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28 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wadsworth v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Driscoll, ¶ 18; MCIA I, ¶ 16 (“Legislation that implicates a fundamental constitutional right is evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard, whereby the government must show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”) (citation omitted); Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 302 , 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (1996) (“The most stringent standard, strict scrutiny, is imposed when the action complained of interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.” (citations omitted)); Mont. 2022See Driscoll, ¶ 18; MCIA I, ¶ 16 (“Legislation that implicates a fundamental constitutional right is evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard, whereby the government must show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”) (citation omitted); Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 302 , 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (1996) (“The most stringent standard, strict scrutiny, is imposed when the action complained of interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.” (citations omitted)); Mont. | 2 | 3 |
Shapiro v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (race); Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (alienage); Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U.S. 633 , 68 S.Ct. 269 , 92 L.Ed. 249 (national origin); Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (fundamental right to travel interstate); Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (fundamental right to vote). 1989See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia (1967), 388 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (race); Graham v. Richardson (1971), 403 U.S. 365 , 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (alienage); Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U.S. 633 , 68 S.Ct. 269 , 92 L.Ed. 249 (national origin); Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (fundamental right to travel interstate); Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (fundamental right to vote). | 2 | 3 |
Heisler v. Hines Motor Co.green2 sentences2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). 2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ricegreen2 sentences1984"Therefore, the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this case is the strict scrutiny test." Rice, 655 P.2d at 1154 (citations omitted). 1984“Therefore, the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this case is the strict scrutiny test.” Rice, 655 P.2d at 1154 (Citations omitted.) A variety of equal protection tests other than strict scrutiny has been applied in cases where infringement of physical liberty was claimed by adults. | 2 | 2 |
Dunn v. Blumsteingreen2 sentences2003“Under that standard, [suspect] legislation is ‘unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest”.’” Johnson, 241 Mont. at 4, 894 P.2d at 273 -74 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 342 , 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284 ) (emphasis added). ¶16 In Kramer, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a law limiting the right to vote in school district elections to property owners or parents of children enrolled in the local public schools. 2003“Under that standard, [suspect] legislation is ‘unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest”.’” Johnson, 241 Mont. at 4, 894 P.2d at 273 -74 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 342 , 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284 ) (emphasis added). ¶16 In Kramer, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a law limiting the right to vote in school district elections to property owners or parents of children enrolled in the local public schools. | 1 | 4 |
Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Servicegreen2 sentences2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). 2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). | 1 | 2 |
Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Countygreen2 sentences2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). 2014Henry , ¶ 29; Heisler v. Hines Motor Co., 282 Mont. 270, 279 , 937 P.2d 45, 50 (1997) (citing Stratemeyer v. Lincoln Co., 259 Mont. 147, 151 , 855 P.2d 506, 509 (1993); Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 42 , 744 P.2d 895, 897 (1987)). | 1 | 2 |
Planned Parenthood v. Stategreen1 sentence2025Planned Parenthood of Mont., 2024 MT 178, ¶ 16 (citing Weems, ¶ 34; Armstrong, ¶ 34). | 1 | 1 |
Planned Parenthood v. Stategreen1 sentence2024The Providers assert the District Court correctly held the provisions likely violate the right to privacy by infringing the right to access abortion without addressing a medically acknowledged, bona fide health risk. 21 ¶26 Under a strict scrutiny analysis of a provision alleged to infringe on a patient’s fundamental right to abortion care in Montana, the State must demonstrate the provision is “narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling interest—‘a medically acknowledged, [bona fide] health risk, clearly and convincingly demonstrated.’” Planned Parenthood of Mont., 2022 MT 157, ¶ 20 (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Grutter v. Bollingerred2 sentences2023For one, neither the State nor Mount points to any evidence that the challenged law actually furthers this asserted interest.9 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 , 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (challenged state 9 To the contrary, courts have noted some growing doubt regarding the efficacy of sex offender registration requirements in general. 2023For one, neither the State nor Mount points to any evidence that the challenged law actually furthers this asserted interest.9 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 , 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (challenged state 9 To the contrary, courts have noted some growing doubt regarding the efficacy of sex offender registration requirements in general. | 1 | 1 |
