2034 and so it need not show that either Chimel rationale existed at the time of the search. ¶ 17 But Robinson does not hold that every search following an arrest is excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement; if it did, the Court’s opin

2018“A warrantless search is per se unreasonable . . . unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244, 247, ¶ 9 (2016). ¶33 One such exception is the protective sweep, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).

2018IV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8, and "any evidence collected in violation" of these provisions "is generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial." State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 10 (2016); see State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244, 247, ¶ 9 (2016) ("A warrantless search is per se unreasonable . . . unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies."). ¶24 We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion.

2019State v. Reyna, 205 Ariz. 374, 378, ¶ 15 (App. 2003). “[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 243 n.13 (1983).

2018Although this exception recognizes the "impracticability of securing a warrant to search a vehicle that could be quickly moved," it is "also justified by a lessened expectation of privacy with respect to vehicles." State v. Reyna, 205 Ariz. 374, 375, ¶ 5 (App. 2003); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) ("Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.") (quotation omitted).

2017See Mazen v. Seidel, 189 Ariz. 195, 197 , 940 P.2d 923, 925 (1997) (“Exigent circumstances are one exception to the warrant requirement and include protective sweeps in response to a probable burglary in progress, a fire or medical emergency, and the likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.”); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (stating “it would defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out the blaze”). ¶18 Appellant maintains that Captain Williams’ warrantless entry into his home was unlawful because Captai

2017See Mazen v. Seidel, 189 Ariz. 195, 197 , 940 P.2d 923, 925 (1997) (“Exigent circumstances are one exception to the warrant requirement and include protective sweeps in response to a probable burglary in progress, a fire or medical emergency, and the likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.”); see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (stating “it would defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out the blaze”). ¶18 Appellant maintains that Captain Williams’ warrantless entry into his home was unlawful because Captai

2015It was the state’s burden to show Ontiveros-Loya consented to the search of the motel room, State v. Lucero, 143 Ariz. 108, 110 , 692 P.2d 287, 289 (1984), and that the search was conducted within the scope of consent, State v. Ahumada, 225 Ariz. 544, ¶ 14 , 241 P.3d 908, 912 (App.2010).

2015State v. Ahumada, 225 Ariz. 544, 548-49, ¶ 15 (App. 2010).

1973In the instant case, the “plain view” doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), provides the relevant exception to the warrant requirement.

1973In the instant case, the “plain view” doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), provides the relevant exception to the warrant requirement.

2010Plain Feel ¶ 15 Under the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement, which has been *549 likened to the plain-view exception, an officer may reach into a suspect’s pocket and seize an item of contraband if the officer “lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). 2 In other words, “[i]n order to seize an item discovered by feel in a pat-down search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the item is contrab

2010Plain Feel ¶ 15 Under the plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement, which has been *549 likened to the plain-view exception, an officer may reach into a suspect’s pocket and seize an item of contraband if the officer “lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). 2 In other words, “[i]n order to seize an item discovered by feel in a pat-down search, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the item is contrab

2017Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 463 , 724 P.2d 545, 549 (1986).

2016Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).

2025The inventory search is a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983).

2016The inventory search is a “well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2606 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).

2018Supra ¶ 23; see, e.g., Ault, 150 Ariz. at 466 (deciding “on independent state grounds” not to apply the federal inevitable discovery doctrine, because “exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrow and we choose not to expand them”); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 (holding that police entries into a home to secure them pending warrant “are ‘per se unlawful’ under our state constitution,” a holding “based upon . . . its specific wording, and our own cases, independent of federal authority”).

2010Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 , 917 P.2d 200, 209 (1996); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 , 689 P.2d at 524 . ¶ 11 One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.

2018However, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398 , 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).

2018However, "because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398 , 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006).

2017In State v, Codo, 147 Ariz. 277, 286 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985), our supreme court concluded that exigent circumstances existed, for purposes of the medical blood draw exception to the warrant requirement, given that ”[t]he highly evanescent nature of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream guaranteed that the alcohol would dissipate over a relatively short period of time." However, the court recently ”disavow[ed]" any suggestion in Codo that there was a "per se exigency" based on "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” Nissley, 241 Ariz. 327, 1111 , 387 P,3d at 1259; see al

2017In State v, Codo, 147 Ariz. 277, 286 , 709 P.2d 1336, 1345 (1985), our supreme court concluded that exigent circumstances existed, for purposes of the medical blood draw exception to the warrant requirement, given that ”[t]he highly evanescent nature of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream guaranteed that the alcohol would dissipate over a relatively short period of time." However, the court recently ”disavow[ed]" any suggestion in Codo that there was a "per se exigency" based on "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” Nissley, 241 Ariz. 327, 1111 , 387 P,3d at 1259; see al

2024This includes situations in which “a third party with ‘common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected’ voluntarily consents to the search.” State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 (1996) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). “[W]hen determining whether common authority exists, the focus is on apparent authority, rather than actual authority.” Id. at 481; see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).

1991United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 , 94 S.Ct. 988, 993 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 250 (1974); see also State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482 , 675 P.2d 1301 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 , 104 S.Ct. 3519 , 82 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984); State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296 , 645 P.2d 811 (1982).

2024We review de novo the superior court’s conclusions regarding whether a search “complied with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 326, ¶ 6 (App. 2000). ¶38 “Probable cause exists if the facts available to the officer” would lead a reasonable person to believe “that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Thompson, 252 Ariz. at 291, ¶ 31 .

2021Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 382 (2014). ¶8 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we “defer to the trial court’s factual findings absent an abuse of discretion,” but review de novo the trial court’s “ultimate legal determination that the search complied with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 326, ¶ 6 (App. 2000).

2010Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 , 917 P.2d 200, 209 (1996); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 , 689 P.2d at 524 . ¶ 11 One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.

2010Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 480 , 917 P.2d 200, 209 (1996); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265 , 689 P.2d at 524 . ¶ 11 One long recognized exception to the warrant requirement is consent.

2007Gant appealed and the court of appeals again reversed, finding that the search of Gant’s car was not incident to his arrest because it was not contemporaneous with his arrest and did not satisfy the rationales set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), for dispensing with the warrant requirement.

2007Gant appealed and the court of appeals again reversed, finding that the search of Gant’s car was not incident to his arrest because it was not contemporaneous with his arrest and did not satisfy the rationales set forth in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), for dispensing with the warrant requirement.