scrutiny test in Missouri

2025Similar to Iowa’s constitution, article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution states: “Any restriction on [the right to bear arms] shall be subject to strict scrutiny . . . .” See id. at 815. 10 Alpert, 543 S.W.3d 596 -97 (quoting Clay, 481 S.W.3d at 538 ).

2016Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814 ; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897 .

2002Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring).

2002Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring).

1994The Supreme Court held that even assuming, arguendo, that all expression reached by tMs ordinance was proscribable under the “fighting words” doctrine, See Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766, 769 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), the ordmance was facially unconstitutional, because it was a content-based regulation of speech, and it failed the applicable strict scrutiny test.

1994The Supreme Court held that even assuming, arguendo, that all expression reached by tMs ordinance was proscribable under the “fighting words” doctrine, See Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766, 769 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942), the ordmance was facially unconstitutional, because it was a content-based regulation of speech, and it failed the applicable strict scrutiny test.

1993Under this test, initially articulated by Justice O’Connor in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2508-10 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2823 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the state’s intrusion into the fundamental liberty interest must “infringe substantially” or “heavily burden” that liberty interest before the strict scrutiny test will be applied.

1993Under this test, initially articulated by Justice O’Connor in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2508-10 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2823 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the state’s intrusion into the fundamental liberty interest must “infringe substantially” or “heavily burden” that liberty interest before the strict scrutiny test will be applied.

1993Under this test, initially articulated by Justice O’Connor in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2508-10 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2823 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the state’s intrusion into the fundamental liberty interest must “infringe substantially” or “heavily burden” that liberty interest before the strict scrutiny test will be applied.

1993Under this test, initially articulated by Justice O’Connor in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461-63 , 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2508-10 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2823 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the state’s intrusion into the fundamental liberty interest must “infringe substantially” or “heavily burden” that liberty interest before the strict scrutiny test will be applied.

1990Although it is questionable as to whether defendant properly raised and preserved these multifaceted constitutional challenges and therefore they should be deemed waived under State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 225 , 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990), the Court will briefly consider each of these assignments.

1990Although it is questionable as to whether defendant properly raised and preserved these multifaceted constitutional challenges and therefore they should be deemed waived under State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 225 , 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990), the Court will briefly consider each of these assignments.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1979He will receive benefits only [to] the extent that he can prove dependency, and if he is himself employed he may be eligible for no supplemental death benefit whatever.” The majority distinguishes Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal.3d 395 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 , and Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 A.D.2d 8 , 385 N.Y.S.2d 178 , on the basis that they adopt a strict scrutiny standard.

1978In McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F.Supp. 366 (W.D.Mo. 1976), the court found Missouri statutes requiring independent candidates to file petitions 188 days before the general election when party candidates did not have to file until July or August placed an impermissible burden on the First Amendment rights of the candidates and those who wished to support them and denied the candidates equal protection under the law.

1978In McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F.Supp. 366 (W.D.Mo.1976), the court found Missouri statutes requiring independent candidates to file petitions 188 days before the general election when party candidates did not have to file until July or August placed an impermissible burden on the First Amendment rights of the candidates and those who wished to support them and denied the candidates equal protection under the law.

1978Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

1978Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).