scrutiny analysis in Texas

2020See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 .

2020See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 .

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2019In applying the strict scrutiny standard to Section 21.15(b)(1)—and holding that Section 21.15(b)(1) did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional on its face in violation of the First Amendment—the Court of Criminal Appeals in Thompson indicated that Section 21.15(b)(2) would indeed meet the strict scrutiny standard: One need only look at the next subsection of the statute— § 21.15(b)(2)—to see an example of a provision that is in fact narrowly drawn to protect substantial privacy interests—the provision that makes it a crime to “photograph or . . . record[] . . . a visual image of

2016Texas Penal Code Sec. 42.01(a)(8) is a content-based regulation of protected expressive 15 See generally United States v. Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 16 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). 17 Ex Parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 348 (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. _____ , 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 18 Id. 7 speech that does not pass the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny test in that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2009A content-neutral restriction on speech withstands intermediate scrutiny “if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)).

2009A content-neutral restriction on speech withstands intermediate scrutiny “if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)).

2009Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2009Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2020Appellees analogize these circumstances to those in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and argue that Harper mandates a strict scrutiny standard of review.

2020Appellees analogize these circumstances to those in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and argue that Harper mandates a strict scrutiny standard of review.

2009A content-neutral restriction on speech withstands intermediate scrutiny “if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)).

2009A content-neutral restriction on speech withstands intermediate scrutiny “if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.” Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)).

2006See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (assuming that freedom of movement is a fundamental right and subjecting a Dallas ordinance restricting minors' right to freedom of movement to strict scrutiny for infringing on that right). 9 In determining whether a law passes constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny standard, a court will ask whether the law "promotes a compelling governmental interest and, if so, whether the [law] is narrowly tailored such that there are no less restrictive means to effectuate the desired end." Id.

2006See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (assuming that freedom of movement is a fundamental right and subjecting a Dallas ordinance restricting minors' right to freedom of movement to strict scrutiny for infringing on that right). 9 In determining whether a law passes constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny standard, a court will ask whether the law "promotes a compelling governmental interest and, if so, whether the [law] is narrowly tailored such that there are no less restrictive means to effectuate the desired end." Id.

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2020See Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 .

2016Texas Penal Code Sec. 42.01(a)(8) is a content-based regulation of protected expressive 15 See generally United States v. Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 16 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). 17 Ex Parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 348 (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. _____ , 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). 18 Id. 7 speech that does not pass the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny test in that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

2019See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); see also Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim.

2016See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 , 130 S.Ct. 1577 , 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010); Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex.Crim.App.2013).

2005State v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 266 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (analyzing Rule 1.08 violation). “[W]hen a client attacks the validity of a transaction with a lawyer, the lawyer has the burden of justifying the transaction.” Id. at 267 .

2005State v. Dolenz, 3 S.W.3d 260, 266 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (analyzing Rule 1.08 violation). “[W]hen a client attacks the validity of a transaction with a lawyer, the lawyer has the burden of justifying the transaction.” Id. at 267 .

2000See Mercer , 538 S.W.2d at 206 .

2000See Mercer, 538 S.W.2d at 206 .

2000Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); San Antonio Indep.

2000Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). 12 A district court may be reversed under this standard only when a reviewing court finds that “the court acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.” Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2021Construing the Statute As Charged Having found that the statutory provision at issue is content based, we agree with the court of appeals that Section 21.16(b) is subject to strict scrutiny.70 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a regulation is justified only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.71 In this context, a regulation is “narrowly drawn” if it uses the least restrictive means of achieving the government interest.72 If a less restrictive means of meeting the compelling interest could be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the st

2015Id.

1999Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 , 98 S.Ct. 673, 681 , 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (legal requirements burdening state citizens’ rights to marry subject to strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause) with Turner, 482 U.S. at 97, 107 S.Ct. at 2266 (prison regulations burdening inmates’ rights to marry are subject to “reasonably related to penological interests” review under Equal Protection Clause).

2006Specifically, TRFRA requires a strict scrutiny analysis, whereas a challenge to a prison regulation under the United States Constitution must demonstrate that the regulation is not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 187 (Tex.2001) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)).

2006Specifically, TRFRA requires a strict scrutiny analysis, whereas a challenge to a prison regulation under the United States Constitution must demonstrate that the regulation is not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 187 (Tex.2001) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 , 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)).

2005Standard of Review The right to work in a particular profession is not a fundamental right that requires review under a strict scrutiny standard. 9 See Mauldin v. Tex. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam'rs , 94 S.W.3d 867 , 872 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet).

2005Standard of Review The right to work in a particular profession is not a tidamental right that requires review under a strict scrutiny standard. ’ See Mauldin v. Tex. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam ‘rs, 94 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet).

2024See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404 , 418–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d).

2022See Perry, 483 S.W.3d at 902 .