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smithred2 sentences2012These distinctions lead us to reject the strict scrutiny analysis from Lukumi Babalu as the appropriate lens through which to analyze the Colony’s claim. ¶22 We instead apply the standard used by the Court in Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 , 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990). 2012These distinctions lead us to reject the strict scrutiny analysis from Lukumi Babalu as the appropriate lens through which to analyze the Colony’s claim. ¶22 We instead apply the standard used by the Court in Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 , 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2012RIGHT TO PRIVACY 2 In State v. Nelson, 2008 MT 359, ¶¶ 27, 33 , 346 Mont. 366 , 195 P.3d 826 , we described the use of medical marijuana as a “right.” However, the right to use marijuana for medical purposes was limited to use in accordance with the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act, and even though the right existed, our conclusion specifically noted that there may be “restrictions on lawful medical marijuana use.” Nelson, ¶ 33. 2012RIGHT TO PRIVACY 2 In State v. Nelson, 2008 MT 359, ¶¶ 27, 33 , 346 Mont. 366 , 195 P.3d 826 , we described the use of medical marijuana as a “right.” However, the right to use marijuana for medical purposes was limited to use in accordance with the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act, and even though the right existed, our conclusion specifically noted that there may be “restrictions on lawful medical marijuana use.” Nelson, ¶ 33. | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 34 , 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 34 , 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 34 . 2004See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 34 , 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 34 , 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 34 . | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Killingsworthgreen2 sentences2003Additionally, the F ourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons equal protection of the laws. ¶15 This Court has noted that “[bjecause voting rights cases involve a fundamental political right, the [U. S.] Supreme Court generally evaluates state legislation apportioning representation and regulating voter qualifications under the strict scrutiny standard.” Johnson v. Killingsworth (1995), 271 Mont. 1, 4 , 894 P.2d 272, 273 (citing, among others, Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ). 2003Additionally, the F ourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons equal protection of the laws. ¶15 This Court has noted that “[bjecause voting rights cases involve a fundamental political right, the [U. S.] Supreme Court generally evaluates state legislation apportioning representation and regulating voter qualifications under the strict scrutiny standard.” Johnson v. Killingsworth (1995), 271 Mont. 1, 4 , 894 P.2d 272, 273 (citing, among others, Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Loving v. Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re S.L.M.
green
2 sentences2024S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 34 , 951 P.2d at 1372 . 1999Matter of S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 33 , 951 P.2d at 1371 . | 2 | 1999–2024 |
Matter of SLM
green
2 sentences2024S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 34 , 951 P.2d at 1372 . 1999Matter of S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 33 , 951 P.2d at 1371 . | 2 | 1999–2024 |
Gryczan v. State
green
2 sentences2024For this reason, legislation infringing the exercise of the right of privacy must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis; that is, “the legislation must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest.” Armstrong, ¶ 34; Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 449 , 942 P.2d at 122 . 2024For this reason, legislation infringing the exercise of the right of privacy must be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis; that is, “the legislation must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest.” Armstrong, ¶ 34; Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 449 , 942 P.2d at 122 . | 2 | 2000–2024 |
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15
green
2 sentences2003Additionally, the F ourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons equal protection of the laws. ¶15 This Court has noted that “[bjecause voting rights cases involve a fundamental political right, the [U. S.] Supreme Court generally evaluates state legislation apportioning representation and regulating voter qualifications under the strict scrutiny standard.” Johnson v. Killingsworth (1995), 271 Mont. 1, 4 , 894 P.2d 272, 273 (citing, among others, Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ). 2003Additionally, the F ourteenth Amendment guarantees all persons equal protection of the laws. ¶15 This Court has noted that “[bjecause voting rights cases involve a fundamental political right, the [U. S.] Supreme Court generally evaluates state legislation apportioning representation and regulating voter qualifications under the strict scrutiny standard.” Johnson v. Killingsworth (1995), 271 Mont. 1, 4 , 894 P.2d 272, 273 (citing, among others, Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ). | 2 | 1995–2003 |
Matter of CH
green
2 sentences1997As in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941 , we must therefore apply a strict scrutiny analysis and determine whether there is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify such an infringement and whether such an infringement is consistent with the mandates of Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution. 1997As in Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d at 941 , we must therefore apply a strict scrutiny analysis and determine whether there is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify such an infringement and whether such an infringement is consistent with the mandates of Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
green
2 sentences2012This determination prompted the District Court to analyze the statute based on the strict scrutiny standard applied in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 2012This determination prompted the District Court to analyze the statute based on the strict scrutiny standard applied in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 , 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lemon v. Kurtzman
red
2 sentences2012The court’s strict scrutiny analysis led it to reject the Department’s claim of any compelling state interest being served by Sections 6 and 7. ¶14 With respect to the Colony’s Establishment Clause claim, the court purported to apply the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 , 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). 2012The court’s strict scrutiny analysis led it to reject the Department’s claim of any compelling state interest being served by Sections 6 and 7. ¶14 With respect to the Colony’s Establishment Clause claim, the court purported to apply the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 , 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality
green
