scrutiny analysis in Iowa

2023Under the strict scrutiny standard, the government must prove the challenged law is “narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling state interest.” Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817 .

2022Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2005).

2022IX); see id. at 490–91 (emphasizing that while the Ninth Amendment was rarely discussed, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,” quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803), and while some might regard the Ninth Amendment a “recent discovery,” it “has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold” (alteration in original)). 186Id. at 495. 120 On standard of review, Justice Goldberg wrote that in a long series of cases involving fundamental rights, the Court had held that the rights may not be abridge

2022IX); see id. at 490–91 (emphasizing that while the Ninth Amendment was rarely discussed, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,” quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803), and while some might regard the Ninth Amendment a “recent discovery,” it “has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold” (alteration in original)). 186Id. at 495. 120 On standard of review, Justice Goldberg wrote that in a long series of cases involving fundamental rights, the Court had held that the rights may not be abridge

2022IX); see id. at 490–91 (emphasizing that while the Ninth Amendment was rarely discussed, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,” quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803), and while some might regard the Ninth Amendment a “recent discovery,” it “has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold” (alteration in original)). 186Id. at 495. 120 On standard of review, Justice Goldberg wrote that in a long series of cases involving fundamental rights, the Court had held that the rights may not be abridge

2022IX); see id. at 490–91 (emphasizing that while the Ninth Amendment was rarely discussed, “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,” quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803), and while some might regard the Ninth Amendment a “recent discovery,” it “has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold” (alteration in original)). 186Id. at 495. 120 On standard of review, Justice Goldberg wrote that in a long series of cases involving fundamental rights, the Court had held that the rights may not be abridge

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968–69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and “provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191 , 1195–96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968-69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and "provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1191, 1195-96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that ”[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d at

2009See People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (discussing a substantive due process challenge to Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998, which requires imposition of indefinite sentence upon sex offender, and rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis because “[a]n adult offender has no fundamental liberty interest in freedom from incarceration”).

2009See People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (discussing a substantive due process challenge to Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998, which requires imposition of indefinite sentence upon sex offender, and rejecting a strict scrutiny analysis because “[a]n adult offender has no fundamental liberty interest in freedom from incarceration”).

2002Here, the mother claims the strict scrutiny standard applies because the appeal affects her “fundamental ‘liberty interest in the care, custody and control of her child.’ ” See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted).

2002Here, the mother claims the strict scrutiny standard applies because the appeal affects her "fundamental `liberty interest in the care, custody and control of her child.'" See In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted).

2000When judicial review is based upon strict scrutiny, “the statute will survive a constitutional challenge only if it is shown that the statute is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989).

1992See id. at 367, 369 .

1990We apply instead the traditional rational basis test for the reasons articulated in Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1986), and Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Iowa 1980).

1986We apply instead the traditional rational basis test for the reasons articulated in Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1986) and Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Iowa 1980).

1989Shapiro , at 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1333 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 617 (1969).

1989Shapiro , at 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1333 , 22 L.Ed.2d at 617 (1969).

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968–69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and “provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191 , 1195–96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968-69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and "provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1191, 1195-96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that ”[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d at

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968–69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and “provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191 , 1195–96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968-69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and "provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1191, 1195-96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that ”[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d at

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968–69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and “provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191 , 1195–96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that “[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d

2015Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 968-69 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations under its state constitution while noting that Alaska’s constitution has a privacy provision and "provides more protection of individual privacy rights than the United States Constitution”); In re T.W., 551 So.2d at 1191, 1195-96 (applying a strict scrutiny analysis under the Florida Constitution, which provides that ”[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein”); Women of the State of Minn., 542 N.W.2d at

2026State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 383–84 (La. 2014) (quoting State in re J.M., 144 So. 3d 853, 860 (La. 2014)).

2026Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d at 385.

2006In In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2000), we did not decide whether a detainee’s liberty interest is fundamental because we concluded chapter 229A passed muster even when judged under a strict scrutiny standard.

2006Id. at 286 .7 We also rejected Garren’s claim that substantive due process required placement of SVPs in the “least restrictive placement.” Id. at 285 (noting that “even if such a right did exist, it is not a ‘fundamental right’ ” (citation omitted)). 7 Unlike the petitioners, Garren presented an equal protection challenge.

2006City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 , 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-42 (1971).

2006City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 , 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-42 (1971).

2026The strict scrutiny standard is a wholly judicial construct developed by courts, for courts, as a tool to “determine whether the government action infringing the fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002).

2026State v. Eberhardt, 145 So. 3d 377, 383–84 (La. 2014) (quoting State in re J.M., 144 So. 3d 853, 860 (La. 2014)).

2025The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the conviction survived the strict scrutiny challenge because “it is constitutionally permissible for the state to treat the entirety of possessing illegal drugs and a firearm as a more serious crime than possessing illegal drugs alone.” Id. at 982.

2025The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the conviction survived the strict scrutiny challenge because “it is constitutionally permissible for the state to treat the entirety of possessing illegal drugs and a firearm as a more serious crime than possessing illegal drugs alone.” Id. at 982 .