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21 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fowlergreen2 sentences2022App. 1, 21 , 676 S.E.2d 523, 540 (2009) (“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (quotations and citation omitted). 2022App. 1, 21 , 676 S.E.2d 523, 540 (2009) (“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (quotations and citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Washington v. Glucksberggreen2 sentences2022App. 1, 21 , 676 S.E.2d 523, 540 (2009) (“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (quotations and citation omitted). 2022App. 1, 21 , 676 S.E.2d 523, 540 (2009) (“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis . . . .”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 , 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997) (explaining the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) (quotations and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Affordable Care, Inc. v. North Carolina State Board of Dental Examinersgreen2 sentences2010App. 527, 536-37 , 571 S.E.2d 52, 59-60 (2002) (reiterating that “economic rules and regulations do not affect a fundamental right for purposes of due process” and thus only require a rational relation standard instead of a strict scrutiny analysis); see also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551 , 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973) (applying a reasonable relation standard in determining whether the previous CON law violated the plaintiffs substantive due process rights where the plaintiff was denied a CON to build a hospital). 2009“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis wherein the party seeking to apply the law must demonstrate that it serves a compelling state interest.” Id. at 535-36 , 571 S.E.2d at 59 . | 1 | 4 |
Shaw v. Huntgreen2 sentences2015In its decision the trial court states that, if plaintiffs meet the threshold burden of establishing that “race was the overriding consideration behind a redistricting plan,” then the state . . . has the burden of “producing evidence that the plan’s use of race is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, and the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court either that the proffered justification is not compelling or that the plan is not narrowly tailored to further it.” Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 436 (E.D.N.C. 1994). 2015In its decision the trial court states that, if plaintiffs meet the threshold burden of establishing that “race was the overriding consideration behind a redistricting plan,” then the state . . . has the burden of “producing evidence that the plan’s use of race is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, and the plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court either that the proffered justification is not compelling or that the plan is not narrowly tailored to further it.” Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 436 (E.D.N.C. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp.green2 sentences2011See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“If the statute at issue affects the exercise of a fundamental right... we apply strict scrutiny.” (emphasis added)). 2011See, e.g., Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“If the statute at issue affects the exercise of a fundamental right... we apply strict scrutiny.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences2010App. 527, 536-37 , 571 S.E.2d 52, 59-60 (2002) (reiterating that “economic rules and regulations do not affect a fundamental right for purposes of due process” and thus only require a rational relation standard instead of a strict scrutiny analysis); see also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551 , 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973) (applying a reasonable relation standard in determining whether the previous CON law violated the plaintiffs substantive due process rights where the plaintiff was denied a CON to build a hospital). 2010App. 527, 536-37 , 571 S.E.2d 52, 59-60 (2002) (reiterating that “economic rules and regulations do not affect a fundamental right for purposes of due process” and thus only require a rational relation standard instead of a strict scrutiny analysis); see also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551 , 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973) (applying a reasonable relation standard in determining whether the previous CON law violated the plaintiffs substantive due process rights where the plaintiff was denied a CON to build a hospital). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Hellergreen2 sentences2009See Heller at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 , 171 L.E.2d at 678 . 2009See Heller at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 , 171 L.E.2d at 678 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blankenship v. Bartlett
green
2 sentences2023We explained that the above showing implicated the fundamental “right to vote on equal terms in representative elections—a one-person, one-vote standard,” id. at 522 , 681 S.E.2d at 762–63, and we thus employed a heightened scrutiny analysis, id. at 523 , 681 S.E.2d at 763 . 2023We explained that the above showing implicated the fundamental “right to vote on equal terms in representative elections—a one-person, one-vote standard,” id. at 522 , 681 S.E.2d at 762–63, and we thus employed a heightened scrutiny analysis, id. at 523 , 681 S.E.2d at 763 . | 3 | 2022–2023 |
State v. Bishop
green
2 sentences2019In order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, "the State must show that the statute serves a compelling governmental interest, and that the law is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest." Bishop , 368 N.C. at 876 , 787 S.E.2d at 819 . 2019In order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, "the State must show that the statute serves a compelling governmental interest, and that the law is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest." Bishop , 368 N.C. at 876 , 787 S.E.2d at 819 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d at 515 , the United States Supreme Court has since explained that for content-neutral regulations, the statute should be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 , 109 S. Ct. at 2756 , 105 L. 2015Ed. 2d at 515 , the United States Supreme Court has since explained that for content-neutral regulations, the statute should be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 , 109 S. Ct. at 2756 , 105 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McCullen v. Coakley
green
2 sentences2015Although the fourth O’Brien factor appears to reflect the strict scrutiny requirement that the regulation be the “least restrictive means” of carrying out a compelling state interest, McCullen, _ U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2530 , 189 L. 2015Although the fourth O’Brien factor appears to reflect the strict scrutiny requirement that the regulation be the “least restrictive means” of carrying out a compelling state interest, McCullen, ___ U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2530 , 189 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
The People v. Marquan M. / County of Albany
green
2 sentences2015Id. , 994 N.Y.S.2d 554 , 19 N.E.3d at 486 -87 . 2015Id. , 994 N.Y.S.2d 554 , 19 N.E.3d at 486 -87 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A.
neutral
1 sentence2009“If the right is constitutionally fundamental, then the court must apply a strict scrutiny analysis wherein the party seeking to apply the law must demonstrate that it serves a compelling state interest.” Id. at 535-36 , 571 S.E.2d at 59 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Clark v. Sanger Clinic, P.A.
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 357, 542 S.E.2d at 673 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce
red
2 sentences1999Austin, 494 U.S. at 658 , 108 L. 1999Austin, 494 U.S. at 658 , 108 L. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Shapiro v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). 1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County
green
2 sentences1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). 1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dunn v. Blumstein
green
2 sentences1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). 1989E.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 , 39 L.Ed. 2d 306 (one-year residency requirement to receive indigent medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972) (one-year residency requirement to exercise right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (one-year residency requirement to receive welfare benefits). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In Re Walker
green
2 sentences1981In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28 , 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972). 1981In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28 , 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.