scrutiny standard in Colorado

2016See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907 , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) ("[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constituti

2016See Mosby v. Devine , 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test — ‘the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.’" (quoting Cole , 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989) ("[C]ourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional rig

2016See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907 , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) ("[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constituti

2016See Mosby v. Devine , 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test — ‘the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.’" (quoting Cole , 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989) ("[C]ourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional rig

2016See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907 , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) ("[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constituti

2016See Mosby v. Devine , 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test — ‘the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.’" (quoting Cole , 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989) ("[C]ourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional rig

2016See Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I.2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has ' been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test - 'the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.'" (quoting Cole, 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907 , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1989) ("[Clourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constituti

2016See Mosby v. Devine , 851 A.2d 1031, 1044-45 (R.I. 2004) ("Even in jurisdictions that have declared the right to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental constitutional right, a strict scrutiny analysis has been rejected in favor of a reasonableness test — ‘the proper question is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power.’" (quoting Cole , 665 N.W.2d at 337 )); see also State v. Comeau , 448 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Neb. 1989) ("[C]ourts have uniformly upheld the police power of the state through its legislature to impose reasonable regulatory control over the state constitutional rig

2016Under the strict scrutiny standard, "[a] legislative enactment which infringes on a fundamental right . . . is constitutionally permissible only if it is ‘ necessary to promote a compelling state interest’ and does so in the least restrictive manner possible." Id. at 1341 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)). ¶17 We are not persuaded. ¶18 In the first instance, we do not read the part of Robertson quoted at length above as rejecting the idea that the right provided by article II, section 13 is fundamental; rather, we read that part as saying that, whether the right is fundame

2016Under the strict scrutiny standard, "[a] legislative enactment which infringes on a fundamental right . . . is constitutionally permissible only if it is ‘ necessary to promote a compelling state interest’ and does so in the least restrictive manner possible." Id. at 1341 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)). ¶17 We are not persuaded. ¶18 In the first instance, we do not read the part of Robertson quoted at length above as rejecting the idea that the right provided by article II, section 13 is fundamental; rather, we read that part as saying that, whether the right is fundame

2016See, e.g. , Heller v. District of Columbia , 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C.

2016See, e.g. , Heller v. District of Columbia , 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C.

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

2004See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 , 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002)("the application of the strict scrutiny test is required to any infringement [the parent-child relationship] may suffer"); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649 , 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002)(examining grandparent visitation statute and noting that strict scrutiny requires compelling state interest to justify state action and careful examination to ascertain whether the action was "narrowly tailored to further [that] interest"); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 , 827 A.2d 203, 214 (2003)("[W]hen the State seeks, by statute, to *553 interfere w

1999See People in Interest of E.I.C., 958 P.2d 511 (Colo.App.1998).

1999See People in Interest of E.I.C., 958 P.2d 511 (Colo.App.1998).

1983See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 , 98 S.Ct. 673 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1977) (although state prohibition against remarriage without court approval where resident already had legal obligation to support other minor children "directly and substantially" interfered with the fundamental right to remarry in violation of equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court expressly noted that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed"); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 , 98 S.Ct. 95 , 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977) (

1983See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 , 98 S.Ct. 673 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1977) (although state prohibition against remarriage without court approval where resident already had legal obligation to support other minor children "directly and substantially" interfered with the fundamental right to remarry in violation of equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court expressly noted that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed"); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 , 98 S.Ct. 95 , 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977) (

2016Under the strict scrutiny standard, "[a] legislative enactment which infringes on a fundamental right . . . is constitutionally permissible only if it is ‘ necessary to promote a compelling state interest’ and does so in the least restrictive manner possible." Id. at 1341 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)). ¶17 We are not persuaded. ¶18 In the first instance, we do not read the part of Robertson quoted at length above as rejecting the idea that the right provided by article II, section 13 is fundamental; rather, we read that part as saying that, whether the right is fundame

2016Under the strict scrutiny standard, "[a] legislative enactment which infringes on a fundamental right . . . is constitutionally permissible only if it is ‘ necessary to promote a compelling state interest’ and does so in the least restrictive manner possible." Id. at 1341 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972)). ¶17 We are not persuaded. ¶18 In the first instance, we do not read the part of Robertson quoted at length above as rejecting the idea that the right provided by article II, section 13 is fundamental; rather, we read that part as saying that, whether the right is fundame

1994See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.) (recognizing that laws which infringe on fundamental rights are subject to strict judicial scrutiny), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 419 , 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993).

1994In Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 419 , 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993), we addressed whether the trial court correctly determined, in granting a preliminary injunction, that Amendment 2 "may burden fundamental rights of an identifiable group." Because the trial court identified a fundamental right, it applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional.

1993Because the defendants and their amici have not proffered any compelling state interest to justify the enactment of Amendment 2 at this stage of the proceedings as required under the strict scrutiny standard of review, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 , 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), we conclude that plaintiffs have met their burden under Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1982).

1993Because the defendants and their amici have not proffered any compelling state interest to justify the enactment of Amendment 2 at this stage of the proceedings as required under the strict scrutiny standard of review, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 , 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2395 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), we conclude that plaintiffs have met their burden under Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1982).

2022Co. v. City of Aurora , 896 P.2d 306, 308 (Colo. 1995) (holding content-neutral city ordinance proscribing direct solicitation of vehicle occupants traveling on city streets, in this case solicitation by newspaper hawkers, was narrowly tailored to advance significant governmental interest in traffic movement and safety). [4] Moreno suggests that a scrutiny analysis could be employed instead.

2021To resolve both claims, we briefly review the circumstances in McSoud that warranted a strict scrutiny analysis and conclude that analysis is inapplicable here. ¶ 24 The court in McSoud restricted the child’s mother from taking the child to a church of her religious choosing during her parenting time unless she also supported the child’s participation in father’s church. 131 P.3d at 1214, 1219-20 .

2021To resolve both claims, we briefly review the circumstances in McSoud that warranted a strict scrutiny analysis and conclude that analysis is inapplicable here. ¶ 24 The court in McSoud restricted the child’s mother from taking the child to a church of her religious choosing during her parenting time unless she also supported the child’s participation in father’s church. 131 P.3d at 1214, 1219-20 .