2 sentences2008DEQ, 1999 MT 248 , 296 Mont. 207 , 988 P.2d 1236 (hereinafter MEIC), environmental rights stated in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution are fundamental rights, any statute or rule implicating the environment must be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis by the courts. 2008DEQ, 1999 MT 248 , 296 Mont. 207 , 988 P.2d 1236 (hereinafter MEIC), environmental rights stated in Article II, Section 3 and Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution are fundamental rights, any statute or rule implicating the environment must be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis by the courts. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Renee
green
2 sentences2001Physical liberty is a fundamental right which would normally trigger either a strict scrutiny analysis, State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 26 , 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 26 , 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 26 , or, in the case of prisoners, application of the “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest” standard. 2001Physical liberty is a fundamental right which would normally trigger either a strict scrutiny analysis, State v. Renee, 1999 MT 135, ¶ 26 , 294 Mont. 527, ¶ 26 , 983 P.2d 893, ¶ 26 , or, in the case of prisoners, application of the “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest” standard. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Tigner v. Texas
green
2 sentences1999It has nevertheless long been a staple of American jurisprudence that “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas (1940), 310 U.S. 141, 147 , 60 S.Ct. 879, 882 , 84 L.Ed. 1124, 1128 . ¶28 We need not determine whether the sentencing statutes for nonviolent felony offenders pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review. 1999It has nevertheless long been a staple of American jurisprudence that “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas (1940), 310 U.S. 141, 147 , 60 S.Ct. 879, 882 , 84 L.Ed. 1124, 1128 . ¶28 We need not determine whether the sentencing statutes for nonviolent felony offenders pass muster under the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Thomas v. Allegany County Board of Education
green
2 sentences1997The court concluded that the school district had satisfied the compelling state interest test in view of the “de minimi burden on the appellant’s freedom of religion and the legitimate interest in avoiding administrative inefficiency.” Thomas, 443 A.2d at 626 . 1997The court concluded that the school district had satisfied the compelling state interest test in view of the "de minimi burden on the appellant's freedom of religion and the legitimate interest in avoiding administrative inefficiency." Thomas, 443 A.2d at 626 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
John Woodland v. City of Houston
green
2 sentences1996Woodland v. City of Houston (5th Cir.1991), 940 F.2d 134, 138 . 1996Woodland v. City of Houston (5th Cir. 1991), 940 F.2d 134, 138 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sadler v. Connolly
green
2 sentences1995In arguing for application of the strict scrutiny standard to the freeholder requirement at issue here, Killingsworth contends that this Court “wishe[d] to use” that standard in Sadler v. Connolly (1978), 175 Mont. 484 , 575 P.2d 51 . 1995In arguing for application of the strict scrutiny standard to the freeholder requirement at issue here, Killingsworth contends that this Court “wishe[d] to use” that standard in Sadler v. Connolly (1978), 175 Mont. 484 , 575 P.2d 51 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District
green
2 sentences1995Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 , 93 S.Ct. at 1229-30 . 1995Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 , 93 S.Ct. at 1229-30 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
2 sentences1995See Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 342 , 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284 ; Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ; Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 562 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 527 . 1995See Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 342 , 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 284 ; Kramer v. Union School District (1969), 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 , 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 589 ; Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 562 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 527 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Haguer v. Committee for Industrial Organization green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Oyama v. California green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Shelton v. Tucker green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Graham v. Richardson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Stanley v. Georgia green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Wisconsin v. Yoder green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Pfost v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Widmar v. Vincent
green
2 sentences1989See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (interstate travel); Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (voting); Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 U.S. 557 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (privacy); Widmar v. Vincent (1981), 454 U.S. 263 , 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (speech); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (press); Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (religion); Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U.S. 479 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (association and belief); and 1989See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (interstate travel); Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (voting); Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 U.S. 557 , 89 S.Ct. 1243 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (privacy); Widmar v. Vincent (1981), 454 U.S. 263 , 102 S.Ct. 269 , 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (speech); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), 464 U.S. 501 , 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (press); Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 , 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (religion); Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U.S. 479 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (association and belief); and | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Butte Community Union v. Lewis green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Oberg v. City of Billings green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bearden v. Georgia green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| McGinnis v. Royster green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| O'Connor v. Donaldson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Matter of Estate of Merkel green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.