scrutiny standard in Utah

2014It is simply to note, as the United States Supreme Court has, the relev- ance of the degree of government discrimination in the applica- tion of the standard of intermediate scrutiny. 32 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 Opinion of the Court ¶73 That said, it is important to recognize the nature and extent of the classification at issue.

2014It is simply to note, as the United States Supreme Court has, the relev- ance of the degree of government discrimination in the applica- tion of the standard of intermediate scrutiny. 32 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 Opinion of the Court ¶73 That said, it is important to recognize the nature and extent of the classification at issue.

2024Since its inception, the Berry test has stated the standard of scrutiny: it requires the court to ask whether the legislature, in abrogating a remedy, redressed a “clear social or economic evil” in a manner that was not “arbitrary or unreasonable.” Berry, 717 P.2d at 680 .

2020When parents fail to, or are incapable of, performing their parental obligations, the (Continued) 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court authorizes a court to terminate a mother’s parental rights without her consent or without proof of unfitness, abandonment, or neglect, a fundamental right has been infringed upon, and we determine the constitutionality of the infringing statute by reviewing it under the strict scrutiny standard.67 ¶38 As applied in this case, the Adoption Act authorized the district court to terminate Mother’s parental rights without her consent and without proof of pare

2020In re Adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, ¶ 14 (internal quotation 80 marks omitted). 81 UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(5)(a). 82 Id. 83 Id. 84See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, ¶¶ 30, 34 , 163 P.3d 623 (concluding that the state had a compelling interest in “speedily (Continued) 20 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Opinion of the Court 110’s strict compliance requirement to determine if it is narrowly tailored to facilitate these interests. ¶43 Under strict scrutiny’s “narrowly tailored” prong, we must determine whether the “legitimate state purpose [could] be . . . more narrowly achieved.”85 In other words, we

2020As applied to this case, section 110’s strict compliance provision fails strict scrutiny review ¶40 Because the Adoption Act authorized the district court to terminate a fundamental right in this case, we must analyze it under the strict scrutiny standard.74 Under the strict scrutiny standard, “a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”75 Section 110’s strict compliance requirement fails this test.76 Even though the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements

2020As applied to this case, section 110’s strict compliance provision fails strict scrutiny review ¶40 Because the Adoption Act authorized the district court to terminate a fundamental right in this case, we must analyze it under the strict scrutiny standard.74 Under the strict scrutiny standard, “a fundamental right is protected except in the limited circumstance in which an infringement of it is shown to be ‘narrowly tailored’ to protect a ‘compelling governmental interest.’”75 Section 110’s strict compliance requirement fails this test.76 Even though the Adoption Act’s procedural requirements

2020We do so now. ¶42 The State of Utah has a number of “compelling interest[s] in the adoption process.”80 First, “the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner.”81 Second, it has an interest “in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements.”82 And third, it has an interest “in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children.”83 These interests satisfy the strict scrutiny standard’s “compelling interest” prong.84 Accordingly, we review section __________________________________________________________ 77 In r

2020We do so now. ¶42 The State of Utah has a number of “compelling interest[s] in the adoption process.”80 First, “the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner.”81 Second, it has an interest “in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements.”82 And third, it has an interest “in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children.”83 These interests satisfy the strict scrutiny standard’s “compelling interest” prong.84 Accordingly, we review section __________________________________________________________ 77 In r

2019Specifically, the Gallivan plurality invoked Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) in support of a “fundamental” right to vote for an initiative, and thus a strict standard of scrutiny for laws impinging on that right. 2002 UT 89, ¶ 26 . ¶70 The Moore case considered an Illinois initiative procedure by which independent candidates could get on the ballot.

2019When the means used by a legislature . . . impinge upon a fundamental right, the court will examine the statute under the strict scrutiny standard.” (citation omitted)); State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808 , 812–13 (Mo. 2015) (per curiam) (applying strict scrutiny to felon-in-possession law based on Missouri Constitution’s right to bear arms provision). ¶87 However, in deciding how to evaluate legislative restrictions on the fundamental right to initiative, the Safe to Learn court chose to announce a standard of review that stops far short of strict or heightened scrutiny. ¶88 The Safe to Learn s

2019Specifically, the Gallivan plurality invoked Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) in support of a “fundamental” right to vote for an initiative, and thus a strict standard of scrutiny for laws impinging on that right. 2002 UT 89, ¶ 26 . ¶70 The Moore case considered an Illinois initiative procedure by which independent candidates could get on the ballot.

2006Id. at 253. [27] Other than Vazquez, supra n. 26, the only "evidence" offered by the State is a journalist-written collection of anecdotal accounts, Andrea Moore-Emmet, God's Brothel (2004). [28] Indeed, one scholar has concluded that "criminalization of polygamy is largely a symbolic tool that seems unlikely to either provide substantial protection to victimized adult and teenage women or to enhance state oversight and regulation of fundamentalist communities." Strassberg supra n. 20, at 411 (suggesting that "targeting the economic structures and arrangements that make these insular polygamou

2006Id. at 253. [27] Other than Vazquez, supra n. 26, the only "evidence" offered by the State is a journalist-written collection of anecdotal accounts, Andrea Moore-Emmet, God's Brothel (2004). [28] Indeed, one scholar has concluded that "criminalization of polygamy is largely a symbolic tool that seems unlikely to either provide substantial protection to victimized adult and teenage women or to enhance state oversight and regulation of fundamentalist communities." Strassberg supra n. 20, at 411 (suggesting that "targeting the economic structures and arrangements that make these insular polygamou

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

2002It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187 , 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied. [9] Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts]

1998The juvenile invoked the strict scrutiny test “on the theory that ‘liberty’ is a fundamental right.” Id. at 399 .

1998Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).

1990Code Ann. § 93-17-5 (1972). [30] Wells, 681 P.2d at 203 . [31] 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). [32] 760 P.2d at 907-08 . [33] 594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979). [34] Id. at 899 . [1] And under Utah constitutional analysis, if an interest or right of the people is given special sanctity by the constitution and that interest or right is infringed by a challenged statute, not only is a strict scrutiny standard applied, but also the presumption of validity normally accorded legislative action is reversed and the burden is imposed on the proponents of the legislation to justify the infringement.