scrutiny standard in Illinois

2002“Legislation challenged in this court benefits from a presumption of constitutionality. [Citation.] Courts examining the constitutional validity of a statute will ordinarily apply the rational basis test. [Citation.] Under this test, a statute will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. [Citation.] Where challenged legislation implicates a fundamental constitutional right, however, such as the right to vote, the presumption of constitutionality is lessened and a far more demanding scrutiny is required. [Cit

2002“Legislation challenged in this court benefits from a presumption of constitutionality. [Citation.] Courts examining the constitutional validity of a statute will ordinarily apply the rational basis test. [Citation.] Under this test, a statute will be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. [Citation.] Where challenged legislation implicates a fundamental constitutional right, however, such as the right to vote, the presumption of constitutionality is lessened and a far more demanding scrutiny is required. [Cit

2004“The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection guarantee depends on the nature of the classification: those based on race or national origin, or affecting fundamental rights, receive a heightened level of review under the strict scrutiny standard, whereas economic and social welfare legislation is reviewed under the highly deferential rational basis test.” In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32 , 37, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998).

2004“The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing legislative classifications under the equal protection guarantee depends on the nature of the classification: those based on race or national origin, or affecting fundamental rights, receive a heightened level of review under the strict scrutiny standard, whereas economic and social welfare legislation is reviewed under the highly deferential rational basis test.” In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32 , 37, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998).

2014People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178 , 204 -8- (2004).

2007See People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 204 , 290 Ill.Dec. 237 , 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004) (legislature must employ least restrictive means consistent with attaining its goal).

2011Justice Breyer explained that the majority "implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly approving a set of laws-prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm sales-whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear." Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 , 128 S.Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).

2011Justice Breyer explained that the majority "implicitly, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly approving a set of laws-prohibitions on concealed weapons, forfeiture by criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm sales-whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear." Heller, 554 U.S. at 688 , 128 S.Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).

2008See In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d at 547 , 535 N.E.2d at 820 .

2008See In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d at 547 , 535 N.E.2d at 820 .

2003See Kaye, 39 Conn. Supp. at 176 , 472 A.2d at 812 .

2003See Kaye, 39 Conn. Supp. at 176 , 472 A.2d at 812 .

2000See Tully, 171 Ill. 2d at 304-05 ; People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989).

2000See Tully, 171 Ill. 2d at 304-05 ; R.G., 131 Ill. 2d at 342 .

2025Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the reviewing court determines whether “the measures employed by the legislature [are] necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and [are] narrowly tailored thereto, i.e., the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal.” In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 , 310 (2005).

2025Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the reviewing court determines whether “the measures employed by the legislature [are] necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and [are] narrowly tailored thereto, i.e., the legislature must use the least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of its goal.” In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 , 310 (2005).

2021“To withstand the strict scrutiny standard, a statute must serve a compelling state interest, and be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest, i.e., the legislature must use the least restrictive means to serve the compelling interest.” Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2000).

2007Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 476-78 .

2018Courts review content-based restrictions under a strict scrutiny standard, and the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 ; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000). ¶ 14 Compelling Government Interest ¶ 15 The State’s interest in restricting R.H.’s social media activity stems from its relationship with him as a juvenile probationer who has engaged in illicit, self-destructive activities.

2017Courts review content-based restrictions under a strict scrutiny standard, and the regulation must be "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." Id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 2226 ; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. , 529 U.S. 803 , 804, 120 S.Ct. 1878 , 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). ¶ 14 Compelling Government Interest ¶ 15 The State's interest in restricting R.H.'s social media activity stems from its relationship with him as a juvenile probationer who has engaged in illicit, self-destructive activities.

2011Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 (undue burden) (O'Connor, J., with Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring), 920 (undue burden) (Stevens, J., concurring), 926 (strict scrutiny) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

2011Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 (undue burden) (O'Connor, J., with Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring), 920 (undue burden) (Stevens, J., concurring), 926 (strict scrutiny) (Blackmun, J., concurring).

2011I, § 6 (prohibiting only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy). ¶ 105 As a result, Illinois privacy jurisprudence is generally not phrased in terms of "a rational basis test," "a strict scrutiny test," or "an undue burden test." Our supreme court has made clear that, once a right to privacy is established under the Illinois Constitution, the sole test for our courts is "whether the state's invasion of individual privacy is reasonable." Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 321 , 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 .

2011I, § 6 (prohibiting only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy). ¶ 105 As a result, Illinois privacy jurisprudence is generally not phrased in terms of "a rational basis test," "a strict scrutiny test," or "an undue burden test." Our supreme court has made clear that, once a right to privacy is established under the Illinois Constitution, the sole test for our courts is "whether the state's invasion of individual privacy is reasonable." Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 321 , 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 .

2011Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 321 , 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 (balancing the individual's interest against the state's interest with a test of reasonableness); Nesbitt, 405 Ill.App.3d at 830 , 345 Ill.Dec. 161 , 938 N.E.2d 600 (considering only the "reasonableness" of the state's privacy intrusion); In re Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 392 , 178 Ill.Dec. 406 , 604 N.E.2d 929 .

2011Caballes, 221 Ill.2d at 321 , 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 (balancing the individual's interest against the state's interest with a test of reasonableness); Nesbitt, 405 Ill.App.3d at 830 , 345 Ill.Dec. 161 , 938 N.E.2d 600 (considering only the "reasonableness" of the state's privacy intrusion); In re Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill.2d at 392 , 178 Ill.Dec. 406 , 604 N.E.2d 929 .

2007People v. Shephard, 152 Ill.2d 489, 500 , 178 Ill.Dec. 724 , 605 N.E.2d 518 (1992).

2007People v. Shephard, 152 Ill.2d 489, 500 , 178 Ill.Dec. 724 , 605 N.E.2d 518 (1992).

2026See, e.g., In re R.H., 2017 IL App (1st) 171332, ¶ 19 (state had compelling interest in restricting minor probationer’s social media activity that was closely related to minor’s crimes, as a means of preventing minor from engaging in additional criminal acts). ¶ 33 Third, with regard to the question of whether an order under the Act may restrict FOIA activity, we agree with Petitioner that the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949 , is instructive.

2026See, e.g., In re R.H., 2017 IL App (1st) 171332, ¶ 19 (state had compelling interest in restricting minor probationer’s social media activity that was closely related to minor’s crimes, as a means of preventing minor from engaging in additional criminal acts). ¶ 33 Third, with regard to the question of whether an order under the Act may restrict FOIA activity, we agree with Petitioner that the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949 , is instructive.